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THOMISTIC SOTERIOLOGY AND THE MYSTICAL BODY



THERE is perhaps no theological problem of more actual import today than that of the Mystical Body. In recent years excellent treatises have been written on this subject and Pope Pius XII has placed in relief its doctrinal and spiritual importance in the encyclical *Mystici Corporis*. The content of the doctrine of the Mystical Body is essentially psychological and is expressed in vital, realistic and impressive formulas. St. Paul, for example, repeats more than once that Christ is our life,¹ that Christ is formed in us,² that we are the fullness of Christ,³ and that all of us form with Him one new man,⁴ one Christ.⁵ St. Augustine repeats the Pauline expressions and adds other that are extraordinarily expressive: Christ is not only the Head, but also the body; the total or

¹ Gal. 2:20.

³ Eph. 1:23.

⁵ I Cor. 12:12.

² Gal. 4:19.

⁴ Eph. 2:13-15.

integral Christ consists of head and body; Christ is ourselves and we are Christ; He and we form the one beloved Son of God.

Some have said that scholastic theology and its great masters were not able rightly to develop the dogma of our incorporation in Christ because this dogma has an eminently and vital psychological character, whereas the Scholastics were given more to the study of *being* rather than *life*. They grasped very well the dogmas of the Trinity, the hypostatic union, and the real presence in the Eucharist because in expressing these dogmas they could use the metaphysical notions of relation, subsistence, hypostasis, person, essence and nature. But they were not prepared to expound a truth of so distinct a character as that of our vivification through Christ. This is especially true because the revealed formulas which express this dogma do not have as determined and concrete a meaning as do those which express the other dogmatic truths just mentioned; and the theologians of the Schools loved precision and avoided vague and indefinite formulas. Hence it is not strange that the doctrine of the Mystical Body should have suffered an eclipse in the time of Scholasticism and that we should find it necessary to return to the Fathers to obtain a more finished and exact idea.

Such opinions have frequently been expressed but they are far from being exact. The truth of the matter is that scholastic theology expresses the one and the same truth with more exact formulas. Therefore, instead of speaking of the "full Christ" or the "total Christ," it speaks of the "mystical person of Christ." The word "person" gives a much more precise meaning than totality or plenitude. Furthermore, the Scholastics do not say that Christ is our life, but that our grace is a participation in His grace.

Restricting ourselves to St. Thomas, we can state with all assurance that the Angelic Doctor has effected a remarkable synthesis of all soteriology by using the doctrine of our incorporation in Christ. For the redemption has two aspects: the first is called objective redemption or redemption effected; the second is called subjective or applied redemption. The first

was realized by the works which Christ performed while in the world; the second, by the sacraments which He instituted to apply to us the fruits of objective redemption.

The realization of the work of redemption is explained by the fact that Christ is the Head of humanity and therefore, endowed with capital grace. In fact, the redemption was effected by the classical five-fold way mentioned in theology: the way of merit, of atonement, of redemption, of sacrifice, and of efficiency.⁶ And if Christ was able to merit, atone and sacrifice for us, and to redeem us and accomplish our salvation efficiently, it was because He possessed capital grace and because we are His members.⁷

Subjective or applied redemption is also explained by the headship of Christ and our incorporation in Him as Head. This redemption is principally realized through the sacraments. Sacramental grace sanctifies or redeems us not only because it bestows on us the divinizing element and makes us sharers in the divine life, but also because it bestows on us the Christianizing element, making us share in the perfections of Christ in Whom it incorporates us by means of the sacraments, as St. Thomas teaches.⁸

Therefore, not only did the doctrine of our incorporation in Christ suffer no eclipse during the period of Scholasticism, but on the contrary, St. Thomas so much appreciated its importance that the entire third part of the *Summa*, all of his Christology, is explained only on the presupposition of Christ's headship and our incorporation in Him as His members. Even more, St. Thomas summarizes the whole of Pauline theology in this one truth, for as he says in the prologue of his commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul:

He wrote fourteen Epistles, of which nine contain teachings directed to the churches of the Gentiles; four, to prelates and princes; and

⁶ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48.

⁷ In regard to merit, cf. III, q. 19, a. 4; q. 48, a. 1; concerning satisfaction, cf. III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1; in regard to liberation, cf. I-II, q. 49, a. 1; concerning sacrifice, cf. III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 3; and concerning efficiency, cf. III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.

⁸ III, q. 62, a. 2.

one, to the people of Israel. And all these teachings concern the grace of Christ, which can be considered in three ways: first, according to the manner in which it is in the Head, that is, in Christ, and this the Apostle expounds in his Epistle to the Hebrews; secondly, according to the manner in which it is in the principal members of the Mystical Body, and he does this in his Epistles directed to the prelates; thirdly, according to the manner in which it is in the Mystical Body itself, which is the Church, and he uses this in his Epistles to the Gentiles.⁹

We believe, then, that it is not only useful but even necessary to expound the doctrine of the Mystical Body by following the authoritative and exceptional methods of St. Thomas. He clarifies the dogma with a special light and he would wish us to be able to see and to make known something of what he himself has taught us. To follow some kind of order, we shall divide our treatment of the subject into four sections: 1) In what sense Christ is Head of the Mystical Body; 2) The vivifying element of the Head and the members of this Body; 3) How the life of the Head is communicated to the members; 4) The means of communicating this life.

We shall see that St. Thomas is original in regard to the first point; namely, in determining the element by which the dignity of headship is attributed to Christ. And since his doctrinal summary is not an empirical summary of affirmations and proofs, but follows a rigorously logical process, we shall see this originality necessarily reflected in the other succeeding points.

1. CHRIST AS HEAD OF THE MYSTICAL BODY

Christ is a very complex being. There are in Him parts which are substantially divine, such as the nature of God and the Person of the Word; there are other parts which are substantially human, such as His body and the human soul which informs it. Finally, there are accidental elements, such as habitual grace, the infused virtues, capital grace, human perfections, etc.

⁹ *Comment. in Epist. Sti. Pauli, Proem.*

When it is stated that Christ is Head of the Mystical Body there is no doubt that this headship pertains to Him in His totality: as man united to the divine Person and with all the natural and supernatural perfections which adorn Him. But this is not what we are seeking; rather we are seeking the formal reason why this particular subject or totality is constituted Head of the human race. For St. Thomas this formality is not something *substantially* divine; it is neither the divine nature nor the Person of the Word. It is a divine but *accidental* perfection which, as accidental, is received in Christ's human nature, for God has no accidents. Consequently, the headship is attributed to Christ insofar as He is a man perfected by a divine element which is distinct from the Person of the Word. In other words, Christ is Head insofar as He is a man supernaturalized by means of capital grace and not precisely as the incarnate or humanized God.

This does not mean that the headship of Christ prescind from the hypostatic union. It presupposes and connotes it, since headship is given Him as a consequence of this union. But to presuppose and connote the hypostatic union is not the same as to say that this union formally constitutes the headship. Christ's headship is not constituted by the hypostatic union and therefore it is not predicated of Him precisely as the God-man; rather it is constituted by capital grace and is predicated of Christ considered as man. This is the thought of St. Thomas. He alone thought this way in his day and to reach this conclusion he had to rectify the traditional teaching of the Schools.

The common opinion in the time of St. Thomas was that the headship pertained to Christ by reason of His double status as God and man. Even the Angelic Doctor, in his early writings, did not disagree with this manner of thinking, although even at the beginning he points out with sufficient clarity what appeared to him to be incompatible in this line of reasoning. But in the *Summa Theologiae* he corrects this thought completely.

Various enumerations of the requisites for headship are still

preserved, for the writers of the Middle Ages composed more than one. Nevertheless it is not difficult to comprise all of them in two elements: *primacy of life in relation to the members* and *homogeneity of nature with the members*. We presuppose that one is here treating of a supernatural life and nature; more concretely, of a life and nature in the order of grace. Hence headship belongs to one who has the primacy of supernatural life and at the same time possesses a unity of nature and life with those of whom he is said to be the head.

The primacy of supernatural life has many manifestations, but these are the principal ones: primacy of order, of perfection, of external influence or government, of internal influence or life. Whoever exercises any of these four types of primacy fulfills the first of the two conditions required for headship. If moreover, he possesses the second—homogeneity of nature with the members—he can in all exactness be called the head.

Now according to many early theologians, primacy belongs to Christ by reason of His status as God and He enjoys homogeneity of nature with us by reason of His condition as man. Consequently, headship is attributed to the *composite*, the union of the divine Person and human nature. He is Head principally by reason of His divine Person and secondarily by reason of His status as man, or vice versa, according as one maintains that the headship demands more primacy than homogeneity or, on the contrary, that homogeneity plays a more important role than primacy. Likewise, there are not lacking those who would say that the dignity of headship is equally divided between the divine Person and the human nature because both are equally necessary for the capital dignity. Such were the various opinions in vogue when St. Thomas approached the question.

If one considers the condition of primacy, says the Angelic Doctor, it can be said that Christ is Head because He is God. Actually, since He is God, He has the fulness of divinity and for that reason He is first in the order of perfection; He exercises over us a vital and sanctifying influence, and He governs us, directing us to Himself. Thus one can find in Christ the

four types of primacy listed above: "Christ can be said to be the Head . . . according to His divine nature because according to that nature He has the plenitude of divinity, as the Apostle says (Colos. 2:9), whence He is over all things God, blessed forever (Rom. 9:5) and from Him as God comes all spiritual grace to us and likewise as God He directs us to Himself."¹⁰

But the four manifestations of primacy in the divine life are also found in the Father and the Holy Ghost and for this reason the other two Persons have an equal right to be called Head of the Church. St. Thomas states this in the same article.

Finally, these four manifestations of primacy are also verified of Christ's humanity, though less perfectly, and therefore His humanity also enjoys primacy of order, of perfection, of influence and of government. It enjoys primacy of order because it occupies the first place from the moment that it was elevated to hypostatic union with the Person of the Word; of perfection, because just as all the senses are radicated in the head, so in Christ-man are contained all graces and gifts; of vital influence, because from Him we receive the sense of faith and the movement of charity, as St. John states when he affirms that through Jesus Christ come all grace and truth; of government, because by His example and doctrine He directs us in our daily advance to God.¹¹

However, the second condition required for headship is found only in the humanity of Christ. The head and the members must be of the same nature and the same life; thus the head of man and his members enjoy human nature and human life, though each exercises different functions, some noble, others lowly. We use as a starting point the fact that the nature of the members is human and that man's supernatural life is accidental or participated. It is, therefore, necessary to approach Christ as man, sanctified by grace, to find this condition of homogeneity with the members. Christ's humanity had a divine personality, but His formal sanctification *in esse naturae* was not effected by the Person of the Word, but by individual and capital accidental grace.

¹⁰ *III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

It is necessary to recall at this point the Thomistic doctrine on the specific unity of sanctifying grace. All sanctifying grace belongs to the one ontological species and there are strong reasons in support of this affirmation which it is not necessary to treat here. From this principle is deduced the fact that the capital grace which formally sanctified the humanity of Christ placed it in a category of sanctity or life specifically identical with that in which men are when they possess sanctifying grace. We say "life specifically identical" but it is to be noted that we do not refer to an identity of the *moral species*. Under one and the same ontological or metaphysical species there are various moral species and this diversity exists in sanctifying grace. The capital grace of the Head and the individual grace of the members belong to diverse moral species, just as do the specifically human life of a member of society who has the office of commanding and the life of him whose duty it is to obey.

All this leads to the following logical conclusion: the homogeneity of life which must prevail between the Head and the members is not actually verified between God and ourselves because God has substantial divinity and ours is accidental. On the other hand, this homogeneity is verified between ourselves and Christ the God-man; hence He must be Head insofar as He is man. But the primacy, and especially the primacy of vital influence which is more specifically capital, although it is verified in both Christ-man and Christ-God, is especially verified in Christ-God.

In the time of St. Thomas it was common to attribute a *moral* efficacy to the humanity of Christ in the communication of grace, reserving the *efficient* or *factual* (*factiva*) efficacy to the divinity. Through His human nature supernaturalized by capital grace Christ merits, satisfies and sacrifices and all this is to cooperate in a moral manner; but He confers grace through His divine power and this is to intervene in an efficient manner. Now since the influence which the Head exercises on the members is efficient and physical, besides being moral, it follows that the primacy of the vital influence re-

quired for headship would not be fully given in the humanity of Christ. Therefore, it was necessary to appeal to His divinity and this explains the prevalent opinion that Christ is Head of the Mystical Body both as God and as man, but *per modum unius*.

As we have already seen, in his commentary on the *Sentences* St. Thomas admits the headship of Christ as God and as man, and he continued to hold the same opinion in *De Veritate*. But he seems to teach this simply because it had always been so taught and also because he had learned it from his master, St. Albert the Great. Yet in spite of saying that the capital dignity is shared between Christ-God and Christ-man, he proposes the question in the following manner: "Whether Christ as Man is head of the Church" and in the conclusion he says: "properly speaking He is head according to His human nature."¹²

In the *Summa*, however, St. Thomas does not say precisely that the headship pertains formally to Christ as God. He treats the point in the section where he discusses those things that were coassumed by Christ.¹³ The Word assumed human nature and coassumed definite perfections and defects of the same, and among the coassumed perfections is that of capital dignity.¹⁴ The headship, therefore, is something that pertains to Christ as man. St. Thomas repeats this in the very statement of the problem, placing it in the form of a doubt: "It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be Head of the Church."¹⁵ Then throughout the entire article and in the answers to the objections he insists that the headship is assumed by the human nature, ending the answer to the third objection in the words: "Christ is likened to the Head in His visible nature in which man is set over man."¹⁶

This is the definitive thought of the Angelic Doctor. In order to substantiate it, he had recourse to a doctrine taught by the Greek Fathers, specifically by St. John Damascene, according to which the assumed human nature was an instrument of the divinity. Some Fathers did not think it opportune

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ III, qq. 7-15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 8.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 1, obj. 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

to say this, because of the possible Nestorian interpretation which the expression might have. If it is affirmed that the human nature is the instrument of God then, since any instrument has a hypostasis distinct from that of the principal cause, the humanity of Christ will have a personality distinct from that of the Word.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the Angelic Doctor affirms that Christ as man is the instrument of the Word because there are some instruments which have the same substance as the principal cause (the arm of the body, for example). This is true of Christ's human nature, which is a united or conjoined instrument and therefore it does not have a distinct subsistence but subsists in the subsistence of the Word. Hence, if the two conditions required for headship; i. e., unity of life with the members and primacy of vital influence, can be verified in Christ's humanity, then His humanity alone constitutes Him as our Head.

That Christ as man possesses unity of life with us is evident and no author has ever doubted it. That He also exercises a vital influence which the Head exercises on the members was an uncertain point up to the time of St. Thomas. True, an influence of a moral character had been attributed to Christ's humanity, but not that of an efficient character; and headship requires an efficient influence. It had been maintained, as we have seen, that this efficiency was something exclusive to God and on this point headship had to be attributed to the divinity. But as soon as it is stated that Christ's human nature is an instrument of the divinity, there is placed in it an efficient causality which is dependent and participated, it is true, but efficient none the less.

He (Christ) has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, according to John 1: 16: *Of His fulness we have all received*. And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church.¹⁸

To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man,

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 8, a. 1 (reduced)

inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, i. e. by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently.¹⁹

As is evident, the Angelic Doctor continues to think that for headship it is necessary to have the two conditions to which we have frequently alluded: homogeneity of life and primacy of vital influence. He also continues to think that the first condition is fulfilled in Christ as man and the second condition, in Christ as God principally and in Christ as man instrumentally or secondarily. This is his innovation by virtue of which he applied to the humanity of Christ not only moral causality which had always been attributed to it, but also efficient causality which is characteristic of the Head.

The conclusion which St. Thomas drew is clear: since the two conditions for headship are verified in the humanity of Christ, it is necessary to say that Christ is Head precisely as man. But this conclusion must be rightly understood. It does not mean that one prescind from the Person of the Word and from the hypostatic union, but only that these elements do not enter as the formal constitutive of headship. It is certain that according to the present providence of God the Christ-man was constituted Head because He was assumed by the Word, but this assumption is not the formal constitutive of headship; the constitutive reason is the social grace with which the assumed humanity was sanctified.

Neither does this mean that the humanity as Head is the fontal cause of the grace which is communicated to us, the members. To be a fontal cause, says St. Thomas, is not a necessary requisite for headship and as a matter of fact *in humanis* the head is not the primary principle of the life which is communicated to the members.²⁰

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, ad 1 (reduced).

²⁰ *De Verit.*, q. 29, a. 4. "One can be understood to influence in a spiritual sense and manner in two ways: in one way as a principal agent . . . in another instrumentally. And thus even the humanity of Christ is the cause of the aforesaid influence . . . And this seems to suffice for the nature of head. For the head of the natural body does not have influence on the members except by reason of hidden power."

The consequences of the change introduced by St. Thomas are of great transcendence and are perceived in the entire development of the doctrine of the Mystical Body. At first it may seem that they minimize the doctrine, since they leave to one side the headship of God in order to postulate that of Christ as man, but we shall see presently that the Thomistic innovation greatly ennobles the mystery of our incorporation in Christ.

2. THE VIVIFYING ELEMENT IN THE MYSTICAL BODY

We have just determined the thought of St. Thomas on the headship of Christ, saying that it pertains to Him formally as man. One refers, of course, to a headship in the order of grace and consequently of grace as divine and participated by man. In a word, we refer to the precisely Christian life. This detail is all-important.

If Christ were our Head precisely as God, He would be so because of certain characteristics which are essentially divine. The vital element which would be derived from Him and which would be transferred to us through the influence of His headship would be the divinity itself as participable, for it is evident that a cause always places in the effect a reflection of what it is in itself. If the cause, or he who produces the vital influence, is God, that which He effects in the terminus, ourselves, will be an element which is essentially divine: grace precisely as a formal participation in the nature, the being and the perfections of God; grace precisely as elevating and divinizing.

That is a great deal, but it is not all. If the Head exerted His influence on the members precisely as He is God, then our relation to the Head of the Mystical Body would be the same as that of the angels. But such is not the case. To see this clearly it is necessary to recall that grace, which is formally divinizing, is virtually much more in addition. It is not strange that this should be so because the same thing is true of God Himself. God also is formally some things and virtually others.

Theology teaches that He is formally whatever has the characteristics of perfection *simpliciter simplex*: being, goodness, truth, intelligence, life, etc. But He is virtually whatever has the characteristics of perfection *secundum quid* or *mixta*.

Grace is formally a divinizing element and virtually it is many other things besides. This multiple virtuality is "formalized" when it passes through Christ as man. Actually, the healing power which is manifested in redemption from sin and in atonement by means of penal and satisfactory actions, and the priestly power which is revealed in redemption through sacrifice, although they are powers of grace, are nevertheless powers which are not in it so far as it is formally divine, but as it is received in the humanity of Christ. On being received there, these characteristics are formalized, whereas in grace as divine they are present only virtually.

God, and for that matter the divine, are not susceptible of suffering or sacrifice. Not of suffering, because they are impassible; nor of sacrifice, because sacrifice is always offered to a superior and nothing is superior to God. The redemptive functions by way of atonement and priestly sacrifice are therefore not attributed to grace as it is divine but so far as it is received by man. Man can suffer, man can be a priest and offer sacrifice. And these actions can have a divine value through the grace of God which, on manifesting itself through such acts, acquires the characteristics of healing and sacerdotal grace.

This phenomenon of formalizing the virtualities of divine grace through the human instrument which receives it falls within the canons of theology. Actually, it is proper to the instrument to determine in some way the virtuality of the principal cause. Thus, one and the same power has various manifestations according to the instrument which is used to manifest it. One and the same human power, for example, will be converted into music, painting, elocution, etc., according as the instrument utilized for its manifestation is reason, the faculty of speech, a brush, a violin, etc. The instrumental cause, says the Angelic Doctor, cooperates in producing the effect of

the principal cause by means of something that is proper to itself. For if an instrument could do nothing in virtue of its own power, it would be useless to employ it and there would be no reason for using particular instruments to perform particular works.²¹

Now the end for which Christ became incarnate and for which He was constituted Head of the human race is redemption or the liberation from sin and the deification of the redeemed through acts of atonement and the priestly sacrifice. That this might be effected, God chose an instrument capable of determining divine grace (which is infinite in its virtuality because it is divine, just as the virtuality of God is infinite) and making it formally healing and formally sacerdotal at the same time that it is formally deifying or elevating. It is deifying because it is divine; it becomes healing because of the acts of atonement; and it becomes priestly because a human instrument, capable of suffering and offering sacrifice, formalizes these two characteristics.

It follows from this that if the capital influence which Christ exercises over us is realized in view of the fact that He is God, His capital grace will be formally *divine* only; whereas if He exercises that influence as man, yet without ceasing to be divine (for this note always accompanies grace), then His grace will be likewise *reparative* and *sacerdotal*. And considering the transmission of grace from the Head to the members, that which we would receive from Christ solely as God would be only divine, as is received by the angels; but if He is also considered as man, that grace will likewise be reparative and sacerdotal.

St. Thomas takes great pains not to call capital grace *gratia Dei*; he calls it *gratia Christi*.²² And the life which is transmitted by this grace he does not call *vita divina*, but *vita christiana*.²³ Not that the grace and life of Christ and the grace and life of Christians are not divine, for they are that; but

²¹ Cf. I, q. 45, a. 5.

²² Cf. *Comment. in Epist. Sti. Pauli, Proem.*

²³ III, q. 62, a. 2.

they are divine with the specific characteristics which we have just mentioned. Divine life and grace are *formally elevating* and *virtually reparative and sacerdotal*; but Christian life and grace are *formally divine, reparative and sacerdotal*.

That the *gratia Christi*, the capital element of Christ, has these characteristic notes is a truth which St. Thomas repeats time and again in the whole third part of the *Summa* and he summarizes it in the forty-eighth question where he reduces the diverse aspects of the work of redemption (merit, satisfaction and sacrifice) to the dignity of Christ's headship. As God, Christ could neither merit nor satisfy nor offer sacrifice. It is true that the subject who does all this is *personally* God, because Christ's Person is divine and therefore all that He does has a personal value which derives from the Person of the Word. But it is also true that the formal principle of merit, satisfaction and sacrifice is not the Person of the Word, but the human nature divinized by habitual and capital grace. If Christ is formally Head as man, if capital grace is the grace of Christ as man, then since the life and grace of the members come from the Head and have its characteristics, the grace and life of Christians, who are members of Christ, will be not only truly divine, but reparative and sacerdotal. Not in the same measure in all, it is true, but to some measure at least in all.

All this is evident in the light of the arguments which we have enuntiated, but St. Thomas also gives assurance of this when he speaks of the communication of the vital element of which we are speaking. He asks in one article of the *Summa*²⁴ whether sacramental grace adds anything to the grace of the virtues and the gifts. Sacramental grace is the grace of Christ which is communicated to us by means of the sacraments instituted by Him; the grace of the virtues and the gifts is that which elevates and perfects the soul and its potencies by capacitating them to work well. Therefore the question is equivalent to asking whether Christian grace adds anything to divine grace. The Angelic Doctor answers affirmatively:

²⁴ III, q. 62, a. 2.

The sacraments are ordained unto certain special effects which are necessary in Christian life. . . . Consequently . . . so does sacramental grace confer, over and above grace commonly so called, and in addition to the virtues and the gifts, a certain Divine assistance in obtaining the end of the sacrament.

The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers of the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary conduct: but as regards certain special effects which are necessary in a Christian life, sacramental grace is needed.²⁵

What special notes grace acquires when it is concretized in Christ and in the Christian are indicated by St. Thomas in the same article and in the fifth article of the same question. Divine grace remits sin, with which it is incompatible, and elevates the soul; Christian grace, in addition to this, is ordained to the diminution and eventual removal of the guilt of sin which remains after the fault has been pardoned and destines the soul who possesses it to determined acts of worship. In other words, it has both a reparative and a sacerdotal character. "Sacramental grace," says the holy Doctor, "seems to be ordained principally to two things: namely, to take away the defects consequent on past sins, insofar as they are transitory in act, but endure in guilt; and, further, to perfect the soul in things pertaining to divine worship in regard to the Christian religion."²⁶

This doctrine of the headship of Christ-man does not exclude a superior divine influence but, on the contrary, presupposes it. Christ as man exercises the vital influence in an instrumental manner and the instrument always presupposes the principal cause. This doctrine simply affirms that in the humanity assumed by the Word are found the two conditions required for headship: homogeneity of supernatural life with the members and an efficient influence over these members. And since the passing of grace through Christ-man manifests not only its divine and deifying formality but also its reparative and sacerdotal formality, the result is that the Thomistic concept explains how and why the members of the Mystical Body,

²⁵ *Ibid.* (reduced).

²⁶ III, q. 62, a. 5.

besides being deified and thus reflecting with Christ the divine perfections, are also christianized and reflect these perfections with which the Christ-man was adorned.

Thus we see the scope of the words of the Apostle when he says that for him to live is Christ and that Christ lives in him and that Christ is formed in us. Actually, Christ is communicated to us not only as divine, but also as regards whatever He has of passivity and suffering and priesthood. And since His priesthood makes Him both a priest and a victim, the Christian who is a reflection of Christ must also offer sacrifice and be a victim for he must possess these two conditions inherent in the priesthood of the New Law. This notion of offering oneself as a victim and which is exacted by Christian grace as sacerdotal, makes us to be perfectly compenetrated with the sacrifice which is offered daily on our altars. It makes us live the Mass vividly and intimately.

We conclude this section by stating that whoever separates the soteriological questions from the doctrine on the headship of Christ-man does not understand the teaching of St. Thomas. They are not separable. It is, therefore, necessary to see reflected in the Christian the characteristics of the Redemption effected by formally human acts and personally divine acts of the Redeemer: satisfaction, atonement and sacrifice.

A treatise on the vitality of the Mystical Body is not a treatise on the grace of God (*gratia Dei*) nor does St. Thomas treat of this vitality in the questions where he discusses divine grace.²⁷ Therefore it was necessary to compose a distinct treatise on the grace of Christ (*gratia Christi*) and this St. Thomas does in the third part of the *Summa*. The grace of Christ begins by being formally divine but it is also everything which we have indicated above.

²⁷ I-II, qq. 109-14.

3. HOW THE LIFE OF THE HEAD IS COMMUNICATED TO THE MEMBERS

The life which is in the Head and which we have called, with St. Thomas, Christian grace, is communicated to the members by means of an efficient activity which is exercised by the Head Himself, by Christ as man, but always under the principal efficient influence of the Word. It is precisely because Christ as man can exercise an activity of this type that He can be and is Head, as we shall demonstrate immediately.

We have recalled that in the time of St. Thomas authors distinguished the activity of Christ by attributing efficient activity to the Word and moral activity to Christ as man. A text from St. Albert will serve to demonstrate this point: "Exigitur influentia capitis . . . ad hoc quod efficienter secundum quod Deus, et meritorie secundum quod homo nobilis influat similem gratiam suae gratiae."²⁸ From this supposition they concluded that headship was a perfection which should be attributed to Christ both as God and as man. The homogeneity of the supernatural life with the members was had by Christ as man; but the efficient influence, also proper to the Head, He had as God.

We know from what has already been said the innovation that was introduced by St. Thomas. From the Greek Fathers he took the notion of instrument and applied it to the humanity of the Word,²⁹ thereby opening the way to attribute to Christ as man the efficient causality required for headship. Thus, asking whether Christ as man is Head, St. Thomas says: "To give grace . . . belongs to Christ . . . instrumentally . . . inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead."³⁰

²⁸ *In III Sent.*, d. 13, a. 5.

²⁹ *III*, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4.

³⁰ *III*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1. Throughout the entire third part of the *Summa* St. Thomas constantly makes application of this doctrine. Thus, in q. 48, a. 6 he affirms: "But since Christ's humanity is the *instrument of the Godhead* . . . all Christ's actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the salvation of men." When treating of the Passion, he writes: "Christ's Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. . . . Thirdly,

There were many reasons why the Angelic Doctor should insist on the notion of efficient causality in Christ as man. Aside from the tradition of Greek theology, there were the words of St. John which present Christ to us as "full of grace and truth" and as the beginning through which grace and truth are produced. But the grace with which Christ was filled has a double aspect: the *entitative habit* which perfects its possessor in the *order of being* and which at the same time perfects one in the *order of operation*. This is according to the traditional definition of grace in which it is represented as a participation in the divine nature, and nature or essence is the first principle of operation. It follows from this that whoever participates in the nature of God has a divine principle of *being* and *operation*.

Now whoever possesses grace in its plenitude will be perfected by it in this double order. And since the most perfect type of operation is efficient, it follows that Christ, who had the plenitude of grace, could thereby efficiently act on those whom He had to act upon; that is, ourselves who are His members. Let us examine this point a little more closely. We have already stated that one who is to fulfil the function of Head must possess, among other conditions, the absolutely necessary one of efficiently influencing the life of the members and of possessing a life which is specifically identical with that which is communicated to the members. In his consideration of Christ as man, St. Thomas states that Christ not only merits but He is the instrument of the Word in the communication of grace, producing it in an efficient manner.

Now the vital influence which the Head exercises on the

by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ's flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead" (q. 49, a. 1). When he speaks of the death of Christ he uses the same notion: "It is the same thing to speak of Christ's death as of His Passion. . . . In this way Christ's death cannot be the cause of our salvation by way of merit, but only by way of causality" (q. 50, a. 6). He uses the same notion in speaking of Christ's Resurrection: "Consequently, Christ's Resurrection has instrumentally an effective power not only with regard to the resurrection of bodies, but also with respect to the resurrection of souls" (q. 56, a. 2).

members, which is the traditional "influit sensum et motum" ⁸¹ and which when transferred to the supernatural order becomes "influere gratiam" ⁸² or the communication of the "senum spiritualem qui consistit in cognitione veritatis et motum spiritualem qui est per gratiae influxum," ⁸³ this influence, we repeat, is efficient in character. This is a point on which the medieval doctors were in full agreement. However, they were not unanimous in determining to whom this efficient causality should be attributed and most of them attributed it exclusively to God. But St. Thomas also attributed it to Christ as man and for that reason he concluded, as we have seen, that in Christ's humanity are verified all the conditions required for headship. All authors were in accord, nevertheless, in asserting that the influence of the Head must be efficient in character and not merely moral.

Efficient causality is distinguished from moral causality in this that it is received directly by the subject which receives it, while moral causality exerts its influence only indirectly. It does not carry through to the terminus which receives the effect but terminates in the operative potency which it influences in the production of a determined effect. A classic example of this type of causality is merit, which exerts a causative influence over mercy but strictly speaking does not produce it. The good meritorious act directly moves the divine will to grant mercy which is due, but the act itself does not produce that mercy. On the other hand, when God, by way of return, grants mercy, He can utilize Christ's humanity as a mediate instrument which produces and communicates grace. In this case Christ's humanity is the efficient cause of what is merited.

Now the Head exerts its vital influence directly, since it is efficient in character. Whence it follows that from the moment that St. Thomas admitted and introduced the instrumental causality of Christ-man in the production of redeeming grace, the way was open for him to say also that Christ-man exercises

⁸¹ III, q. 8, a. 1, obj. 1.

⁸² *Ibid.*, corp.

⁸³ III, q. 69, a. 5.

a capital or vital influence. And this efficient causality of Christ's humanity, which satisfies for the first condition required for headship, also satisfies for the second condition. Actually, a moral cause need not be of the same nature as the effect which it produces because in reality it does not produce the effect. Consequently, the moral cause does not impress its characteristic on the effect produced. It could, of course, happen that the effect attributed to a moral cause be similar to that cause, as for example our grace which is merited by Christ is similar to His grace, but this does not flow from the very intrinsic requirements of moral causality which, as we have said, does not itself reach to the terminus or effect.

Efficient causality, on the other hand, does place in the effect its own manner of being and is homogeneous with the effect. Therefore, it fulfills the requirements of headship which consists in the communication of its own life. Furthermore, it is certain that the efficient cause is extrinsic to the effect produced; neither the material nor the formal cause constitute the effect as such. But this is no obstacle to homogeneity between cause and effect; it means simply that the efficient cause is not numerically identical with the effect, as the father is not numerically identical with his son. But it can and does constitute a *specific* unity whereby homogeneity of nature and life are preserved.

The reason for this is that "the effect is likened to the form by which the agent acts." Now agents can operate with two kinds of forms: natural or exemplary. He who works with the first produces a univocal effect which is also homogeneous, as happens in the act of generation. He who works with the exemplary form produces an analogous effect, as happens in artistic production. In the latter case, the cause and effect do not pertain to the same specific nature and, although there is no homogeneity between the artist and his work, there is a homogeneity between the exemplary form and the work produced. Consequently, whatever the class of the efficient cause, there is always a specific identity between the cause and the effects; sometimes univocal, sometimes analogical.

Let us now transfer these concepts to the humanity of Christ which, for St. Thomas, is the cause of our grace. It does not produce grace by means of a natural form but by means of an artificial or acquired form; that is, by means of capital grace with which it is gifted. By reason of this grace Christ-man becomes an instrument of the Word in the production of grace and consequently becomes our Head. And He produces a grace in us that is similar to His own (as man, that is); not a grace that is substantially divine, but divine in an accidental manner. He produces in us habitual grace which has all the characteristics which we have previously assigned to it.

We see, therefore, that in explaining the influence of Christ by efficient causality we perfectly preserve the vital influence and the homogeneity which prevail between the Head and the members. It is worth while to insist upon the new light which this explanation throws on the Pauline expressions formerly cited. The life of Christ is a reality in us; His grace is ours after the fashion that any efficient cause is in the effect. There is a formal identity between ourselves and Christ; not in the sense that Christ as Head and we as members have the same numerically identical form (grace), but that we both possess a specifically identical form. Moreover, this specific equality pertains only to the ontological species and not to the moral species, for the grace of Christ is capital grace whereas in us grace is personal or individual. There is, therefore, a formal and specific identity between Christ and us, between Him as Head and ourselves as members. Both of us have essentially the same sanctity and the same perfection, though Christ has the plenitude and we have only a participation.³⁴ We can, therefore, say with St. Paul, "my life is Christ" and we can also say that the Christian is another Christ.

It would be difficult to find a more sublime doctrine expressed in more exact theological terms. St. Thomas achieved this through the introduction into soteriology of the notion of efficient instrumental causality and its application to the hu-

³⁴ III, q. 7, a. 9.

manity of Christ. At the same time, he preserves the moral causality which has traditionally been attributed to Christ.

4. THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HEAD AND MEMBERS

We now know what for St. Thomas is the Head of the Mystical Body; it is Christ as man. We also know what is the life that descends from the Head to the members; it is Christian grace. We know, finally, how it is transmitted; by a causality of an efficient instrumental nature. Let us now examine the medium of this transmission whereby the humanity of Christ is placed in contact with the members.

When we speak of the humanity of Christ we do not refer only to His soul, which is the most perfect and noble part wherein grace is principally radicated. We refer to both His body and His soul. Both of them have an active role in the communication of Christian grace. The process is as follows: the grace of headship is rooted as in its proper subject in the soul of Christ by means of which it also reaches to the body, so that the two are sanctified and constituted spiritual Head of all men who have been redeemed by the body and soul of Christ. From the body of Christ this grace descends to our bodies and reaches our very souls which are the proper subjects of Christian grace.⁸⁵

Therefore, the medium of communication whereby the life of the Head reaches the members is made up of the two elements which constitute the humanity of Christ. Grace is in His entire being and His whole being is sanctified by grace. It is natural, if it is in both His body and His soul, that both will serve as instruments in the communication of grace. And they communicate grace to both our body and our soul because both have need of grace since both are victims of the moral evil which is healed by grace and both will eventually be recipients

⁸⁵ III, q. 8, a. 2: "Hence the whole manhood of Christ, i.e., according to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body; but principally the soul, and secondarily the body."

of the glory which is attained through grace. There are sins in both the body and the soul; in the body there is sensuality and in the soul there is ignorance and malice. There is also in the soul the wound of sin which we call *fomes peccati*. Thus we see that both our constitutive elements have need of healing grace and they further stand in need of elevating grace because both must be divinized here in order to be glorified in heaven.

The manner in which the humanity of Christ is placed in contact with our humanity in order to communicate grace to us in an efficient manner and the problem of how Christ can produce grace on earth without leaving heaven would be too lengthy to explain here. We shall content ourselves with a consideration of the means used to communicate this grace, without trying to explain the way in which it is accomplished.

To produce anything efficiently there is required a certain physical contact between the cause and the subject wherein the effect is to be produced. The cause of the communication of grace is the humanity of Christ, which is present only in heaven and in the Eucharist. The subject on which the humanity of Christ works is ourselves. Therefore, in order to produce Christian grace in His members Christ makes use of the sacraments, and especially the sacrament of the Eucharist.

It is from the Cross that Christ principally exercises His office as Head and, therefore, in His passion and death Christians find the inexhaustible fount of the grace which vivifies. The suffering humanity of the crucified Christ makes use of the sacraments as separated instruments to communicate grace to us. And since the vivifying influence of the Head must be efficient, the sacraments which are used by Christ to effect this communication are also said to produce grace efficiently.³⁶ It would be interesting to study the function of each sacrament in the process of our vivification by Christ. Baptism is the first because it initiates us into this incorporation with Christ.³⁷ The Eucharist, however, merits a special place.

³⁶ III, q. 62, a. 5.

³⁷ III, q. 69, a. 2: "By Baptism a man is incorporated in the Passion and death of Christ." *Ibid.*, a. 3: "By Baptism, man is incorporated in Christ, and is made His member."

For the Angelic Doctor, as also for the generality of theologians, the Eucharist has two effects: one which is proper to it, that of bestowing a nutritive grace,³⁸ and the other which is more general, grace considered as vivifying.³⁹ Therefore theologians are wont to say that the unity of the Mystical Body is especially maintained in this sacrament⁴⁰ and this unity is the result of the communication to the members of the life of the Head.

In the case of the Eucharist the supernatural life of Christ-man is not communicated to us by any means distinct from the humanity itself, as happens in the other sacraments. In the Eucharist it is the very body of Christ which is placed in immediate contact with men, that body which for us is the vivifying element or, as the Apostle says, the "spiritus vivificans."⁴¹ St. John assures us of the same thing when he says: "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life."⁴²

But how does the eucharistic flesh of Christ cause life in those who eat it? Is His flesh perhaps vivifying? As flesh, no; it does not cause supernatural life nor even natural life for, since it is eucharistic, it is not naturally assimilable. It vivifies spiritually insofar as it is the subject of the spirit or the grace of Christ, for it is not Christ's humanity as such that causes our divine life, but the grace that is contained in His humanity. When the body of Christ comes in contact with ours there is an intimate communication of grace because for us it is not body, but "spiritus vivificans." And when Jesus states that whoever eats His body is with Him and that He is in the one who communicates, He refers to a presence of His body but even more to a presence of His spirit and grace. Christ is given to us in the Eucharist and in giving Himself to us He also gives the grace which He possesses, which is not only divine, as we have explained, but also Christian. He therefore trans-

³⁸ III, q. 79, a. 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

⁴⁰ III, q. 73, a. 3.

⁴¹ I Cor. 15:45.

⁴² John 6:54 f.

forms us into what He Himself is spiritually. This is what is meant by our incorporation in Christ.

But do not the other sacraments also unite us to Christ the Head? St. Thomas teaches that they do, insofar as they are in some way related to the Eucharist.⁴³ The desire for the Eucharist is interwoven in the other sacraments and becomes their end and measure. The Angelic Doctor indicates this when he says: "The Eucharist is, as it were, the consummation of the spiritual life, and the end of all the sacraments . . . for by the hallowings of all the sacraments preparation is made for receiving or consecrating the Eucharist. . . . By Baptism a man is ordained to the Eucharist."⁴⁴ It follows from this that the Eucharist will have a special efficacy in the production of grace by the other sacraments.

St. John teaches that from the Eucharist proceeds life.⁴⁵ St. Thomas also states that whatever vivifying power grace has in us proceeds from some desire for the Eucharist.⁴⁶ Therefore, we can conclude that grace, considered as vivifying, though it is likewise produced by the other sacraments, is done so only insofar as they are ordained to the Eucharist.⁴⁷ And since the communication of the life of Christ constitutes our incorporation in Him, it also follows that while the other sacraments do incorporate us in Christ,⁴⁸ it is the Eucharist which has this incorporation as a characteristic effect.⁴⁹

To understand this we should recall that each sacrament produces a grace which is proper to itself. Thus, according to the Apostle, Baptism causes death to sin and the beginning of the life of Christ or the Christian life.⁵⁰ Baptismal grace, as produced by this sacrament, has two formalities: death to an evil life and resurrection to a new life. It is not the same thing to die to sin and to live the supernatural life; they are two dis-

⁴³ III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1: "Hence it is due to the efficacy of its power, that even from desire thereof a man procures grace whereby he is enabled to lead the spiritual life."

⁴⁴ III, q. 73, a. 3.

⁴⁵ John 6:54.

⁴⁶ III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 73, a. 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 5; q. 69, aa. 2, 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 73, a. 3.

⁵⁰ Rom. 6:4-8.

tinct formalities, though in fact they are contained in the one and the same reality, grace. In the present divine economy these formalities are inseparable; one cannot conceive of death to sin without supernatural life. But this is so, not by the natural exigencies of things, but because God has so determined. God could have willed that man should have a natural perfection and in this case the liberation from sin would not imply the possession of divine life. God did not, however, will so; rather, He willed that there should be no other perfection save supernatural perfection. For that reason the remission of sins carries with it the bestowal of grace. Rather, the sin is remitted by grace which, at the same time that it heals the evil, gives the good or the life of God.

These two effects are produced by the one sacrament of Baptism, as St. Paul says: "For we are buried together with him by baptism into death: that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life."⁵¹ But, although Baptism effects these two things, it does not do so in the same manner. It can be said, therefore, that Baptism of itself effects the death to sin; it also communicates new life, but insofar as it implies some desire for or ordination to the Eucharist, which is the vivifying sacrament. In like manner the words of the first consecration of the Mass cause both the body and the blood of the Lord to be present on the altar; the body, by the power of conversion which the words themselves contain, and the blood, by reason of an objective ordination to the blood which is in the body. This desire is based on the inseparability of the two elements, for the two cannot actually be separated; where one is, the other is also.

It is certain that St. John teaches that without the Eucharist there is no divine life and also that the other sacraments somehow give life.⁵² It is, therefore, necessary to appeal to some eucharistic influence over the other sacraments and which St.

⁵¹ Rom. 6:4.

⁵² John 6:54.

Thomas explains by the objective desire which is in the sacraments themselves and not only in the recipient.⁵³

What we have said concerning Baptism is also true of the other sacraments; i. e., they all cause a determined and particular grace which is a special mode of grace in general. But every modality presupposes a subject to be modified and therefore every *modal grace* presupposes grace itself which is thus modified. Now if the sacraments have the power of causing a modality of grace, for example the grace of virility which is caused by Confirmation, then they are said to cause grace according to the modality in which it is received. Hence Confirmation increases grace as such in giving it a new modality. But grace as such has a vivifying character and this character proceeds, as we have seen, from an ordination or desire for the Eucharist. Therefore, Confirmation and the other sacraments cause the grace which they cause insofar as they have this objective desire for the Eucharist.

We conclude this section by saying with St. Thomas that "the reality of the sacrament (the Eucharist) is the unity of the Mystical Body."⁵⁴ The means by which the grace of the Head descends to the members are the sacraments and more especially the sacrament of the Eucharist. "This sacrament has of itself the power of bestowing grace; nor does anyone possess grace before receiving this sacrament except from some desire thereof. . . . Hence it is due to the efficacy of its power that even from desire thereof a man procures grace whereby he is enabled to lead the spiritual life."⁵⁵ In a word, all the sacraments bestow grace and with it the supernatural life, though each one causes a special grace. Yet all the sacraments effect this by reason of their dependence on the Eucharist, which is antonomastically the sacrament of life, of union with Christ and of the Mystical Body.

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⁵³ III, q. 73, a. 3; q. 179, a. 1, ad 1.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 73, a. 1.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.

With this we terminate our considerations. We have seen that Christ is Head as man and that by reason of His being Head as man the vital element of the Mystical Body is not *divine* grace but *Christian* grace. We have also seen that the Head communicates His life to the members in an instrumental and efficient manner and that the sacraments, especially the Eucharist, exercise the noble function of incorporating into Christ those who are united to Him. If the members develop as they ought the grace they receive, they will receive further graces until they are perfectly vivified.

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THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

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WHEN the disciples said to Christ, "Lord, teach us to pray,"¹ they acknowledged three things. First they manifested their own lack of knowledge, for if they already knew how to pray they would not have asked for instruction. Secondly, they indicated their willingness to learn, since they voluntarily asked Christ for the instruction. Finally, the disciples showed that they recognized Our Lord was a teacher and that as such He had certain authority in matters of learning, as well as a right to respect because of His knowledge. Otherwise they would not have approached Him in the first place. In one word, we can say that the disciples were docile. When they wanted to learn something they came to their Teacher with a docile spirit.

The purpose of this article is to establish that this admirable quality called docility is a virtue and that, consequently, it is a necessary part of man's equipment for virtuous living. Such a consideration is of value today. By a clearer understanding of docility we may find some solution to such modern problems as juvenile delinquency and the general spirit of too much independence that grows from exaggerated notions of democracy and equality.

In order to accomplish the objective of this study, it will be necessary to follow St. Thomas' own method of determining the nature of a virtue. The Angelic Doctor usually proceeds from the objects since these give the formal cause of a virtue. Once these objects have been discovered, there still remains the consideration of the material cause or subject of inherence of the virtue.

When the fact that docility is a virtue has been established, then the all important task of proving that it is a distinct virtue will be treated. Such a proof entails further emphasis on the

¹ Luke 11 : 1.

objects of docility. We shall also include a section on the virtues that resemble docility. Finally, the properties and effects of docility will be considered plus the inevitable tract on the vices opposed to the virtue.

Although the outline is obvious enough, there are special difficulties in a treatment of docility. The meagerness of material is one. Practically no one has determined whether docility is a virtue, and if so, why, or what sort of virtue it is. It seems to be taken for granted in a vague way that docility is a special virtue. This also means that much concerning the nature of docility has been presumed rather than explained. Hence, confusion on precisely what docility is can easily arise. The purpose of this essay, then, is to establish, according to the principles of St. Thomas, that docility is a distinct virtue and to delineate its character. Because of the lack of material on the subject our undertaking has the added note of originality, along with the dangers of all explorations.

1. DOCILITY DEFINED

A favorite starting point with St. Thomas in treating of a virtue was to cite the authority of St. Isidore.² The Spanish bishop of Seville did not omit the word "docile" from his famous lexicon. In a brief descriptive phrase, he says: "One is docile, not because he is learned, but because he can be taught; for he is capable and apt for learning."³ Although St. Thomas does not refer to this definition, he was undoubtedly acquainted with it. His own definition is: ". . . it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught."⁴ This is an extremely brief observation, yet it is a starting point. By enumerating what others have by way of truncated definitions, we shall reach a clearer appreciation of docility. Thus, Sylvius adds a few more notions in his statement of the meaning of docility: "Docility is called that by which anyone is prompt and ready

² As a matter of fact, St. Thomas does just that very thing in the article following docility. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 4.

³ *P. L.* LXXXII, 374.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, a. 3.

in receiving discipline and acquiring knowledge from others.”⁵ Gonet includes the special purpose of docility in his expression of its nature: “Docility implies an affection and promptitude for learning, which also helps much for prudence.”⁶ Less scientific, more wordy but nonetheless useful, is Msgr. Kerby’s definition: “It is the business of docility to foster a love both which is so impersonal and holy that the ideal man shrinks from neither effort nor sacrifice in seeking truth and serving justice.”⁷ Finally we list Mortimer Adler’s understanding of docility which brings in several new ideas: “Docility is the virtue which regulates a man’s will with respect to learning from a teacher.”⁸

These versions of docility hardly merit the distinction of being called definitions, with the exception of Dr. Adler’s. St. Thomas was assuredly not even attempting a formal definition since he qualifies his statement with the words “it is a mark of docility.” In other words, the Angelic Doctor implies that there is much more to docility than readiness to be taught. Nevertheless, from these various and closely related notions on docility, we can formulate a working definition of our own. We say: “Docility is a virtue that makes a man apt for learning from others.” This is a quasi-metaphysical definition of docility inasmuch as it gives its genus, namely, virtue, and as its quasi-specific difference we have the phrase “that makes a man apt for learning from others.” We shall return to this definition as soon as we have treated certain necessary preliminaries that arise from the relationship of docility to prudence.

a. *Relationship of Docility and Prudence*

In order to avoid a myriad of repetitions, it would be well to explain the interplay between docility and prudence before

⁵ *Commentarium in Totam Secundam Secundae* (Venice: 1726), III, 214.

⁶ J. B. Gonet, *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* (Paris: 1876), V, 356.

⁷ W. J. Kerby, “Clerical Docility,” *The Ecclesiastical Review* (Philadelphia: 1922), LXVI, 143 ff.

⁸ Mortimer J. Adler, “Docility and Authority” and “Docility and History,” *Commonweal* 31 (1940), 504 ff. and 4 ff.

examining docility in its recognized role of integral part to prudence. A brief consideration of prudence itself will help to throw some light on the nature of docility. The classic definition of this cardinal virtue is the one given by Aristotle: prudence is the right reason of things to be done.⁹ The distinctive character of prudence consists in the fact that it is a virtue formally intellectual inasmuch as it perfects the practical intellect by directing human acts conformably with right reason. On the other hand, it is materially moral since its matter is moral acts. It is not the duty of prudence to determine the ends of moral virtues but rather to find the means for attaining the ends already given by nature. It is under this aspect of actually and effectively determining means to ends that prudence takes on the role of coordinator unifying all virtues.¹⁰

There are three steps in the prudential act: counsel, judgment, and command.¹¹ Since judgment is concerned with the facts already discovered and because command is the final and decisive step to act, these do not pertain to our consideration. Docility is about discipline, the acquisition, in other words, of the truths upon which the prudent man will judge and, after selecting one, will pass his command. Hence docility will be closely adjoined to counsel whose function it is to make discovery by way of inquiry.

This means that we consider it outside the field of docility actually to judge on the verity or falsity of information supplied to it. Docility of its very nature seems almost to imply a suspension of judgment. People who are too self-assertive in their judgments are the ones who need docility most. The reasonableness of this restriction that we are placing on docility can perhaps be seen more clearly if viewed from the function of the teacher. In answering the question whether one man can teach another,¹² St. Thomas points out that the teacher is an exterior principle of the pupil's learning. ". . . anyone who

⁹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 5.

¹⁰ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, aa. 1-7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, a. 8.

¹² *Ibid.*, I, q. 117, a. 1.

teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (*Poster.* I, 1): All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge." One who is being led obviously is not making any decisions right at that moment. Consequently, as will be pointed out later, the judgment on the new facet of information will not be made by docility but ultimately only by the intellectual virtue employed for gaining the knowledge.

Having thus restricted docility's part in the virtue of prudence to the first act of prudence, that of counsel, it is fitting next to consider in more detail the nature of counsel. This act is enumerated among the twelve parts of a human act. It is placed as its fifth act, the third of the intellectual ones.¹³ It is concerned with the means to the end and is a speculative consideration of them.

The exposition of counsel as given by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* plus the commentary of St. Thomas will serve for our purpose here. Counsel can be called deliberation with oneself over material that offers reason for doubting. This being so, Aristotle immediately eliminates certain objects from the domain of counsel.¹⁴ He reduces these objects to four classes based on the causes of things. Thus no one deliberates on the nature of things, for example whether a tree is a tree. Nor does one, unless a fool or a madman the Stagirite does not hesitate to say, take counsel about events that happen from necessity, such as the rising of the sun. In fact, even those things that happen purely by chance are not properly the material for counsel, "like the finding of treasure." Finally, we do not always deliberate about things man has done himself. "No Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians," observes Aristotle, or to bring it up to date, no American takes counsel about the next election among the Eskimos. There is but one reason for all these not pertaining

¹³ R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De Revelatione* (Rome: 1929), I, 538. Also cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 14.

¹⁴ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, III, 3; St. Thomas, *III Ethic.*, lect. 7.

to counsel—they are beyond the power of the man doing the deliberation to alter or change.

However, when a doubt asserts itself, counsel is at hand to perform. Nature determines the ends of the virtues themselves, but it leaves man to discover the means for attaining these ends. That is the service given by prudence, but it is counsel that is the arsenal supplying judgment and command with their matter for the final steps of prudence. The field of counsel can be seen in the words of Aristotle: "Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding."¹⁵ In the next paragraph Aristotle continues on this matter by remarking that men "... assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last."¹⁶

Thus St. Thomas observes that "counsel is a certain inquisition."¹⁷ It is here that docility enters the scene. Since counsel is concerned with investigation, it can do this either by private discovery or by means of discipline. The latter is the way of docility. Thus docility's part in prudence is to supply counsel with matter and the merit of the matter is decided by counsel perfected by the virtue of eubulia. Left to itself counsel would be in constant danger of erring. This is why it needs the virtue of eubulia to perfect it. The very word means good counsel. Thus docility precedes counsel and eubulia completes it. If this is all that docility does it must remain forever an admirable *conditio sine qua non* for prudence, but never will it attain the full stature of a virtue.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, III, 3, 1112b 5; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, lectio 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1112b 15; St. Thomas, *ibid.*, lectio 8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Briefly stated, then, docility is related to prudence as an integral part of a perfect virtue. By integral parts of a virtue is meant those conditions that are necessary if the virtue is to be had in its perfection.¹⁸ Thus prudence, by the very force of its object which is steeped in the contingent, needs docility as a prerequisite to its own successful functioning. Without docility, prudence would be overwhelmed by the multitude of possibilities that are normally present in the particular undertakings of daily action.

b. *Docility: The Problem*

It will be recalled that only Dr. Adler besides ourselves referred to docility as a virtue. There is a good reason for this. Since St. Thomas treats of docility as an integral part of prudence, an immediate difficulty arises in attempting to maintain that docility is a virtue. That which is an integral part of a virtue is not itself a virtue, just as the roof is not the house although it is an integral part of the house. If this analogy made by St. Thomas of integral parts of a house were taken absolutely, then docility could never be a virtue, any more than a roof of itself could ever be a house. Of course the comparison is not that rigid.

Nevertheless, it is true that precisely as an integral part, such a part is not a virtue. St. Thomas is quite explicit on the point: "Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence; they are, as it were, integral parts thereof, insofar as they are all requisite for perfect prudence."¹⁹ Thus it must be conceded that, under the aspect of an integral part of prudence, docility is not a virtue. However, considered from another aspect, two avenues are open to it for being a good habit. It might be attached to a greater virtue as a potential part; or secondly, it could be a species of a higher virtue.²⁰

¹⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 48.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 4.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 48 where St. Thomas explains what is meant by integral, subjective, and potential parts of a virtue.

There are several examples in the *Summa* of an integral part being also a virtue under another formality. In the tract on fortitude, St. Thomas shows that from one point of view magnanimity and magnificence are integral parts of the cardinal virtue, fortitude, but under another aspect they are potential parts and so, true virtues. The same is shown of patience and perseverance.²¹ Hence, docility can quite conveniently serve a twofold function, that, namely, of being an integral part of prudence and likewise, when referred to its proper matter, of being a subjective or potential part of one of the cardinal virtues.

Are there any solid grounds in the doctrine of St. Thomas for maintaining that there is more to docility than its intimate connection with prudence might at first lead us to suppose? The citing of other virtues that play the dual role of integral part and true virtue only argues to the possibility of docility having a similar part in man's moral life. It certainly does not establish the fact. Indeed, from the case at hand one might be led to conclude that St. Thomas did not consider docility to be an independent virtue. If he did, one might ask, why did he not treat of it here? In the examples just mentioned of other virtues serving as integral parts, St. Thomas makes no such omission. The Angelic Doctor acknowledges them as integral parts and then examines them later in the tract as true virtues. Hence this citation of magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance seems more to militate against docility's chances of being a virtue than to sponsor them.

On the other hand, we have texts from St. Thomas that lead one to the conclusion that he actually regarded docility as a true virtue and not as restricted to prudence as an integral part. We can begin by examining more closely what St. Thomas says of docility when he treats of it with regards to prudence. One thing that immediately strikes the reader of this section is docility's close link with knowledge. St. Thomas lists eight integral parts of prudence: memory, reasoning, understanding,

²¹ *Ibid.*, q. 128.

docility, shrewdness, foresight, circumspection, and caution. The first five, which includes docility, regard prudence inasmuch as it is cognoscitive.²² Although all five parts are concerned with knowledge, they approach it in different ways. Thus memory and understanding are about knowledge itself: memory insofar as it is past; while understanding treats the facts at hand. As to the acquisition of knowledge we have docility in learning by way of discipline and shrewdness in learning by means of discovery. Finally it is reasoning that makes use of this knowledge.

This notion of docility gaining knowledge for its possessor by way of learning through discipline was contained in the nominal definitions enumerated at the outset. It is this attribute in docility that inclines one to see in it more than its prudential aspects already noted. Under this latter consideration it was pointed out that docility is connected with counsel, an act of prudence. Counsel is not interested in natures, the necessary, things beyond our control. Yet one of the special pedagogical devices employed by St. Thomas is to render his pupil docile. If the Saint had considered docility so related to prudence that it could not share its fecundity other than with that virtue's act of counsel, then it would have been a futile gesture for him on the other hand to insist on rendering his pupil docile in order to teach the student some discipline, such as philosophy, which certainly is interested in nature and the necessary.

First we shall consider the words of St. Thomas on this point of making a person docile, in order to determine what exactly is meant. In commenting on Aristotle's *De Anima*, St. Thomas states that the Philosopher "... does the three things necessary in each preface . . . First, he renders the hearer benevolent. Secondly, he makes him docile. Thirdly, he renders him attentive. Indeed, he makes him good-willed by showing the utility of the science; docile by setting forth the order and distinction of the tract; attentive by attesting to the difficulty of the tract."²³ Cardinal Cajetan commenting on

²² *Ibid.*, q. 48.

²³ *I de Anima*, lectio 1.

St. Thomas' *De Ente et Essentia*,²⁴ shows that the Angelic Doctor himself "by observing the art of rhetoric does three things in the preface." They are the same three that St. Thomas perceived in Aristotle's methodology. Obviously then, docility is not for the sole purpose of perfecting prudence, but is for "the acquisition of new knowledge . . . by the experience and teaching of others . . ." in all fields of learning.²⁵ It is true that in prudence where there is present so tremendous a number of possibilities for attaining an end, docility is manifestly a necessity. Yet it is nonetheless true that for the acquiring of any branch of knowledge, a man must be docile or else expose himself to error because he lacks an experienced guide or even give up altogether the pursuit of learning because of the impossibility of comprehending the whole field unaided.²⁶

If docility were restricted solely to prudence as an integral part, then there would be little point in Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Cajetan trying to make their pupils docile. Actually, Aristotle does give us at least one insight into his mind on the problem. Although not treating of docility and not formally concerned with it at the time, he observes that a student's lack of understanding of a principle need not be a barrier to his progress in learning. He has but to accept the principle on the authority of the teacher.²⁷ This is clearly another instance of the need of docility on the part of the pupil. St. Thomas also mentions the same thing in his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. For the sake of clarity and by way of bringing out the relation of all that has thus far been exposed, the whole passage will be quoted. St. Thomas is inquiring about the integral parts of prudence. Taking the integral part called foresight as his focal point, the Angelic Doctor enumerates three ways it can be impeded in its function of ordering things to their end:

²⁴ Cajetan, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

²⁵ Walter Farrell O. P., *A Companion to the Summa* (New York: 1940), III, 151.

²⁶ This is evident since man is a social animal. Cf. III *Cont. Gent.*, c. 117: Cum homo sit naturaliter animal sociale, indiget ab aliis hominibus adiuvari ad consequendum proprium finem.

²⁷ *I Post. Anal.*, II, 72a 15.

It happens, however, that foresight can be impeded in three ways:

Firstly, from the part of finding the way itself, which sometimes seems good, and is not; and this impediment is taken away by caution whose office it is to discern from virtues vices parading under the appearance of virtues.

Secondly, from the order of itself to the end, lest, namely, the way which of itself is apt to the end be impeded by something extrinsic so that it cannot lead to the end; and this pertains to circumspection which is the safeguard against contrary vices by which prudence is especially impeded.

Thirdly, on the part of the man himself tending to the end, who cannot find ways accommodated for the end intended; whence it is necessary that he should receive it from others through doctrine. It is necessary that the prudent man have operable principles either from himself or receive them readily from others. He, however, who has neither, is a useless fellow as is said in *I Ethics*, c. 2. And this is docility in a passive sense. If, however, docility is accepted in an active sense then it will pertain to prudence according to its most perfect existence, since it not only finds for itself, but also for others, what things are useful to the end; and thus prudence is attributed to teaching the unlearned.²⁸

This lengthy quotation has the value of clarifying the position of docility in prudence from the very words of St. Thomas. The concluding sentence gives reason for holding that the object of docility is not limited only to the means to human acts. Rather docility can be about the means of attaining any branch of science. Passive docility lifts man from the false and dangerous security of self-sufficiency to the high plane of humble submission of knowledge.

Francisco de Vitoria also definitely understood docility as closely related to knowledge or even to wisdom, and not merely the magnificent cog in the mechanism of the prudential act that all admit it to be. In an almost untranslatable passage he says in substance: The Doctor declares what docility is, which should be heard by the wise. All heresies and those that are now arise from this, namely, indocility, as if it were said to

²⁸ *III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1.

these what Augustine says: I was willing to accept, but it was not proved. And thus these are indocile.²⁹ In other words, heretics might have good intentions, but because they did not consider the dogmas of the Faith as operating ground for docility, they fell into error. They may have had the docility of prudence about the particular matters of action, but it bogged down when it became a question of intellectual assent to truths transcending the human intellect.

From these passages in St. Thomas and likewise from the observations of the commentators, there are clear indications that docility, in addition to being an integral part of prudence, has functions quite distinct from its prudential aspect. One obvious answer to the query why docility was not considered by St. Thomas under prudence is that apparently under this broader aspect docility does not belong to prudence. However, the final statement on that point must wait further investigation. If it is going to be a virtue at all, docility will be either a subjective or potential part of some higher virtue. Since docility must fit under one of these two classes, it will be necessary very briefly to explain what is meant by a subjective part and a potential part of a virtue. Subjective parts of a virtue are its species. Thus their relation to the principal virtue is simply one of species to genus. The species shares the perfect nature of the cardinal virtue and is distinguished from it by its specific difference. The potential part, on the other hand, does not partake of the complete nature of the main virtue, nor does it measure up to the exacting standards of the principal virtue. However, it does imitate it to some extent and share in its nature.³⁰ The only way to answer satisfactorily the question under discussion is to discover and explain the causes of the virtue of docility. From this information it will be possible to conclude as to the nature of docility and its place in the hierarchy of moral virtues.

²⁹ Doctor declarat quid sit docilitas, quod audiat a sapientibus. Hinc proveniunt omnes haereses et quae nunc sunt, ut si dicatur illis, hoc dicit Augustinus: bene volo, sed non probavit. Et sic isti sunt indociles. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae* (Venice: 1726), III, 377.

³⁰ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 48.

2. DOCILITY: ITS NATURE

From what has been written thus far, it is becoming apparent that docility can be viewed under other than its prudential aspects. St. Thomas demanded docility in his students and in so doing has given us the solid argument that he never intended to limit the function of docility to the role of an integral part of prudence. Fortified with this indirect support from the Angelic Doctor in favor of a virtue of docility, we now proceed to explain the very nature of docility itself.

The knowledge that we have of docility so far is based mainly on the descriptions of it given above in our various nominal definitions. From these, two notions stand out. In the first place, the definitions emphasize the idea of knowledge to be acquired, a fact that was reenforced by the insistence of St. Thomas on docility as a necessary part of the student's equipment in the classroom. Secondly, the definitions agree that the learning is to come from others. We can restate these elements by saying that docility respects persons of learning precisely because of their learning. Put this way we begin to perceive that the prime point of docility and the key to its relationship with the cardinal virtues will be found in the fact that it is principally concerned with a relation to others. Docility has respect towards men of learning either in their books or in the classroom. This draws us near to the nature of justice which extends to others and gives to each his due.³¹ Since this is so, it would be valuable for the fuller understanding of our subject-matter to consider very briefly the aspects of justice that have pertinence to docility.

a. *Docility and Justice*

In his general treatment of the cardinal virtues, St. Thomas lists all the essential elements of justice when he writes: "... good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of

³¹ *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 11.

equality.”³² When St. Thomas comes to his particular consideration of justice he follows the lead given by Aristotle and Ulpian and formulates his definition of this cardinal virtue as follows: “Justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will.”³³ As he develops this question on justice the Angelic Doctor explains the parts of the definition. Some of these expositions have importance for our subject. Hence when St. Thomas points out that justice “. . . denotes essentially relation to another,”³⁴ we immediately see that docility has at least this much in common with it. The foundation for this relationship to others is the reality of equality “. . . for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another.”³⁵ From this characteristic of equality St. Thomas comes to the important conclusion that the medium of justice is a real mean and not only one of reason.

The matter of justice is external operation, insofar as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less . . . wherefore justice observes the real mean.³⁶

Being medial, it should be noted, is a quality of moral virtues. Good moral habits are between extremes, one of defect and the other of excess, with regard to the rule or measure placed by reason itself. In other words, a habit is good when it is in conformity with right reason. When this rule of reason operates upon matter already determined and fixed by the very nature of the thing, as happens in justice, then we have the rational and real mean coinciding. At other times the determination is according to reason only, that is, it is subjective varying according to a prudential evaluation by each person in each thing, as occurs in the virtues of temperance and fortitude.³⁷

³² *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 3.

³³ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 10.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 64. See also E. T. Toccafondi, *Philosophia Moralis Generalis* (Rome: 1943), p. 201-202.

Although it would be possible here and now to examine the mean of docility and thus compare it to that of justice, this problem can be solved with greater facility if we postpone it until we have considered the parts of justice. We shall discover that the mean of justice and its parts is a shifting ground and hence we would expose ourselves to error if we did not have before us the full doctrine on the mean of justice.

Justice, as was the case with prudence, has integral, subjective, and potential parts. Instead of considering the integral parts immediately, as one might expect, St. Thomas first turns his attention to the subjective parts of justice.³⁸ By doing this, St. Thomas brings out the notion of debt and equality which is so essential for understanding justice. The Angelic Doctor considers as the two species of particular justice, distributive and commutative justice. As always the words of St. Thomas himself are clear:

In distributive justice something is given to a private individual, insofar as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole . . . in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons . . . the mean . . . follows geometrical proportion, wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion.

On the other hand, in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the arithmetical mean . . .³⁹

From this quotation it might be pointed out that distributive justice is a relation of community to the individual, while com-

³⁸ Some authors have reversed this order. Cf. B. H. Merkelbach O.P., *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Paris: 1938), II, 251 and Toccafondi, *op. cit.*, p. 209. Fr. Prümmer retains the order of St. Thomas, D. M. Prümmer, O.P., *Manuale Theologiae Moralis* (Fribourg: 1922) II, 67.

³⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 61, a. 2.

mutative justice is between person and person. How this and the question of the medium of justice have reference to docility will be shown presently.

After the subjective parts, St. Thomas treats of the integral parts. These are to do good and to decline from evil. In the answer to an objection St. Thomas explains these parts with regard to the mean.

The reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is that the moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand, justice is concerned with operations and external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is another.⁴⁰

Finally St. Thomas enumerates and explains the potential parts of justice. Just as in prudence, so too in justice the virtues annexed to it have something in common on one hand and lack or fall short of the perfection of justice on the other. "Accordingly since justice is of one man to another . . . all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice."⁴¹ Recalling that justice consists essentially in giving to each his due according to equality, St. Thomas continues: "Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due."⁴²

There are then listed nine potential parts of justice.⁴³ Three of these "render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due." In the first place stands religion. ". . . whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, q. 80, a. u.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ For the place of equity or *epikeia* cf. Prümmer, *op. cit.*, II, 273, and Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, II, 845.

man rendered to God as much as he owes Him . . .”⁴⁴ Religion consists in offering worship to God. Secondly we have the virtue of piety whereby man gives what he can of the unpayable debt he owes to parents and country. Finally, there is observance which gives deference and honor to those who excel in virtue, since there is no way for man adequately to reward the virtuous.

Inasmuch as the object of a virtue lacks the aspect of debt, that virtue falls short of the full nature of justice. St. Thomas lists six potential parts of justice which are merely potential because their object does not have the perfect aspect of something “due” strictly. Thus by a moral necessity man must be truthful or the whole rectitude of the moral order would be disrupted. Likewise a man must be grateful for good things and vindictive on account of bad things. Thus we have gratitude and revenge. Last of all there are liberality and affability which have little of the nature of anything due but are conducive to greater rectitude in moral affairs.

With this information before us, we can now center our attention on docility and see where it fits. It has already been pointed out that docility has respect to others and hence we see from this common aspect that it can be annexed to justice. First of all we must decide whether docility is so connected to justice that it can be a subjective part or species of this cardinal virtue. We have seen that both distributive and commutative justice attain an equality, but the former’s is proportional and the latter’s is arithmetical.⁴⁵ Docility regards learning in another. Now learning is a quality of the soul and not something that can be measured by a quantitative rule. Thus it would be impossible to attain the precision demanded of both distributive and commutative justice in establishing the equality required for paying a debt according to its exact demands. Because of this defect in docility, it certainly cannot be a species of justice.

From this deficiency in docility it also follows that the real

⁴⁴ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 80.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 61, a. 2.

mean of justice, that is, something fixed and determined by the very nature of the transaction, does not fully apply to docility. Thus, for example, in commutative justice when a man owes another five dollars he must pay exactly five dollars in order to remove the debt. It would be foolish to argue that to the teacher who taught a pupil history the pupil must erase the debt by teaching in his turn the history to the professor. Yet one should not conclude from this that there is no real mean in docility. Rather the rendering of the debt is not in the same kind, which can even happen in commutative justice, when a person gives a service equal to five dollars instead of the token wealth. Nevertheless, it is true to say that there will be a degree of subjectivity in the docile person inasmuch as one's own learning will determine just how learned another person is in relation to him.

Although docility cannot be an integral part of justice, since the two parts enumerated by St. Thomas suffice, however, docility is not concerned with the passions "wherein to do good is to observe the mean." Rather it follows justice in being concerned with external things, namely the learning received from another and the problem of how to make return payment.

It is only when we come to the special consideration of the potential parts of justice that the nature of docility becomes more evident. We shall consider under our first group religion, piety, and observance, all of which fail to attain the full stature of justice in their deficiency of paying in full the debt that is owed. As we proceed in our investigation we shall compare docility with the virtue under consideration making use of the knowledge that we already have from our definitions.

The first of the three virtues to be examined is religion, which directs man to God.⁴⁶ It is a special virtue for it gives due honor to God Who because of His singular excellence is most worthy of all praise. Exactly what aspect of the Divine Excellence does religion have for its object? "Religion is formally one unique and specific virtue because of the one formal reason

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 1.

of its object, namely, worship to God as the first and most universal Principle.”⁴⁷

Docility, as we know, gives respect and honor to a person because of his learning. How then shall we consider it as related to God, the first and most universal Principle? God can be viewed here exclusively under the aspect of Creator and we discover that He is the source of all knowledge. Not only did He make the objects that were to serve as man’s medium of learning; not only did He create the human soul endowing it with the cognoscitive faculty of intellect; but He is also the light of the intellect by reason⁴⁸ and has added another light, far exceeding any ability of unaided man, that of Faith. Hence, God is the ultimate source of all knowledge. It would not be enough to state that God possesses all knowledge. Docility can operate only towards those who impart their learning, not to those who hoard it. Through Revelation God has communicated to man the truths of the supernatural order and thus has made Himself a legitimate object for docility. By all means it can be said that one is docile to God and in a way far exceeding the docility he would give to others.

Although in God there are many titles for being honored by us, such as Father, which piety honors for us; Lord, which *dulia* renders to Him; as Benefactor, which gratitude renders; as King and Prince, which observance serves; and so forth; yet all are founded in that unique reason of first and most universal principle which religion regards. Hence religion itself honors God under all the above mentioned titles under a more eminent reason, and so it is eminently piety, observance, *dulia*, gratitude, and so forth. . . .⁴⁹

Hence the docility exhibited to God is an eminent docility. This special type and function of docility belongs to mystical theology. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange writes: “Mystical theology treats principally of docility to the Holy Ghost, of the infused

⁴⁷ Est religio formaliter una virtus atoma et specifica propter unam formalem rationem obiecti, nempe cultus Deo ut primo et universalissimo principio. . . . Salmanticenses, *Cursus Theol.* (Paris: 1870), VI, 450.

⁴⁸ In *Joan.* c. 1, lectio 3.

⁴⁹ Salmanticenses, *op. cit.* and *loc. cit.*

contemplation of the mysteries of faith, of the union with God which proceeds from it, and also of extraordinary graces, such as visions and revelations, which sometimes accompany infused contemplation.”⁵⁰ Since we are seeking the essence of docility in its proper nature rather than in its elevated state by reason of having God for its source of learning, we shall not include the docility annexed to religion in our future considerations.

After the virtue of religion, St. Thomas takes up that of piety. This second of the triumvirate of virtues rendering honor to others regards primarily one's parents and country.⁵¹ St. Thomas sums up the object and purpose of piety as follows:

Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellences and the various benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place. . . . In the second place, the principles of being and government. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore . . . does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.⁵²

Yet parents are more than merely the principles of a man's being. St. Thomas always recognized the truth that parents are the educators of their offspring as well. His arguments for the stability and indissolubility of marriage are based on the fact that parents are expected to bring their children to the perfect man, a creature of knowledge and virtue.⁵³ St. Thomas explicitly lists the offices of the father: “. . . a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life.”⁵⁴ With the mention of learning, once again docility comes to our attention. Parents are certainly teachers and it is normally from them that children are taught their first words, are instructed in the habits essential for daily living, and not infrequently initiated into

⁵⁰ R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *The Three Ages of the Interior Life* (St. Louis: 1947), I, 10.

⁵¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 101, a. 1,

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*; Suppl. q. 41, a. 1, and q. 67, a. 1.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 102, a. 1.

the truths of the supernatural order. The task of parents includes not only intellectual virtues but, often of greater importance in the life of a child, also moral training. Yet here, as in the case of docility towards God, we really are speaking of a preeminent type of the virtue towards such a special object as one's parents. With reference to parents docility falls under the sway of piety and may be considered as one of its functions.

In like manner, the debt one owes to his country is discharged, so far as it can be discharged at all, through the virtue of piety. By being a citizen of a nation one learns its spirit and is instructed in its traditions and educated to civil virtue. If we just consider the nation as a society capable of imparting its meaning to its citizens we must say that there is room for docility here also. Once again, as in the case of parents, this docility properly is a function of piety and is hence a special and eminent brand of docility rather than the special one that we are attempting to discover and analyse.

Finally we arrive at the virtue of observance. Speaking of this virtue St. Thomas remarks: "Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents, so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity."⁵⁵ And who are these persons in position of dignity? ". . . for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth."⁵⁶

This reverence and honor that we give to a professor in matters of learning flows from what we intend to show is the special virtue of docility. It is true that we have placed docility under both religion and piety. We have endeavored, however, to show that the docility owed to God is embraced under the virtue of religion itself. Thus all the acts that man renders to God under the aspect of paying a debt can be said to flow from the virtue of religion. Similarly, piety encompasses the docility due to parents and country. Both in the case of religion and

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

piety docility's object can be considered in this way: Docility to God regards God as teacher; docility to parents and country regards parents and country as teacher. But the proper docility that we wish to examine regards teacher as teacher.

Hence returning to observance, we note that, taking it as a genus, there are as many species under it as there are dignities to receive special reverence. Many of these virtues are without names because of our bankruptcy of vocabulary.⁵⁷ Such virtues thus bear only the common names of observance. For instance, there is no special name for the honor we pay to a general in his capacity as military leader and exemplar of the peculiar virtues of his type of life. Nor do we have any distinctive word for the acknowledgment of accomplishments due to those dedicated to the thespian art or to poetry, although such individuals hold a certain dignity in the community by reason of their unusual talents. However, in the case of the recognition of another's learning we do have a special name for the virtue that prompts such recognition, that of docility. Since docility is a species of observance it will share its nature. Therefore, we can consider the objects of observance and with but a minor qualification show that these are likewise the objects of docility.

The point of distinguishing virtues through their objects is for the purpose of clarification. Such a procedure has its foundation in philosophy. Thus the traditional example given is that of how we see. We are told that color is the immediate object of the eye and as a result of seeing colors we can behold all other colored material objects. Yet none of this would be possible were it not for light in the first place which serves as the medium by which all things are visible.⁵⁸ This outline, then, is used with much advantage in the field of the virtues.

It will be necessary to consider three objects: the primary and secondary material objects and the formal object.⁵⁹ Taken

⁵⁷ This is recognized by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* II, 7, 1108a 15.

⁵⁸ E. Hugon, O. P. *Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae* (Paris: 1920), I, 6.

⁵⁹ Cf. Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, I, 513 and footnote; Prümmer, *op. cit.*, I, 319-320. Fr. Merkelbach is closer to St. Thomas in his statement of the objects of a virtue, but many moralists use the same division as given by Fr. Prümmer. Thus, for them,

together the three objects form what is called the formal cause of the virtue.⁶⁰

b. *The Formal Cause of Docility*

Returning to observance we note that its secondary material object is the reverence and cult or honor that we give to superiors because of their excellence and our consequent submission to them. The primary material object of observance is to establish the debt of equality between the honor exhibited and the right of the superior to such consideration. The formal object or the proximate motive is the special honesty of the said equality.⁶¹

Now the only change in the case of docility will be in the secondary material object. Observance is the generic virtue. It gives reverence and honor to superiors because of their excellence. There is no specification as to that in which the excellence consists. When this excellence is learning then we have a determined object upon which observance can operate. This in turn gives determination to the virtue which we call docility. In other words, when the general virtue of observance regards a person established in some dignity and the person considered is a professor in matters of learning we have a specific determination and hence a species under observance which is named docility. That docility is a formally distinct virtue from observance will be established later. Since we have here given the formal cause of docility at least in its broad outline, it would be well to discuss its material object and thus terminate the treatment of docility from the point of view of its nature.

the material object is all that which the virtue treats. The *obiectum formale quod* is that which it immediately attains and by reason of which all others are reached. The *obiectum formale quo* is that by whose medium the *obiectum formale quod* is attained. However, when treating of Faith, St. Thomas simply makes the distinction of material and formal. Cf. II-II, q. 1, a. 1. We have followed this method and hence use Fr. Merkelbach's analysis of the objects of the virtues that we shall consider.

⁶⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 3.

⁶¹ Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, II, 811.

There need be no delay over the second group of virtues annexed to justice as potential parts. Since we have already shown that docility is connected with justice through observance, it can hardly be expected that some other virtue will also serve this purpose. Secondly, the notion of debt in the remaining five potential parts differs from the obligation that docility is prepared to fulfill.⁶² St. Thomas views these remaining potential parts of justice as rendering a moral debt as contrasted with the legal debt of religion, piety, and observance.

c. *The Material Cause of Docility*

In determining the material cause of docility our concern will be with a point already made, namely, that docility is annexed to justice as a potential part through the medium of observance. It might be well to recall, in passing, that since virtues are accidents and because accidents do not exist independently of a subject, we can legitimately designate the subject of an accidental form its material cause, by way of analogy to a substantially composed being in which the subject of the substantial form is always matter.⁶³ Hence, when we speak of the material cause of an accident we mean its subject of inherence. Thus to determine the material cause of docility is nothing else than to discover to what faculty of the soul it properly belongs.

We already know that docility imitates the mode of justice. Therefore, we can conclude to its material cause or the subject of that virtue. With St. Thomas we note:

... if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.⁶⁴

⁶² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 80.

⁶³ Cf. *de Virtut. in Comm.*, a. 3 and F. X. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae* (Paris: 1938), III, 164 et seq.

⁶⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 56, a. 6.

Docility falls under the "such like" inasmuch as it is connected with justice in precisely that aspect of giving what is due to others. The will, then, is the subject of docility and this constitutes the material cause of what we hope to establish as the virtue of docility.

Consequently, we agree with Mortimer Adler when he writes: "I place docility in the group of virtues annexed to justice, for it consists in rendering to teachers what is their due."⁶⁵ By docility we attain "a right attitude" towards teachers.⁶⁶ The debt that each student owes the true source of wisdom is so tremendous that he can never fully repay it. The master of a science has spent years in accumulating his fund of knowledge. Through the powers of his mind and unremitting application, the teacher has acquired a depth of understanding in his particular field of learning. The pupil approaches him with but a mite of doctrine and receives from the man of learning all the benefit of his study and investigation. What can the pupil give in return? Since justice in its perfection demands equivalent payment, we see immediately that such an arrangement is impossible in this case. There is no equality here. All the giving has been from the professor and all the receiving by the learner. The latter cannot return knowledge for knowledge because that would be pointless. Were he to pay the teacher money or give him a service, it would be but a gesture or sign of appreciation, it still would not recompense adequately for the knowledge received. Just as a son can never fully repay his father for his natural life,⁶⁷ so too a student cannot adequately recompense his teacher who by imparting knowledge has, as it were, given life to his intellect. Thus we return to what was said before, namely, that docility falls short of the essential nature of justice as an equality in repaying what is due.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 14.

⁶⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 10.

3. THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

Having determined the material and formal causes of docility, it is a relatively simple step to the definite demonstration that docility is a virtue. St. Thomas employs various middle terms in his syllogisms establishing that a particular human habit is a virtue. The most obvious method is to show that the habit under scrutiny equates the definition of virtue. In this way the habit is placed in the genus of virtue. From this generic notion St. Thomas can then go on to discover whether the good habit is a special virtue. Aristotle defined virtue as that which renders a human act and man himself good.⁶⁹ Now docility does that since it establishes a just relation between man and man.

How docility is a special virtue must be determined from its object. A virtue is distinct by reason of the fact that it regards its object in a special way, regards in it a distinctive formality.⁷⁰ Examining the original definitions of docility word by word will bring out the special trait to be found in that virtue. Docility is concerned with the acquiring of knowledge, not with imparting it or correlating it. The former would pertain to teaching, the latter to philosophy and science. It is the acquisition of knowledge, not of money, fame, or even virtue that is docility's forte. Finally the knowledge is had from others, not from one's own efforts.

It has been sufficiently established that docility belongs to the will by reason of its connection with the virtue of observance. Is it so connected with observance that it cannot be independent? A superficial reading of St. Thomas might lead one to conclude that docility is not a special virtue. In formulating an objection that observance is not a special virtue, St. Thomas writes:

Further, just as honor and worship are due to those who are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay

⁶⁹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 6.

⁷⁰ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 101, a. 3.

honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.⁷¹

Our interest here is, of course, with the minor of the syllogism. St. Thomas replies:

. . . the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself . . . for as much as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.⁷²

Certainly this line of reasoning would seem to rule out the possibility of making docility a distinct virtue. However, we must understand very precisely just what is the mind of St. Thomas on the qualities required for a special virtue. We are attempting to show that docility is a species of observance. Hence it is true to say that all respect paid to persons by reason of their excellence belongs to observance in the sense, namely, that every species belongs to its genus. The same difficulty comes up under the question of obedience. St. Thomas inquires whether there is a special kind of obedience for each different type of superior.

Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special virtues.⁷³

This example exactly parallels our own problem. Whereas we are maintaining that docility is a species of observance, someone else might come and argue that there is a special virtue for each type of superior obeyed. St. Thomas in answering this objection also solves our problem:

Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits of various species according to the various aspects of ex-

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, q. 102, a. 1, ad 2.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 2, ad 2.

cellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect.⁷⁴

Hence, while obedience regards the precept and not the person and thus has no species, observance regards the excellence and therefore can have species. When the excellence considered is a teacher's learning as teacher, then we have the virtue of docility. It is important to recall that docility considers the teacher as teacher. One is held by the general virtue of observance to respect the learning of all men of letters. This is true even if these men never teach any one nor write a book for others to use in studying. Thus, for example, a Doctor of Canon Law would be entitled to reverence for his learning even if he had entered a Trappist Monastery immediately upon completion of his course of studies and consequently never taught a day in his life. But as teacher, the honor and respect is due not only because of his excellence in learning but also in view of the added quality of principle in relation to others, namely, he is directive of the minds of his pupils to knowledge.

We can conclude that docility is a species of observance having all the characteristics of its genus virtue but finding in its object a special aspect that gives a new determination to observance and makes it docility. From all the information gathered it is now fitting to formulate an integral definition of the virtue of docility. We say: *docility is a moral virtue connected with justice through observance, whereby one renders the honor and attention due to one whose excellence in learning merits such respect and reverence.*

We do not have to seek the authority of any philosopher or theologian in order to establish the existence of docility. The need for such a quality is evident to reason from the very nature of man. In learning, he must begin by proceeding in the dark, blindly following the leadership of a more learned person than he is. From man's own experience, he realizes that he owes a debt to those who have given him knowledge and who continue to do so.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Likewise, he is aware of the respect and honor he owes the teacher. The very sense of justice within man tells him to pay the debt he owes by the means at his disposal. Upon consideration, he will discover that the only method is by rendering honor and attention. Of course, he will not formulate his conclusion clearly nor even necessarily be conscious of what he is doing. Nevertheless, it is true that he is exercising the virtue of docility.

Indeed, any teacher can perceive this virtue in his pupils. He might misname it obedience or call it by some vague term such as good-will or cooperation, but if he had the precision of the philosopher he would call the respect and honor he receives by the name of docility. The teacher is also aware of this attention he deserves and that he is not unreasonable in demanding it in his pupils. Thus we see from either side of the professorial chair, in the pupil or in the teacher, that at least the acts of docility are evident to anyone who looks and observes.

a. Docility and Related Virtues

i. The Cardinal Virtues

Although we have shown that docility is annexed to justice as a potential part, for the sake of completeness we shall now point out why it could not be otherwise. By a process of elimination we thus shall have an indirect argument for maintaining that docility must belong to justice. This is a valid method of procedure but, of course, it has many limitations. It merely shows what a virtue is not, not what it is. However, in our case what docility is already has been determined. At the end of this section we shall have established that docility does not belong to prudence, fortitude, or temperance. That much we could easily conclude to even now. Yet, a special examination of these three cardinal virtues will give us the why and perhaps a few more insights into the nature and function of docility.

Recalling our remarks on prudence, we should note here that

we no longer view docility under its role of integral part of that virtue, for in this capacity it can never attain the status of a true virtue. But what are docility's chances of being a subjective or potential part of prudence? Such possibilities evaporate under the heat of examination. Prudence is the right reason of doing things and is especially manifest in its three acts of counsel, judgment, and command.⁷⁵ Docility will not be a subjective part of this virtue, for as stated above it does not go beyond the act of counsel. Thus it cannot perfectly share in the nature of prudence either as an integral part, which is patent, or as an independent virtue.

The potential parts of prudence listed by St. Thomas are eubulia perfecting the act of counsel, which point we have already discussed, and synthesis and gnome perfecting the act of judgment.⁷⁶ To these docility does not pertain. In order to be a potential part of a virtue it is necessary to imitate its mode in some way.⁷⁷ With regard to eubulia, the docility which is an integral part of prudence is perfective of it antecedently insofar as it is informative to counsel itself. This aspect of docility was given adequate treatment early in this article. We conclude, therefore, that the virtue of docility is not annexed to prudence, although there is no doubt that a man is certainly being prudent if he is also docile. However, that is true in practising any virtue.

We next consider the credentials of fortitude in claiming docility for itself. There is no difficulty in showing that docility will not be a subjective part of that virtue, for as St. Thomas points out: "But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter."⁷⁸ The possibilities of being a potential part, again as with prudence, depend on a consideration of the mode of fortitude. This cardinal virtue has for its special function the double role of

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 47, a. 1.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 51, aa. 1-4.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 134, a. 4, ad 2; q. 137, a. 2, ad 1; q. 157, a. 3, ad 2; q. 161, a. 4.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 128.

withstanding the dangers of death arising from perils and the brave advance to such dangers when reason demands. There is nothing in the nature of docility that indicates so glamorous a career for its possessor. Teachers and books can sometimes be deadly with the poison of error but when they are, docility refuses to have any part with them at all. Although one might picture a martyr being docile to the executioner as to how to place his head on the block, the mite of knowledge gained hardly would warrant one in making docility a potential part of fortitude. Such a situation is unusual and purely circumstantial to docility.

Temperance is the virtue regulative of man's moral life as regards the pleasures of touch especially insofar as these are concerned with the perpetuation of the species and the individual himself.⁷⁹ Under this aspect docility would seem to have little in common with temperance. One does not eat a book, much less a teacher, except under most unusual circumstances and then not out of any spirit of justice or desire for learning. Nor does docility have any immediate connection with matrimony. However, we shall show now that docility does find some virtues belonging to temperance that seem to share its own characteristics.

ii. Virtues that Appear Like Docility

After our consideration of the cardinal virtues we can now investigate those virtues that, on first sight, seem to have such common notes with docility that they might seem to be identical with it. Under this heading we shall consider four such virtues. The procedure will be simply to bring out the very essence of the virtue selected and compare it with docility. In this way it should be evident in what they agree and differ. The virtues chosen for this comparative study are obedience, meekness, humility, and studiousness. We shall focus our investigation first on obedience which as a species of observance and consequently a potential part of justice deserves first place.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 141, a. 3.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 1.

Obedience according to St. Thomas is based on the very order of nature itself.

Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural things it behooves the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.⁸¹

Obedience has for its special object a tacit or expressed command.⁸² This is its secondary material object or the matter about which it concerns itself. Docility, on the other hand, has for its secondary material object the reverence or honor due to teachers because of their excellence in learning. The primary material object of obedience also differs from that of docility. Obedience establishes the due equality between the acts executing the precept and the right of the superior to have those acts carried out.⁸³ Docility strives to establish the debt of equality between the honor exhibited and the right of the teacher to such reverence because of his learning. The virtues agree in their formal object since both are species of observance and consequently potential parts of justice.

Perhaps the fundamental reason for confusing the two virtues is that they usually go together in the same person. We normally think of a pupil as owing both docility and obedience to his teacher. The teacher has the right to the first by reason of his learning; he is generally given the second since he stands in the place of the pupil's parents or guardians who have jurisdiction from the very nature of things. Yet, the two virtues need not be so closely related. For students in colleges or universities we do not conceive of the teacher as also one to

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 2.

⁸³ Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, II, 813-814.

whom obedience is due. In such institutions of higher learning, rules and regulations are drawn up and violations are referred to the dean of discipline. The teacher receives only as much honor as his learning entitles him to and in no way is viewed as an exercise boy in obedience. Thus the similarity between docility and obedience is reduced considerably. Both have the same material cause, being, as they are, rooted in the will. Both attempt to pay the debt due to a superior: docility to the person of learning; obedience to the lawfully constituted authority. Each contains an element of submission.⁸⁴ Obedience's flows from the order of nature itself, unless it is religious obedience and then the motive is supernatural. Docility's submissiveness results from the docile person's awareness of his inadequacies in knowledge. However, they differ, as we have shown, in their material objects. Therefore, we can conclude that docility and obedience are not one and the same virtue but both are species of observance and parts of justice.

Superficially meekness might be confused with docility. Yet when one recalls its definition such confusion vanishes. Meekness is a virtue that moderates according to right reason anger and the desire for revenge.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, meekness does have a role to play with regard to knowledge. St. Thomas brings this out in an objection and its solution. In formulating an objection concerned with knowledge of God, St. Thomas says: "Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James 1:21): With meekness receive the ingrafted word, and (Ecclus. 5:13): Be meek to hear the word of God." He replies: "Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger . . . ; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger."⁸⁶ This is simply another case of two virtues operating on like matter but for different

⁸⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 9, ad 1.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 157, a. 1.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 157, a. 4, ad 1.

reasons. Meekness, a potential part of temperance, helps a man considerably to attain learning, just as docility does. Meekness accomplishes its purpose by restraining one of man's unreasonable appetites, which, unrestrained, would interfere with, or render impossible that attainment of knowledge. Docility does it by paying the debt of reverence and attention due to one who is imparting the knowledge.

The note of reverence in docility might lead one to identify this virtue with that of humility, one of whose outstanding traits is to revere. "We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake . . ." ⁸⁷

The truth of the matter is that, if we scrutinize the nature of humility, we discover how unlike docility it really is. Humility is a potential part of temperance ⁸⁸ contained under modesty as one of its species. ⁸⁹ The special matter of humility is ". . . to temper and restrain the mind lest it tend to high things immoderately." ⁹⁰ In technical language the complete dichotomy between docility and humility is made evident. Both differ in their material cause. Humility is essentially in the irascible appetite ⁹¹ although it has its rule in knowledge and is considered principally in the will when it is about a spiritual good. Docility is not concerned with the lower appetite but is both essentially and principally in the will. The objects of humility are vastly different from docility's. Humility has a twofold office, namely, of suppressing the inordinate desire for one's own excellence and of subjecting oneself to God. Hence, aside from the element of reverence intrinsic to both, humility and docility have little common ground.

Perhaps no virtue more than studiousness would be associated in the popular mind with docility. Both are immediately concerned with knowledge. Both call forth visions of impetuous

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 161, a. 3, ad 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 143.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 161, prologue.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 161, a. 1.

⁹¹ Prümmer, *op. cit.*, II, 547.

anxiety to learn with a keen application to study. Yet from St. Thomas' treatment of studiousness it is plain that it is purely gratuitous to identify docility with it. His doctrine on studiousness is neatly summed up in an answer to an objection:

But as regards knowledge man has contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination, studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.⁹²

Doubtless more virtues could be listed as appearing like docility. All virtues are so intimately connected that each helps the other in some way and thus takes on some of its beauty and comeliness. To enumerate them all would merely be to build up straw men in order to knock them down. It is, of course, true that all four of these virtues play a part in the perfect functioning of docility. Something of this interaction will be discussed later.

b. *Docility and Its Sources of Information*

Having considered what is essential to docility, we may add one note of an accidental nature. Since docility is about learning from others, the question arises concerning its sources of information. We have called the object of docility many times by the simple designation of "teacher." In doing this we do not mean to make docility exclusively a classroom virtue. On the contrary, the word "teacher" was used in a wide sense.

⁹² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 166, a. 2, ad 3.

Returning once again to the explicit treatment given docility by St. Thomas, we read the following: "Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters."⁹³ From Sylvius we add a reason why old folks are particularly worthy to be consulted: "... they have learned much both from great length of time and many experiences."⁹⁴ Besides those whom years have made wise, we have the scholars. Of them we read in St. Thomas: "Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence . . . he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned. . . ."⁹⁵ But not only the living are sources of information. As to documents, Cajetan advises his reader: "... and attend how great a solicitude prudence demands for the documents of the great. And add that docility calls forth not only the records and suggestions of the great but also of the lesser so that reason can perfectly discourse. And note that negligence and contempt of hearing the living and those now dead is the mother of imprudence."⁹⁶ This distinction of dead and living teachers was a favorite of Mortimer Adler in his *How to Read a Book*. His observation from his article on docility is of interest: "Books are instruments of instruction, and obviously call for docility in those who would learn from them, as much as living teachers do."⁹⁷ Hence docility is of tremendous consequence to the student whether he is in the presence of a great teacher in the classroom or in the company of a great book in his study. All the true sources of learning merit the reverence and attention that are given by the docile person.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, q. 49, a. 3.

⁹⁴ Maxime indiget homo erudiri ab aliis, praesertim senibus, qui et temporis diuturnitate, et multis experientiis plurima didicerunt. Franciscus Sylvius, *Commentarium in Totam Secundam Secundae* (Venice: 1726), III, 214.

⁹⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 3, ad 2.

⁹⁶ Cajetan, *op. cit.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

⁹⁷ Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

4. THE PROPERTIES OF DOCILITY

With the consideration of what pertains to the essence of docility completed, we can now examine the properties that flow from its nature. Every virtue has its special characteristics and marks. Sylvius gives us a very general idea on this point as regards our virtue: "Docility is called that by which anyone is prompt and ready in receiving discipline . . ." ⁹⁸ Of course promptness and readiness are generic to all virtue. Yet in docility they do take on a special significance. This importance rests on the fact that the virtue of docility gives its possessor two basic truths. First, he realizes that he owes a debt to his teacher because of that person's excellence in learning; secondly, he sees that as a pupil he is incapable of adequately paying this debt. Impressed with these, the pupil does the one thing most demonstrative of his appreciation for his teacher's efforts, namely, he gives full cooperation to his instructor.

The attention that a student gives his professor is indicative of his readiness and promptness for learning and is the first property of docility. Lack of attention would show not only a want of interest in the subject taught but also a grave shortcoming in the respect the teacher has a right to expect. Attention is the act of the mind applying itself to some one thing. This attention can be perfect or imperfect depending on whether the pupil's intellect is intent on the object of consideration or remiss in its application.⁹⁹ For the docile person there is, of course, no alternative but to be attentive. The primary material object of docility is the endeavor to establish the debt of equality between the honor exhibited to the teacher and that teacher's right to such consideration. There is no better way to attain some degree of success in paying the debt due to the teacher than for the pupil to be wholly intent on the exposition of truth given by the teacher.

Two further properties of docility are evident from a statement of Msgr. Kerby: "Docility involves openness of mind

⁹⁸ Sylvius, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

⁹⁹ Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, II, 694-695.

and a certain hesitation in taking attitudes.”¹⁰⁰ Certainly one who closes his mind to all the founts of learning is incapable of practising the virtue of docility. Hence one must listen to his teacher or read his book with the attitude of mind that these sources of information have something worthwhile to offer. When the reputation of a teacher or writer is well established then the pupil should have no fear in accepting the directives or facts that are offered. If the pupil lacks openness of mind, all the efforts of the teacher are frustrated. In a word, open-mindedness is the ready acceptance of the instruction imparted by the teacher.

The hesitation that Msgr. Kerby mentions is not a pugnacious attitude but rather is indicative of the docile man's realization of his need for guidance. He is uncertain and in a state of cogitation. This reaction is found more in the college and post-graduate student than in pupils of the grammar and high school levels. These latter do not have the background necessary for independent judgment and it is this trait in the student that causes him some delay in accepting all the doctrine presented to him. Hesitation is, therefore, not found in all pupils but only in those already familiar with the field in which they are receiving instruction. In final analysis, hesitation seems less a property and more an accidental circumstance that sometimes finds its way into docility.

A final property of docility is submissiveness. Since the teacher must be held in honor because of his excellence in learning, the debt of reverence is always present in docility. The prime motive and end of honor is reverence.¹⁰¹ This reverence can only show itself by a fitting submission and a willing acknowledgment of dependence on the teacher. Without submission and the awareness of dependence the honor exhibited would be a mere external thing void of any meaning in the pupil. The student, by docility, realizes that the teacher is giving him the knowledge he lacks and thus the honor given is the outward sign of the interior disposition to follow the directions of the teacher in matters of learning.

¹⁰⁰ Kerby, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

¹⁰¹ Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, II, 435.

Dr. Adler adds several other properties: "There is also an element of gratitude in docility, responsive to the charity of teaching; and an element of humility, because through docility we are rightly ordered to superiors."¹⁰² We can also add that obedience, meekness, and studiosity, although not properties in the strict sense, have integral roles to play in the virtue of docility. These virtues have already been distinguished from docility, yet their part in its perfect function remains to be seen.

Obedience helps to keep man's rational appetite, his will, in proper rectitude towards his sources of knowledge. Since a teacher is one who disciplines the mind of his pupil, of necessity he must give his students certain commands. If the student is unwilling to obey the directive norms of the professor then the efforts of the professor are nullified. The pupil is one searching for truth. It is the task of the teacher to tell him where to find it. A student who refuses to follow the suggestions of the teacher is unreasonable in remaining in class. In the course of studies the good student will encounter difficulties. It is here that he especially needs the advice of a teacher. The obedient student will carry out the methods advanced by his teacher for solving intellectual problems. This simple intellectual obedience is crucial to the successful functioning of docility. In its turn, docility makes the pupil attentive and submissive and consequently makes reasonable the obedience to the teacher that all discipline demands.

Meekness does the rectifying in man's irascible appetite. Nothing is more disastrous to learning than an antagonistic attitude toward the teacher on the part of the pupil. In such an atmosphere, the classroom is turned into a gridiron whereon the pupil is constantly attempting to steal the authority of the teacher for himself. There is no objection to honest difficulties and sincere requests for an exposition of some obscure point. Rather, a problem arises when the pupil assumes a role of equality or even of superiority and tries to match his imagined talents against the genuine learning of the teacher. What the

¹⁰² Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

teacher should do is a matter of pedagogy, but what the pupil obviously lacks is meekness. With such a lacuna in his virtuous life, docility would be impossible. Meekness, then, moderates the impetuosity of youth in thinking that he knows all the answers.

Humility, of course, strengthens docility's attitude of reverence, a point that has already been treated. Since humility is a part of temperance it will have the moderating effect on docility somewhat along the lines of meekness.¹⁰³ Both meekness and humility respect the irascible appetite. In checking the individual's passion of hope, humility does the important service for docility of keeping the pupil from depending too much on his own efforts. Thus mindful of his limitations the pupil is so much the better disposed to be attentive in class because he realizes that such concentration will be his best means for comprehending the subject being taught to him.

Finally, studiosity keeps aflame in the student the desire for knowledge. Learning at times entails a certain degree of drudgery. Laziness can be traced to man's lower nature and the impediment to learning that this causes is removed by studiousness. Yet primarily, this virtue annexed to temperance restrains the immoderate desire of seeking knowledge beyond one's capacity.¹⁰⁴ It will be noticed that there is a certain degree of overlapping in the influence of the virtues just treated in the student's life. Their cumulative force, however, makes docility's perfect exercise possible.

a. *The Effects of Docility*

i. In Daily Living

From the properties of docility and from the information on the nature of this virtue, it is now possible to consider its effects. In general it can be said that the field of docility is as wide as is one's need for guidance.¹⁰⁵ The stranger in a new

¹⁰³ Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, II, 970.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 976.

¹⁰⁵ "It is highly unlikely that we shall ever meet a man who is inferior to us

town can exercise the virtue in the presence of a twelve year old child who gives him street directions. Since docility is exhibited to persons of learning, then the most common place for its flowering will be the classroom and, in the case of dead teachers, in the company of books. Docility is in a sense the sesame that opens the passage to learning. It removes the stone that would block the progress of one's advance in knowledge.

Specifically, the most important effect of docility is the intellectual formation that it gives the mind of the student. The teacher molds the mind of his pupils. In the classroom not only facts are explained but training of the intellect is afforded. It cannot be denied that those taught the system of Aristotle, for instance, and that of Schopenhauer are vastly different products when they leave school. Sometimes students remain impervious to this important effect of docility either because they receive no one definite kind of discipline or have minds not quite capable of such precise formation.

A second effect of docility is the ease in learning that it offers the pupil. Unable to conquer the vast field of learning unaided, the student finds in the teacher one who is both a guidepost and the travelling companion of his studies. The teacher is a guidepost in his role of showing the direction in which the pupil should go. This end in view is, of course, truth. The teacher is the student's companion inasmuch as he imparts knowledge to his pupil little by little and in proportion to the student's intellectual ability. Likewise the teacher lessens the burden of study. He directs the student to the best sources of learning and relieves him of much of the weariness attached to research. In short, docility makes it possible for students to profit from the knowledge of others.

Considered in the pupil himself, one of the principal effects of docility is its tranquilizing influence. It is said of St. Thomas

in every way; that is, in every man there will be some title to superiority on the basis of which he has just claim to the payment we reserve for unpayable debts, namely, honor and reverence, with a certain amount of subjection." Walter Farrell, O.P., "Virtues of the Household," *The Thomist* X (1947), p. 364.

that, because of his huge physique and his reticence in class, he gained the uncomplimentary nickname of "Dumb Ox." If the fact of his non-loquaciousness is true, it would be but a logical effect of docility. The docile pupil does not try to turn the professor's lecture into a contest of matching wits. Not that docility opposes questions from the pupil. It does, nevertheless, impose a momentary silence to allow time for grasping the doctrine expounded rather than have one blurt out with a thoughtless question. Docility also causes calmness in the pupil from the fact that it removes the fear of error. The pupil who feels himself being led by a competent guide can dismiss any apprehensions of erring.

In reading books docility's role is of prime importance. It is always possible to ask a professor to clarify his statement. This is not so easy with the author of a book and often impossible if said author is deceased. In reading the great masters, docility imposes an attitude of reverence on the student or the scholar. The docile person reads a master bearing in mind that he is trying to understand what the author has to teach. Docility wards off the constant temptation of finding fault with an accepted authority. It is easy to blame the author for one's own lack of penetration. Docility both gives one the determination to pursue one's study and restrains one from dismissing a worthy author on flimsy grounds. This effect of docility flows from its inherent note of justice towards others.

The virtue of docility is put to its severest test in the so-called Socratic method of pedagogy. Under this form of teaching, the pupil is led along by the teacher from what knowledge the pupil already has acquired. The fund of information is constantly challenged in order to make the pupil see its deeper meaning. Under such duress, the pupil readily sees his own shortcomings in so vivid a way that if he lacks docility he will inevitably fall into a rebellious attitude toward his teacher. He will become resentful of the embarrassing exposé of his own inadequacies. On the other hand, the student possessed of docility will accept the exercise as a mental treat and a valuable means for giving him a more profound knowledge of what

he previously knew imperfectly while also opening the way to new learning.

Docility is not the panacea to cure all the failures current in teaching circles today. Along with the other virtues of justice, however, it can do much to remedy the unfortunate state of affairs now upon us. Docility is needed in the pupil if the teacher is to have any success in conveying his matter. An indocile pupil can raise an iron curtain as impenetrable as any in the political order. Docility, on the other hand, makes the task of teaching considerably lighter and is a source of encouragement to the teacher in his arduous task.

ii. In the Spiritual Life

Docility to the Holy Ghost and all the inspirations of God pertains to a special aspect of that virtue. Although we eliminated an *ex professo* treatment of supernatural docility from our present consideration, a few words on the relationship of docility to spiritual direction is justified here. God communicates Himself to man through the ministry of man. Priests by reason of ordination and canonical jurisdiction have the task of sanctifying the faithful towards their supernatural end. This includes not only governing the members of the Church but also the office of teaching.¹⁰⁶ There is, consequently, a correspondent duty on the part of the faithful to be docile to the priest.

The priest is particularly a teacher in the pulpit and the confessional. The Sunday instruction deserves a docile audience especially since such guidance as the priest gives in his sermon has for its end supernatural life. In like manner, and in some respects even more so, is this necessity for docility true of confession. There the priest has the soul of an individual exposed to his judgment. With the special graces of the Sacrament and the help of the Holy Ghost, the priest advises the penitent as to a course of action in his spiritual life. To fail in docility under such circumstances would be

¹⁰⁶ Prümmer, *op. cit.*, III, p. 279.

dangerous. Yet scrupulous persons are undoubtedly failing in docility when they cling to their own will in spite of the superior knowledge and position of their spiritual director.

The need for docility toward ecclesiastical authorities is one that should be stressed. The laity as a whole has a serious obligation to follow the advice given by the Holy Father and the other shepherds of souls. Pronouncements on labor, warnings against the dangers of materialism and the general pagan atmosphere of the world are not only to be read by the faithful but to be studied in a docile spirit. Disciplinary measures, the reasons for which are not always readily available, require a docile subject if they are to be effective. Suffice it to say on this point of docility in the spiritual life that those who practise docility towards Church, parents, country, and teachers have an excellent indication that it is flourishing also in the supernatural order under the Holy Ghost.

b. *Vices Opposed to Docility*

Every cloud has its silver lining, but each virtue manages to find itself in competition with several opposing vices. The fact that virtue stands in the middle¹⁰⁷ invariably leads to the discussion of the vicious habits that lie in ambush on the side of the road. In the case of docility there is no exception. There are two extremes to which a man can go and therefore exceed or fail to attain the mean of the virtue of docility.

The more obvious of these is indocility. Docility means paying the debt due to another for his learning; indocility refuses the payment. It is not a question of not realizing another's superiority and consequently one's inferiority. If one honestly did not recognize the difference, then ignorance might excuse. Indocility is present when an individual is very much appraised of the true state of affairs but flatly refuses to act in the fitting way about it. There is an air of self-sufficiency on the part of the indocile person. However, his viciousness comes from his failure to render to a man of learning what is his due. Such

¹⁰⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 6.

accidental considerations as the personality of the teacher, the type of print within the book are extrinsic to docility. Yet these often form petty excuses for justifying indocility. The man of knowledge has a special dignity from the very fact of his erudition and the book has value from the truths that it contains. The indocile person passes over these sources as though they had no pertinency to his own progress in learning.

The person who is without docility is also lacking in gratitude, reverence, and submission to the source of learning. This results from his bad attitude towards one who is capable of teaching him. Since no one, in the ordinary run of things, is ever intuitively endowed with all knowledge, docility towards teachers is not an optional virtue. One cannot presuppose that he knows everything or can learn all things on his own. Such is patent folly and thus this deordination is rightly considered to be a sin. It is against justice and we call it indocility.

Indocility has some interesting contrasts with docility. Whereas the latter causes the pupil to be attentive, indocility results in either an attitude of indifference or of a hostile, fault-finding, perverted attention. Lack of interest will be found in the lazy pupil who has little or no appreciation of his obligation to perfect his intellect with truth or his will by giving each man his due. Such a spirit of unconcern for his teacher's efforts is negatively, at least, irreverent and ungrateful.

When a student is not slothful but adopts rather a certain approach of tolerance and condescendence towards all sources of learning, he readily becomes the eclectic. This is the great intellectual compromiser. He refuses docility to all, has loyalties to none, and never fulfills his obligation in justice of giving each man his due. The eclectic views himself as a liberal. He conceives of himself as broadminded and not like the rest of men who confine themselves to one stuffy system of thought and thus stymie their mental progress. Without, in all probability, realizing it, the eclectic is too proud to be docile and too lacking in perseverance to master any one school of thought. He remains always the antique collector among thinkers, gathering, as he does, into the storeroom of his mind the old

thoughts of various, and even conflicting, teachers. Like a man without a country, he owes allegiance to no one. The eclectic is the man who has discovered an intellectual jig-saw puzzle whose parts can never be fitted together.

Another exponent of indocility is the skeptic. Included under this heading are the agnostic, freethinker, and just plain ordinary unbeliever. The skeptic questions the fundamental doctrines of religion and philosophy and refuses to acknowledge as valid the accepted conclusions of either. Docility is practically unknown to the skeptic. He has created in himself a psychological block that prevents him from acquiring knowledge from others and limits himself, therefore, merely to opinions freighted with doubts. By his very refusal to admit man's ability to learn truth with certainty, the skeptic eliminates the possibility of having a debt to pay others as teachers of truth. The skeptic particularly lacks the humility and meekness that are integral to docility if this virtue is to exist in the individual.

At the other extreme from the vice of indocility, there is slavery of the mind to a teacher. Actually one so afflicted is not seeking to learn the truth but instead tries to learn or parrot what another says. This vice is called subservience¹⁰⁸ and consists in an unreasonable submission to a person's genuine or merely apparent excellence in doctrine. This defect from docility offers difficulties not found in indocility. It has been repeated frequently that docility fails to measure up to the nature of justice because it cannot pay the full debt due to the teacher. Subservience gives one the impression of paying too much.

The question is less one of paying too much and more one of rendering the honor and respect to the wrong individual. It is the old story of robbing Peter in order to pay Paul. Not every instrument of discipline is worthy of docility. Some who occupy the seats of learning are not clothed with the robes of pure truth. Although the pupil may not discover this immedi-

¹⁰⁸ Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

ately, once the fact is known, then, of course, any obligation of docility ceases. As shown above, docility does not make that decision; this is left to the intellectual virtue involved in the situation. Once this virtue has definite proof of incompetence, then the pupil no longer owes docility to the pseudo-master. Hence, the vice of subservience would occur in the case where a person tenaciously submitted to one who had been proven unworthy of honor as a teacher.

Yet what must be said of the pupil who goes to a recognized source of learning and acts like a sponge lapping up the waters of wisdom? In other words, he merely accepts every conclusion without any attempt to understand the premises. He is so awed by the intellectual acumen of his master that he accepts everything proposed and commits it to memory considering himself lucky to have discovered this royal road to knowledge. Obviously someone is being short-changed in this payment of the debt of docility. Pertinent to this Mortimer Adler notes: "... for Catholic students, in contrast to those in our secular colleges, the motion should be away from subservience."¹⁰⁹ Apparently Professor Adler found a supernatural hangover in his Catholic students who, by reason of the gift of Faith, assent to Divine Truth without hesitation.¹¹⁰ Whether or not Dr. Adler's analysis is correct is not at issue here. In any event, whoever accepts truths knowable by the natural light of reason on purely human authority when he is perfectly capable of understanding them by his own effort is guilty of subservience. Such an individual has opinion, not knowledge. He may even have a conviction but it is not intellectual, it

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 506.

¹¹⁰ Perhaps Dr. Adler is a bit too generous in his evaluation of both Catholic and secular students. It could be just a case of ordinary laziness that makes the Catholic student so ready to accept all doctrine without dispute and the same vice in secular students who simply do not bother to penetrate the doctrine presented and find an easy out by rejecting it. If that is too stern a judgment, it is not meant to be uncharitable. But the truth of the matter is that there are relatively few good speculative minds in the world—and they would be the only ones who would actually analyse each nugget of truth presented to the natural powers of reason. For most pupils it is a case of the lecture going in one ear and out the other and with just enough cramming at exam time to pass a mid-term or a final.

is volitional. The abuse of docility comes from the fact of substituting it for the intellectual virtue by which the student should have learned the subject of instruction.

We cannot, however, pass over this problem of subservience without some further remarks. There is a vast difference in approaching a teacher such as St. Thomas Aquinas and one of the calibre of Karl Marx. The doctrine of St. Thomas has been canonized, as it were, by the Church. The errors of Marx, on the other hand, have been condemned. Thus, one goes to St. Thomas as to a guide. One takes up Marx with a critical mind, not a docile spirit. Any philosopher whose doctrine is infected with error should be read only by those who have solid principles for judging what they read. Docility has no place here in spite of the possibilities of discovering some truths among the falsehoods. Purveyors of errors lack the excellence required for docility. It would be intellectual idolatry to bow down before the graven images of false science.

When one reads a master of knowledge such as St. Thomas, if one fails to grasp at once certain truths, he would be most rash to place the blame on St. Thomas instead of first trying harder to understand what the Angelic Doctor said. Only pygmy minds or intellectual midgets read the intellectual great with an attitude of trying to discover something wrong in their works. These dwarfs of the classroom are indocile and have completely gone to the extreme opposite of subservience. What it comes down to is that they have accepted the teachings and principles of no master and hence are matching their microscopic brains against the penetrating minds of the ages.

We conclude, therefore, that there are two vices opposed to docility. That which is by reason of defect is named indocility, while subservience designates the excess of the mean of the virtue. Indocility appears to be the more opposed to the virtue because it completely eliminates any traces of docility and successfully closes the door to learning from others which is, after all, a greater fount of learning than one's own independent efforts. Hence, indocility more extensively prevents our acquiring knowledge than does subservience. This latter vice imitates

docility and can, when given to a good teacher, be the source of learning. Yet, in this case, it cheats the student of his own learning because it depends on human authority to a degree that is detrimental to individual progress in knowledge.

c. *Acquisition and Growth of Docility*

When Cardinal Cajetan notes that docility is acquired and not inborn,¹¹¹ he is but applying the familiar doctrine that natural habits may have an innate tendency or beginning in us but their perfection and growth only come with repeated acts on our part. Of course, it is not here the question of the infused virtues. Docility since it is a virtue will come into the soul of the baptized along with the other virtues. Yet one's development in this virtue will still be very much up to himself. It is something he must work for if he lacks the predisposing conditions that make its practise easy or else he must guard it should he already have it, as it were, by nature.

Since docility has the notion of submission so closely bound up with it, its acquisition and increase will normally proceed along with the growth in humility. But even aside from that fundamental virtue, another way of developing docility is to meditate upon the impossibility of accomplishing anything completely on one's own and at the same time on the many sources of learning at one's disposal. This ends in humility anyway, but it is a good preparation especially for one who might have Cartesian inclinations toward doubting everything.

The Scholastic method and consequently that of the *Summa* is an excellent indication of docility in act. First a question is placed. The student is not certain of the answer or at least not of the reasons for the answer. Then the objections are presented in order, as it were, to convince the reader that without the doctrine of the body of the article he would be at a loss to solve the difficulties. In the *Summa*, by means of the *Sed Contra*, St. Thomas usually cites some authority. And that is sufficient to justify the reply.¹¹² However, he does not stop

¹¹¹ Cajetan, *op. cit.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

¹¹² e. g. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 71, a. 6.

here lest docility fall into subservience and the pupil become a parrot instead of a man. The body of the article gives the intellect its opportunity to understand why the reply is what it is. Docility does not, therefore, destroy the mind. It guides and directs it. The student can spend as much time as is required for mastering the reasons advanced in the response. He can examine the proof. If he does this in a docile spirit then he can accomplish much. The indocile person instead of trying to understand what the writer says attempts to punch holes into his doctrine. He is a faultfinder instead of a truthfinder. In the company of a master one can afford to be docile without danger. Only in the case of false teachers does one read, if at all, with a critical almost prejudiced mind constantly on guard against intellectual booby traps. This latter state of mind is hardly conducive to learning since it keeps the mind in a constant state of trepidation. The concentration required for learning is aided considerably if one can afford to study with a docile mind. This is possible only in the presence of a true professor and teacher of sound doctrine.

The horizon of docility will lessen as one advances in knowledge because he has fewer masters to whom he must pay a debt. Yet no one will ever reach that state where docility is without use of function. Consequently, one should make constant efforts at developing the virtue of docility. The man who is a consistent reader of intellectually superior books is strengthening and intensifying his habit of docility. In philosophical journals, in scientific periodicals, in business magazines, as well as in the vast fields of specialized literature, the reader is challenged to be docile in order that he may read the author's exposition and arguments before judging the work. No one can be an authority in every branch of learning and hence each has much to gain from those who do know their subject well.

At no place perhaps is docility put to a more demanding test than at the conference table. Docility is a virtue essential, for example, to both labor and management if any rapprochement is to be reached. Even in friendly discussions docility plays its part. Many a person reads an item of interest but misses

its significance. He can discover its meaning if he has the docility to listen and learn from others. Indeed, the constant and prolonged misunderstanding that exists between such erudite men of learning as philosophers and scientists can in part be traced to their mutual lack of docility. Each faction is so anxious to assert its own position that they never give their fellow intellectuals a chance to state theirs. Many an apparent Gordian knot among men of learning can be broken by the simple process of all becoming docile.

Conclusion

The docile man is singularly blessed, for he is learning something every day of his life. St. Paul wrote: "For since the creation His invisible attributes are clearly seen . . . being understood through the things that are made."¹¹³ Nature is shouting to man that there is a God, but if man is lacking docility he will not learn this great truth. Hence of such an indocile individual can it be said: "The fool said in his heart: There is no God."¹¹⁴

For the man who already believes and acknowledges the existence of God, docility will deepen the knowledge and strengthen the conviction of the Divine reality. In some ways the docile man becomes like the poet. This latter person sees not something old and routine each day but something new and fresh even though his eyes have seen the same object many times. The poet knows that we can never fully explore the nature of any created thing. That is why every object is always full of adventure for him. The docile man, without necessarily becoming a poet, does become poetical and turns the hum-drum, lifelong acceptance of daily experience into a thrilling revelation of truth.

Every creature, every action, every incident of the day contains a cargo of truths. To one who views life in this way, the exercise of the virtue of docility is not confined to the four walls of a classroom or the two covers of a book. Rather the

¹¹³ Romans 1:20.

¹¹⁴ Psalms 52:1.

whole day is a perpetual opportunity to grow in docility. This is significant. All nature is a mirror of the perfections of God. Man is made to the image of God. Now since grace perfects nature, it follows that in the supernatural order docility is of prime importance since it is of such great value in the natural order. Unlike faith which changes to vision, docility will always remain because man can never pay the debt that docility sets out to render. Therefore the docile man is actually preparing himself for complete submission to the Holy Ghost and consequently the highest degree of docility in heaven.

Man's final beatitude will consist in the contemplation of Eternal Truth. Then the beatified will perceive how important docility was in human life. In subjecting himself to all sources of truth, the docile man was in reality submitting also to Infinite Truth, the Fount of all true knowledge. By the time man attains to heaven docility will have so become a part of him that learning from others will be one of the accidental joys of heaven just as learning from God will be its essence.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CURRENT CRITICISMS OF THE SYLLOGISM

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I. IS THE SYLLOGISM FUNDAMENTAL TO ALL DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE.

WITH respect to the syllogism, Prof. Lewis has spoken with both assurance and finality: "To regard the syllogism as indispensable, or as reasoning *par excellence*, is the apotheosis of stupidity."¹

The applicability of this apparent judgment from on high would seem to be unmistakable. For so far as these present essays are concerned,² one corollary of the conclusions reached thus far would certainly be that there is no form of deductive argument or demonstration but what is ultimately dependent on the syllogism.

Thus in our first paper we tried to show that of the two possible varieties of propositional composition, the conjunctive and the implicative, it is simply impossible to describe or account for implicative compounds on a truth-functional basis. And the reason such a thing is impossible is because the connection between the component propositions in any such compound is in no wise dependent upon the mere truth or falsity of the propositions thus combined. Instead, the connection in most cases³ depends upon the mediation between two extreme terms by a third or middle term.

Nevertheless, the grounds for this last point will doubtless bear recapitulation. Thus it will be remembered how in de-

¹ Lewis, C. I., "A Survey of Symbolic Logic," (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918), pp. 1-2.

² Previous articles in this series are "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," *The Thomist*, XIII (Jan. 1950), pp. 50-96, and "Basic Confusions in Current Notions of Propositional Calculi," XIV (April 1951), pp. 238-258.

³ i. e. in all cases in which it is not a question of either an inductive or an immediate inference.

scribing so-called implicative compounds, we pointed out that there were really two kinds of them, hypothetical compounds and categorical compounds. Of the latter, those that were most properly implicative were the so-called causal propositions. On the other hand, the hypotheticals were represented by conditionals and disjunctives. Now all of these compounds being implicative in character, there must necessarily be in each of them an implicative relationship between one proposition functioning as antecedent and another functioning as consequent (i. e. between premise and conclusion).⁴

But in virtue of what may the antecedent in such instances be said to *imply* the conclusion? There are three possible alternatives. It may be that the antecedent provides inductive evidence of the consequent or conclusion. Or it may be that the consequent is not a conclusion from the antecedent at all, but only a different way of stating the same thing, an "immediate inference," in other words. Or finally, it may be that the antecedent contains, either implicitly or explicitly, a middle term that mediates between the subject and predicate term of the consequent—in which case the whole conditional or causal proposition would really be in the nature of an enthymeme.⁵

Now of these three alternatives, the first is obviously not relevant to our present concerns. As for the second, it does not so much invalidate our thesis as confirm it—the thesis, namely, that all deductive inference is syllogistic. In fact, as we were at such pains to try to show in our second paper, an immediate inference does not represent an inference from a proposition but rather a property of a proposition.⁶ And if we

⁴ This summary statement would, of course, have to be amplified somewhat in order to fit the case of disjunctive propositions. Cf. "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," *loc. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

⁵ Cf. the fuller discussion of this in our first paper, *loc. cit.*, pp. 74-79.

⁶ Indeed, the point would seem to be that when the same notions or concepts come into play in the two cases, then immediate inferences may be seen to involve a difference of "intention" as compared with mediate inferences. Thus, for example, when one asserts that if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, what one is talking about or intending are real natures or essences of things, viz. virtue, knowledge, and teachability. On the other hand, let one assert that if, since virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, therefore if virtue can't be taught, it isn't

want to prove or demonstrate such a property actually to be a property of a given proposition, our proof would invariably seem to be syllogistic.⁷

Accordingly, inductive inferences being not relevant, and immediate inferences being shown to constitute no exception, it follows that in any implicative compound involving a deductive relationship between antecedent and consequent, the former will always be found to imply the latter in virtue of some third or middle term which mediates between the two terms of the consequent.

Moreover, what was thus set forth in our first paper—viz. that all deductive inference must be syllogistic—was further confirmed by the argument of the second paper. For there, examining the theorems of the propositional calculus, we found that far from representing a tremendous variety of types and patterns of inference, these theorems were not properly representative of forms of inference at all. Rather they for the most part did no more than exhibit the properties of various kinds of compound propositions. And in the few instances in which theorems were found that were representative of genuine types of inference, these theorems, when closely examined, did not seem properly to belong to a propositional calculus at all. Besides, the patterns of inference displayed in such theorems were all of them based upon the principle of a mediation of two terms by a third.⁸

Quite unmistakably, therefore, the whole of our argument up to now would but serve to underscore the ancient Aristotelian contention that any sort of deductive proof or demon-

knowledge. In such a case, what is intended are not the real natures or essences *as such* but rather the propositions in which these natures are considered. In short, the difference turns on the fact that in the one instance we are considering objects of first intention and in the other objects of second intention.

⁷ We are referring, of course, to the proofs by so-called "substitution" and by *modus ponens*. For a discussion of these, cf. "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," *loc. cit.*, pp. 85-87.

⁸ For instance, $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ obviously involves a polysyllogism. Cf. our first paper, *loc. cit.*, pp. 77-79. On the other hand, the syllogistic character of $p \cdot p \supset q : \supset \cdot q$ we have already exhibited in the preceding paper, "Basic Confusions in Current Notions of Propositional Calculi," *loc. cit.*, p. 248.

stration must perforce rest upon a procedure of mediating between two extreme terms by a third or middle term. Accordingly, so far as Prof. Lewis is concerned, we have the choice either of regarding him as having been at once over-confident and confused, or of regarding ourselves as having indulged in an apotheosis of stupidity. Peculiarly enough, our preference is for the former rather than for the latter alternative.

II. THE SYLLOGISM AS VIEWED BY THE MATHEMATICAL LOGICIANS

But leaving admissions of temerity aside, our immediate business now is that of explaining how such confidence and confusion in regard to the syllogism could ever have arisen in the mind of Prof. Lewis, or for that matter of any other mathematical logician. Why is it, in other words, that mathematical logicians should have come to regard the syllogism as being only one among many possible types of inference, and a comparatively insignificant type at that?

Already a partial answer to this question has been suggested by the discussion of the preceding paper. For having regarded all the manifold theorems of their propositional calculi merely as so many different "validating forms of inference,"⁹ it is little wonder that the mathematical logicians should have derided unmercifully the claim of the Aristotelians that the syllogism was the one and only basic form of deductive inference. But now that we have exposed these presumed validating forms of inference and shown that they are not forms of inference at all, but rather mere "immediate inferences," may we accordingly expect that Prof. Lewis *et al.* will graciously defer to the power of argument and admit that it is not we who have been stupid, so much as they who have been mistaken?

Hardly! For the issue is really not so simple. On the contrary, a mathematical logician such as Prof. Lewis would probably throw out the whole of our argument in this con-

⁹ This phrase, borrowed from Whitehead, is used extensively by Eaton, *General Logic* (New York, 1932), p. 2.

nection simply because he would not recognize any such distinction between mediate and immediate inference as the one we have tried to draw. Thus it will be remembered that following Maritain we said ¹⁰ that mediate inference always involves an attempt to prove or demonstrate a *new* truth, whereas immediate inference never involves more than an attempt to state exactly the *same* truth over again in a different way. In short, mediate inference is supposed to lead us to new knowledge, whereas immediate inference leads only to a new propositional formulation of what we already know.

But now so far as the mathematical logicians are concerned, it would be difficult to find any of them who would admit that deductive inference ever leads to such a thing as new knowledge. On the contrary, any deduction, they would say, the minute one considers the principle on which it is based, will be seen to involve nothing more or less than merely saying over again in the conclusion what has already been laid down in the premises. In this sense, the relation of conclusion to premises in a syllogism, for example, is held to be like the relation of predicate to subject in a so-called analytic proposition. In other words, the whole thing is a mere tautology in the more usual and literal sense of that word.

Thus consider how Prof. Lewis would put the matter:

the tautology of any law of logic is merely a special case of the general principle that what is true by definition cannot conceivably be false: it merely explicates, or follows from, a meaning which has been assigned, and requires nothing in particular about the universe or the facts of nature. Thus any logical principle (and, in fact, any other truth which can be certified by logic alone) is tautological in the sense that it is an analytic proposition.¹¹

Accordingly, such being Prof. Lewis' general understanding of the nature of deductive inference, one may readily guess how Prof. Lewis views the syllogism. Its treatment, of course, comes under the algebra of classes; and as an inseparable concomitant

¹⁰ Cf. "Basic Confusions . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 242 ff.

¹¹ Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic* (New York: The Century Co., 1932), p. 211.


of the algebra there are the familiar Venn diagrams. Thus, for example, consider a third figure syllogism of the mood I A I:

Some *a* is *c*

All *a* is *b*

Some *b* is *c*

This may be represented in a Venn diagram thus:



Now Prof. Lewis comments on this as follows:

This asterisk in the compartment *a b c* could be read 'Some *a* is *b*' or 'Some *a* is *c*' or 'Some things are *a*, *b*, and *c*, all three,' as well as 'Some *b* is *c*.' All of these conclusions, as a fact, follow from the given premises. The syllogistic conclusion, is simply *one* of the conclusions which the premises give; namely, that one which meets two extra-logical requirements: (1) it follows from neither premise alone, and (2) it does not involve the middle term, common to the two premises . . .

The only further point involved is, in some cases, to remember that an equation or an inequation can be read in more than one way: for example $a-b=0$ is 'No *a* is not-*b*' and 'No not-*b* is *a*,' as well as 'All *a* is *b*;' and $ab \neq 0$ is 'Some *b* is *a*' as well as 'Some *a* is *b*.' Attention to these alternative readings will reveal the fact that there are certain valid forms of syllogistic inference which are not included amongst the traditional moods and figures—but that point is not particularly important.¹²

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

Finally, several pages later Prof. Lewis adds this further observation which is also relevant to our purposes:

There is one point of considerable theoretical importance concerning which the algebra leaves no possible doubt: there is no such thing as *the* conclusion from any premise or any set of premises; given any premises whatever, there are an infinite number of conclusions which may validly be drawn. This is an unavoidable consequence of Poretsky's Law of Forms.¹³

Quite obviously in this analysis of the syllogism the distinction between mediate and immediate inference is disregarded entirely. As a consequence, there is no one conclusion which the syllogism may be regarded as proving; rather there is a whole infinity of propositions which one could formulate, and which would none of them be conclusions in the proper sense but rather mere variant ways of describing the basic situation exhibited in the Venn diagram.

Moreover, the root of this disregard of the distinction between mediate and immediate inference, would seem to be traceable to the fact that on such an analysis of the syllogism there can be no question of arriving at new knowledge from already known premises. For everything, including the conclusion, is in a sense already known: it is already there and out on the table, so to speak, in the Venn diagram. Thus nothing is proved or demonstrated by a syllogism; instead, given a certain set of facts, countless numbers of propositions can be worked out that will be descriptive of that same given set of facts.

So understood, it is quite obvious that the syllogism can in no wise claim to be the sole form or pattern of deductive inference. In fact, so understood, one may well wonder whether the syllogism has anything to do with inference at all, in the sense in which we have taken it. For if inference be supposed to be a process of proof or demonstration of something new from what we already know, it is clear that, as conceived by Prof. Lewis, the syllogism performs no such function. Very

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

well, then, we can only conclude that Aristotle's understanding of the syllogism and, for that matter, of deductive inference itself must have been very different from Prof. Lewis. But how may the character of this difference be brought into focus?

III. CRITICISMS OF THE SYLLOGISM THAT INVOLVE A CON- FUSION OF *Ens* AND *Ens Rationis*

Perhaps the best way to bring out the difference between the Aristotelian view of the syllogism and more recent treatments of it would be to remind ourselves once more of the so-called intentional character of Aristotelian logic. For with this in mind, it should be clear that from the Aristotelian point of view Prof. Lewis' treatment of inference and of the syllogism really has nothing to do with logic at all; in fact, Prof. Lewis isn't even talking about the syllogism or about inference in the Aristotelian sense. And the reason Prof. Lewis' investigations must seem to an Aristotelian to be so wide of the mark is because what Prof. Lewis is dealing with are manifestly objects of first intention, whereas logic is concerned only with objects of second intention. In short, his error, like that of all the mathematical logicians, would seem to lie in a very serious metaphysical confusion of real being with logical being, of *ens* with *ens rationis*.

But to support these contentions, suppose we proceed in some such fashion as this. Thus take the syllogism as it is to be understood from the Aristotelian point of view. As such, it is not anything real at all: it neither exists nor is capable of existing *in rerum natura*. Instead, it is a mere being of reason, like a proposition or a definition or a concept or any other logical entity whatsoever. And yet, though not real itself, the syllogism is a means or instrument by which we can come to know and understand real things. In short, the syllogism is an object of second intention, though an instrument of first intention.¹⁴

¹⁴ Of course, this does not mean to imply that it could not be used as an instrument of second intention also. Thus we use logic in order to know about logic itself.

Accordingly, the syllogism being only a being of reason and not a real being, one must never confuse the order and connection of parts within the syllogism with the order and connection of parts among real things *in rerum natura*. Thus to take just one illustration, consider the example which we used in our first paper:

Any two angles having the same supplementary angle
in common are equal.

The two opposite angles of intersecting straight lines
have the same supplementary angle in common.

∴ The opposite angles are equal.

This syllogism is made up of three terms or concepts: (1) the notion of the opposite angles of two intersecting straight lines; (2) the notion of equality; (3) the notion of two angles having the same supplementary angle in common.

Now these three notions are all distinct in our minds and then are joined together in the three propositions and in the argument as a whole. But their juncture, no less than their separation, is effected intellectually and in the mind.

In other words, the real things signified by these three notions are not thus separated from one another and then joined together in reality and *in rerum natura*. Instead, any real instance of opposite interior angles of intersecting straight lines is never *really* separate and distinct from the equality of such angles. Nor, likewise, do such angles ever exist separately and apart from the fact of their having a common supplementary angle. On the contrary, in reality and *in rerum natura* there is simply a unity; and only intellectually and in the mind are these things separated from one another and then joined again in propositions and arguments.¹⁵

Similarly, so far as our knowledge and understanding go, we may *first* know that the opposite interior angles do have the same supplementary angle, and only *later* come to realize that

¹⁵ Cf. Aquinas' succinct statement of this, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2: Knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another.

for that very reason these two angles must be equal. On the other hand, so far as the real order of things is concerned it is obviously not the case that the opposite interior angles first come to have the same supplementary angle and only later come to be equal.¹⁶

Accordingly, returning to Prof. Lewis' analysis of the syllogism, we should be able to understand a little more clearly just why such an analysis may be said to involve a confusion of *ens rationis* with *ens*. For interpreting the terms of a syllogism as classes and then illustrating the relations between these classes by means of the Venn diagrams, Prof. Lewis seems to have fallen into the trap of confusing the logical relations between the concepts with the real relations between the circular areas of the diagram.

Thus in the diagram itself, of course, there are no premises or conclusion; in fact, there just isn't any proof at all. Indeed, if in the real diagram anything is prior to anything else, it certainly is not prior in the way in which premises are prior to a conclusion. Instead, there are merely the three circular areas and their mutual interrelations. And these interrelationships in turn are susceptible of description through an infinity of propositions.¹⁷

Little wonder, then, that Prof. Lewis in the example cited should have said that "Some a is b" or "Some a is c" or "Some things are a, b, and c, all three" are just as much "conclusions" as "some b is c." Presumably what he must have meant by this is that the *facts* described by these various propositions are all of them alike embraced by the original geometrical situation exhibited in the diagram. In consequence, when so regarded, these propositions are none of them, strictly speaking, conclusions, simply because there hasn't been any proof. Instead, all that has happened is a mere reading off of interrelationships revealed in the diagram.¹⁸

¹⁶ Of course, this must not be taken as excluding a real causal priority in things.

¹⁷ Assuming, that is, the soundness of Poretsky's law.

¹⁸ It might be objected that this distinction which we are trying to draw between the way the mathematical logicians view the syllogism and the way

Indeed, this point has been made quite sharply, even if perhaps somewhat unwittingly and naïvely by Prof. Quine. Thus in discussing the use of the Venn diagrams, he says:

In order to check the validity of a syllogism by diagrams, three overlapping circles are used (as in Diagrams 5 et seq.) to represent the three terms 'F,' 'G,' and 'H,' of the syllogism. We enter the content of the two premisses in the diagram by the method explained in connection with Diagrams 1-4, and then we inspect the diagram to see whether the content of the conclusion has *automatically* appeared in the diagram as a result of entering the two premisses. This is all there is to the method.¹⁹

Now, of course, even though as so described, these "conclusions" have not been proved, but merely exhibited, there is no reason why they could not be proved. After all, what one is dealing with here are simply geometrical areas. Consequently, just as ordinary propositions in geometry can be proved by

the Aristotelians view it really turns on the distinction between logic and psychology. Thus as Prof. Lewis himself has remarked (*Survey*, p. 1):

The reasons for the syllogistic form are psychological, not logical: the syllogism, made up of the smallest number of propositions (three), each with the smallest number of terms (two), by which any generality of reasoning can be attained, represents the limitations of human attention, not logical necessity. (For a further discussion of the same point, cf. *ibid.* pp. 198-201).

Unfortunately, however, this attempt to relegate the Aristotelian treatment of the syllogism, and for that matter Aristotelian logic generally, to the realm of mere psychology simply will not bear scrutiny. In the first place, those who have come forward with this suggestion have seemingly never taken the trouble themselves to present a real philosophical account of the precise nature of the distinction between logic and psychology. And in the second place, so far as the Aristotelians are concerned, it is clear that psychology being a natural science, what is studied in such a science are real events and happenings in nature. In other words, the science of psychology involves a concern with first intentions, rather than with second intentions. Accordingly, in the light of all that we have said about Aristotelian logic's exclusive concern with *entia rationis* and second intentions, it is simply incredible that anyone should suppose the Aristotelians to have confused logic with psychology.

Nevertheless, an adequate treatment of this whole question of the relation logic and psychology, as it is understood by the mathematical logicians on the one hand and by the Aristotelians on the other, would lie quite beyond the confines of this present essay.

¹⁹ *A Short Course in Logic* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 36 mimeographed. Our italics.

regular syllogistic demonstration, so also these propositions pertaining to the interrelationships between the areas of the Venn diagrams should be subject to syllogistic demonstration. Of course, in such a case we should not be demonstrating anything about logic or logical entities (objects of second intention), but rather our demonstration would be about ordinary objects of first intention (in this case, over-lapping surface areas).

And yet such is not the way the mathematical logicians regard the Venn diagrams: they do not think of them as merely representing a certain subject matter that logical inferences may be about; no, they suppose them to represent these inferences themselves. In other words, the confusion that is involved here is as subtle as it is complex. But still there is no reason why it cannot be disentangled and exposed to full view.

Thus to begin with, let us recognize that there is a distinction between *ens* and *ens rationis*, between objects of first intention and objects of second intention. Next, let us recognize that the proper concern of logic is with objects of the second type and not of the first. Third, let us recognize that logic, being thus concerned with these *entia rationis*, will inevitably involve drawing distinctions between things that are really united or uniting things that are really distinct. For instance, concepts may be distinguished from one another, even though the things they signify are really one. Or again, a proposition may follow other propositions, even though the fact which the proposition signifies does not occur *in rerum natura* after the fact signified by the other propositions.

But now, being quite indifferent to First Philosophy, the mathematical logicians have paid no attention to considerations of this sort. Instead, plunging right into a furious business with terms and propositions and what not, they seem scarcely to have stopped to consider what sort of things it was they were dealing with. In consequence, they have taken those traditional logical entities known as terms and concepts and have treated them simply as classes; and these classes, then,

and their interrelations they have proceeded to represent by means of Euler's circles or Venn's diagrams. Finally, by a subtle confusion of the illustration with the illustrated, the original logical entities or beings of reason, viz, terms or concepts, have come to be transformed into real beings, viz. circular surface areas.²⁰

In consequence, the fact is quite forgotten that logical relations between terms may be very different from real relations between circles. And so it is that the syllogism could come to be regarded as not being a means of proof in the old sense at all. Indeed, how could the syllogism possibly be an instrument of demonstration, if it no longer involve the mediation of two terms by a third? But clearly, when the syllogism itself is identified with the Venn diagram representing it, there is no mediation involved in it whatsoever. In other words, in such a case the confusion of *ens rationis* with *ens*, or logic with mathematics, is complete.²¹

IV. THE THEORY OF RELATIONS: A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF CONFUSION IN REGARD TO THE *Being* OF LOGICAL ENTITIES

But with this, we find that our argument in this present paper would seem to be pointing to much the same conclusion as our argument in the first paper—the conclusion namely, that mathematical logic, despite its impressive and elaborate superstructure, is none-the-less erected upon a very serious metaphysical confusion of *ens* with *ens rationis*. Thus in our first paper we reached this conclusion in the course of our examination of the truth-functional interpretation of propo-

²⁰ Needless to say, this particular discussion of the syllogism only serves to raise the more general question of the significance and legitimacy of such a thing as the algebra of classes. However, this question lies beyond the scope of our present investigation. Cf. our earlier discussions, "Concerning the Ontological Status of Logical Forms," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. II, no. 6 (December 1948), 40-64; also *Intentional Logic* (New Haven, 1952), pp. 116-127.

²¹ This statement presupposes the validity of the Aristotelian account of the nature of mathematics, an account which is certainly not widely recognized today. Cf. our earlier remarks on this point, "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," *loc. cit.*, p. 95.

sitional composition. Indeed, we found that to interpret propositions truth-functionally was in effect to remove the inescapably intentional character of propositions and thereby to transform these logical entities into objects of first intention—in other words, a confusion of *ens rationis* with *ens*. And now a similar conclusion has emerged from our investigation of the syllogism and its attempted interpretation by means of the class calculus and the Venn diagrams. For the effect of such an interpretation was, as we saw, to transform logical entities like terms or concepts into real entities like circular areas. Once more, the confusion was one of *ens rationis* with *ens*.

Moreover, the position of Prof. Lewis in this whole situation would seem to be a peculiarly anomalous one. Thus recognizing the inadequacy of a merely truth-functional interpretation of propositional compounds, Prof. Lewis by his calculus of strict implication would seem to bid fair to avoid the error of eradicating the intentional character of propositions. His propositions do still seem to be propositions, and not some wholly different object of first intention. On the other hand, because he has fallen into the common error of all the mathematical logicians in his interpretation of the syllogism, he seems to have completely misunderstood the nature of inference and proof; and in consequence, while his propositional calculus is truly a calculus of propositions, it is none-the-less vitiated by an apparently total ignorance of the significance of the distinction between mediate and immediate inference, or better, between a genuine pattern of inference on the one hand and a mere determination of the properties of propositions on the other.

And lest it be supposed that we have merely hit upon isolated and exceptional instances of this metaphysical confusion of *ens* and *ens rationis* on the part of the mathematical logicians, we might also call attention in passing to still another example of such confusion, although there is obviously neither time nor space to discuss it in any detail here. This example is drawn from the theory of relations. As is well known, the calculus of relations, like the calculus of classes, is regarded as a most

important part of the whole development of mathematical logic. Indeed, some logicians would regard it not as a mere part, but rather as capable of embracing the whole of logic, so that on such a view the appropriate name for logic would not be so much mathematical logic or symbolic logic, but rather relational logic. Moreover, for a rather glowing account of the possibilities of logic as so conceived, we might cite a passage from Eaton:

Since logic is necessarily abstract, it is possible that the definition we have given is not abstract enough. The notions of 'proposition' and 'valid inference' may not be relevant to a logic of the most general form. Anything that can be called a system of entities, whether these entities be propositions, geometrical points, tables, chairs, electrons, or numbers, has a structure; (what is meant by *structure* would need to be carefully defined;) and we can study the general features of system-structure in abstraction from all particular subject-matters. Logic may be *the science of possible systems viewed merely as types of structure*. Such a science would not necessarily deal with propositions and inferences; a system of propositional relationships would be a special case of some more general type of structure, which might be exemplified by other entities than propositions. This logic would enable us to construct conceptual 'maps' in the most abstract possible terms of all that might be, without regard to whether or not these 'maps' corresponded to anything real. It would be the sort of logic that Leibniz's God might have employed in shaping the most general outlines of his possible worlds. We mention this conception of logic as indicating a direction, already suggested by the work of certain mathematicians and logicians, which logical study may take in the future.²²

Now as a piece of rhetoric, this passage may be rather unusual, at least for a logic text. But as a description of logic, it reveals all too clearly the serious confusion of *ens* and *ens rationis* which any such logic of relations must necessarily entail. For after all, some relations and structures are real, whereas others are mere logical relations or beings of reason.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 11. Eaton adds in a footnote, "The postulational methods of Peano, Hilbert, and Huntington suggest such a view of logic, and it seems also to be the conception which lies behind the work of Mr. H. M. Sheffer."

For instance, relations like "greater than," "north of," "father of," "similar to," etc. are real relations, capable of holding between real things *in rerum natura*. On the other hand, the relation of a predicate to a subject, or of a proposition to its contrapositive, of a middle term to two extreme terms—these are all mere relations of reason, which neither exist nor are capable of existing between real things *in rerum natura*.

Moreover, to treat these relations of reason as if they were homogeneous with real relations, or the real relations as if they were of the same sort as relations of reason—such treatment, involving as it does a confusion of *ens* and *ens rationis*, is bound to have disastrous consequences in any attempt at understanding logical relations, just as we have seen it to have in attempts at understanding logical propositions and classes.²³

For instance, let us take just one concrete case in order to see how such a confusion may manifest itself in the domain of relations. Thus if we turn to Cohen and Nagel's text book we find a short paragraph devoted to the discussion of so-called "inference by Converse Relation":

If *Chicago is west of New York* we may validly infer that *New York is east of Chicago*; if *Socrates was a teacher of Plato* we may

²³ It may perhaps have occurred to the reader that this whole argument in a sense may seem to be beside the point. For to judge from the quotation from Eaton, it would hardly seem accurate to suggest that all mathematical logicians have simply confused *ens* and *ens rationis*. On the contrary, one might say that the relational logicians, so far from confusing the two, have rather been concerned with abstracting from the specific differences of each, in order to construct a logic of such generalized types of order as to be applicable to either *entia* or *entia rationis*.

To this the answer is that there just is no genus which is capable of embracing both *ens* and *ens rationis* as species. And to suppose that there is such a genus is but to commit the common, but none-the-less serious, metaphysical blunder of treating univocally that which can only be handled analogously. Nevertheless, there is obviously no time in this present study to defend and explain this point of First Philosophy. Suffice it to say here that simply from our examples and illustrations the reader may recognize how extremely dubious it is to talk about entities that are to be considered neither as objects of first intention nor as objects of second intention, neither as *entia* nor as *entia rationis*. Indeed, every attempt to do so will in the concrete case turn out to be in no wise an abstraction from both, but rather a confounding of both and a consequent surreptitious and vicious reduction of the one to the other.

infer that *Plato was a pupil of Socrates*; if *Seven is greater than five* we may infer that *Five is less than seven*. In each of these pairs of propositions the two are equivalent. Such inferences are of the form: If *a* stands to *b* in a certain relation, *b* stands to *a* in the converse relation.²⁴

Now the interesting thing about this is that if we keep in mind the distinction between *ens* and *ens rationis*, or that between first intentions and second intentions, it should be immediately obvious that a consideration of such relations as are here cited has nothing to do with logic at all. Quite the contrary, being "to the west of," or being "a pupil of," or being "greater than" represent real relations and as such are properly objects of first intention rather than of second intention. In fact, how do we know that if *x* is west of *y*, then *y* is east of *x*? Certainly not from logic, but rather from a study of the world of nature. On the other hand, if we want to know whether *p**v**q*, implies *q**v**p*, it is clear that we must learn this not from the study of nature, but rather from the study of those beings of reason known as propositions.

In other words, the convertibility of certain logical entities such as propositions or terms in a proposition must in no wise be confused with what has traditionally been called the mutuality²⁵ of certain real relations *in rerum natura*. This would be the same sort of thing as confusing logical terms or concepts with circular surface areas in geometry.

Of course, this does not imply that these so-called real relations may not be legitimately and fruitfully investigated. On the contrary, one might very well abstract them from the material conditions in which they exist and so proceed to order them with genuine scientific rigor, demonstrating their various properties and deducing certain ones from others that are prior and more fundamental. In this way the study of relations might turn out to be a very important branch of mathematics.²⁶

²⁴ *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York, 1934), p. 63.

²⁵ Cf. Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae*, I (Freiberg: Herder, 1937), p. 155.

²⁶ On this view of mathematics, cf. "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," *loc. cit.*, p. 96.

And yet for all that, it should certainly not be confused with logic, inasmuch as its concern would perforce be with *entia*, whereas logic's is with *entia rationis*.

With this, then, we may conclude this comparative examination and appraisal of Aristotelian logic and mathematical logic. Not that such an examination has been by any means complete; rather it has been really no more than begun. And yet from such beginnings it is hoped that one can see that traditional Aristotelian logic²⁷ can by no means be merely ushered off the stage as comprising but a tiny and insignificant part of the great whole of mathematical logic. On the contrary, mathematical logic itself as an integrated science is rendered profoundly suspect simply because of the philosophical naïveté of its founders and present exponents.

Moreover, when these metaphysical confusions that lie at the base of mathematical logic are cleared up—and principally the confusion of *ens rationis* with *ens*—; it may be found that while the impressive developments in mathematical logic may have great significance for some such subjects as mathematics, they certainly have in no wise changed the character of logic, and at most have contributed only additions of detail to the main outlines of the science as it was originally foreshadowed by Aristotle and later developed by the Scholastics.

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²⁷ Provided, of course, that such logic be adequately and properly understood, and not merely taken in the watered down versions of it that have been current in the last few centuries, q. v., *ibid.*, p. 51, note 6.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ernst Cassirer: The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and History since Hegel. Translated by W. H. Woglom and C. W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. Pp. 350 with index. \$5.00.

The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Evanston: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949. Pp. 954 with index. \$6.00.

One of the most important works of the late Ernst Cassirer, and an outstanding contribution to the history of modern philosophy, particularly in regard to the problem of knowledge, is his monumental "Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neuen Zeit," in four volumes, the first of which appeared in 1906, the last now appearing in English even before its German edition. The manuscript was completed in 1940, during the author's sojourn in Sweden, and was brought to the United States by his widow in 1946; no better memorial of a great scholar could be offered to his many friends and admirers in the United States and England than this fine translation, and one hopes that this volume will be followed by the three companion volumes, as well produced and printed as this one.

Cassirer's idea in this series was not just to write another history of philosophy; he is concerned principally with the problem of knowledge, and aims at showing how modern thought developed in antithesis to mediaeval systems, primarily on account of the influence of modern science, and particularly of the growth and spread of the mathematical mentality from Descartes onwards. He traces the origin of the rationalistic as opposed to the theological view of reality, and draws largely on the works of scientists; one of the most remarkable qualities of this series is the vast erudition of the author, as evidenced by the references and footnotes which testify to his wide reading and make this work one of the chief examples of philosophical historiography in this century.

It is perhaps unfortunate that this volume deals far less with pure philosophy than the other three. In the preceding volumes the classical philosophers were considered in their relation to the scientific thought of their day; in this volume Cassirer abandons the pure philosophers, in order to treat of the scientific advances that influenced philosophers. As he himself says "We shall not follow out the findings attained in the theory of knowledge by reference to the philosophical classics of the period under discussion, but shall try to penetrate the motives that led to their discovery." (p. 18) Such a study is very necessary and very opportune, but

it does seem rather misleading to describe such a work as giving us "philosophy, science and history since Hegel." The philosophy of science, however important it may be, does not exhaust the problem of knowledge. It does treat in some detail of logic, and of one part of critical metaphysics; it supposes general critics and the psychology of knowledge, as well as the general ontologies underlying various systems, and none of these is touched on in this work, except in a brief way in the introduction. (pp. 1-19) Cassirer's aim is strictly limited; his theme is the problem of the relation of philosophy to science since Hegel. He rightly insists that philosophy has been profoundly influenced by science, and that to understand much of modern philosophy one has first to take account of developments within the various sciences. Ever since Galileo and Descartes, mathematics and mathematical physics have more and more influenced the development of philosophy, so that the first part of this work is dedicated to those sciences. The last century and the present age saw the development of two sciences that have increasingly affected the course of philosophic thought, namely biology and history; in the second and third parts Cassirer traces the development of these sciences. His method throughout is mainly historical, though he does let his own preferences appear from time to time, and he is more interested in epistemological problems raised by the advances in science than in the progress of science itself. He has a rare gift of situating past theories in their historical context and of penetrating to the core of the theory, and the work is written with a clarity of style that is all too rare in German authors. Cassirer himself hardly regarded his work as quite complete, and would surely have added a conclusion, summing up the results of his enquiries in the three domains of thought and expressing his own convictions had he not died, unexpectedly, in 1945. Even as a history of the individual sciences there are many lacunae, for Cassirer did not intend to treat of all the developments in mathematics, physics, biology and history, but only of those which are significant from the point of view of their methods and of the implied conception of knowledge. In spite of such defects, this work remains one of the most thorough treatises of our time on the philosophical implications of exact science, biology and history, and fully deserves the attention of both philosopher and scientist.

In the first part, devoted to exact science, Cassirer treats of the content of geometrical axioms in the light of the rise of non-euclidian geometries, and then of the origin of geometrical thought. A Thomist would be inclined to agree with Cassirer that the new geometry is "a pure science of relations which has to do not with the ascertaining of objects and their characteristics, substances and their properties, but with orders of ideas alone." (p. 35) Then comes an interesting discussion on the nature of mathematics, tracing the rise of the new idea of that science from Leibniz on, in the primacy of the idea of order over that of measure, insofar as men-

suration is seen to be a problem whose assumptions have to be sought out. Modern research, in discovering these assumptions, has led to a fusing of geometrical and physical science. Recent theories on the foundations of arithmetic are next studied, from the empiricism of Stuart Mill, and the substantive or representative theories of Cantor, Frege and Russell, to the functional theory of Dedekind and the intuitionism of Brouwer and Weyl. The last chapter in this section deals with mathematical-physics: the abandonment of the mechanistic view and the transition to the symbolic of functional conception of this science, passing through the phenomenalism of Mach, the energetics of Lübeck, the theory of science of Hertz, Poincaré and Duhem, and finally the impact of the relativity and quantum theories. These most recent developments in science are but scantily treated, as the author has written of them extensively in other works, notably in his "Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik," (1937), to which he refers the reader. This first section will be extremely useful to the Thomist philosopher of nature who desires to keep abreast of the recent scientific researches into such notions as space, number and measure, and to the metaphysician engaged on the epistemology of the sciences; Cassirer's lucid and brief exposition is a safe guide in a notoriously difficult and abstract maze of conflicting and complicated theories.

Whereas the distinction between living and non-living beings has always been recognized, Cassirer maintains that the problem of biological knowledge, as opposed to the type of knowledge proper to the mathematical natural sciences, is first clearly stated by Kant, whose general solution is dealt with in the first chapter of the second part of this work. It is evident that he regards the Kantian solution as essentially valid; the mathematical and biological interpretations of nature are rather complementary than opposed, since they regard two forms of order in knowledge, allowing us to complete a synthesis of appearances according to concepts, and not the intimate nature of reality itself. "Causality has to do with knowledge of the objective temporal succession of events, the order in change, whereas the concept of purpose has to do with the structure of those empirical objects that are called living organisms." (p. 121) Though one may disagree with this Kantian solution, one finds in this section a very clear statement of the Kantian biology as contained in the "Critique of Judgment," particularly in this first chapter, and again when treating later on of some recent advances in biology, v. g. pp. 198, 210-211. The development of biological science itself is thoroughly expounded, beginning with Goethe's contribution, his genial intuition of an idealistic morphology, and passing through the rise of embryology (Von Baer, Schleiden) to the evolutionary theories of Darwin and his first disciples, and finally to the opposing school of vitalism (Driesch). The last stage of this development is still

characterized by the conflict between mechanism and vitalism, but Cassirer does not bring us right up to the most recent developments in this field and, as is only to be expected, shows more familiarity with German scholarship than with that of other nations. Yet the picture he traces of the growth of biology is essentially complete, especially from his own chosen point of view, that of the changes that have compelled biology to examine the question of its own nature as science and thus to clarify to itself its own specific purpose and methods of thought. One must, however, raise the point, that Cassirer seems to take it for granted that it belongs to the biologist, as to the mathematician and historian, to discuss and determine the nature of his science; there is more than a tinge of positivism in such a position as defended by Cassirer, for such questions, for the Scholastic, pertain essentially to metaphysics in its critical function. However, it is well known that some Louvain neo-Thomists would dispute this view, and they certainly cannot be accused of positivism.

As biology was revolutionized, mainly through the idea of evolution, and saw a transition from the ideal of a merely historical to that of a causal evolution in the explanation of life, so too history, the subject of the final part of this work, witnessed a change in its conception from a mere record of events to the ideal of tracing the evolution and causal connection of events. Herder and Niebuhr were the principal agents of this transformation, while Ranke developed the technique of historical investigation and Humboldt limited this investigation to purely natural causes, though both he and Ranke postulated "spiritual existences" beyond the natural causes, and Ranke identified such spiritual existences with the thoughts of God. The cardinal function of history in revealing the laws that govern phenomena was stressed by Comte, whose naturalism was carried a step further by Taine, who transferred the Baconian ideal of induction from physics to history. Mommsen and Droysen reacted against such positivism, and conceived history as the interpretation of events in the light of political forms. So arose the conflict, at the end of the nineteenth century, between political and general history, while Lamprecht sought to base history on the new scientific psychology. The last chapter in this section deals with the history of religion, particularly with mythology, the recognition of the value of myths, and of rites, in affording a key to the interpretation of history.

From this brief sketch of the contents of this masterly work the reader may gain an idea of the riches it contains; every statement and interpretation is fully documented; the foot-notes provide a valuable index to the modern literature on the subjects treated and testify to the wide erudition of the author. His own treatment of these difficult subjects is a splendid example of the modern ideal of historical investigation, especially as regards the tracing of the development of ideas. But the work has more than a historical value; if it is not strictly philosophy, it deals with subjects

intimately connected with philosophy, and thus merits the attention and gratitude of both historian and philosopher.

It may interest readers to know that an Italian translation of the four volumes of this work is at present being published by Einaudi, at Turin, under the title "*Storia della Filosofia Moderna*"; the first volume has just been published (1952), costing L. 4,500.

The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer is the sixth volume in this notable series which has already dedicated volumes to Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, Moore and Russell. The death of Cassirer in 1945, while this work was still in preparation, was, after consideration, not allowed to prevent his inclusion in a series devoted to living philosophers; and instead of the intended reply by the subject of the volume to the various contributors the editor has given us Cassirer's essay on "Spirit and Life in contemporary philosophy," (pp. 855-880) which was published in German in 1930 and is now translated specifically for the present work by R. W. Bretall and P. A. Schilpp. That Cassirer made a great impression in America, where his forced exile from Germany took him in 1941, after some years in England and Sweden, is evident from the section of this volume devoted to his life and character. (pp. 1-72) Friends, colleagues and pupils alike testify to the charm of his character and his gifts as a teacher. Perhaps this charm, coupled with the sense of loss caused by his sudden and unexpected death, may explain a certain exaggeration in speaking of him and in assessing his rank as a philosopher. He is note-worthy, but hardly great, at least in the line of pure philosophy.

The Editor follows the plan adopted for the companion volumes of this series, inviting contributory essays from twenty-three experts who deal with the various aspects of Cassirer's many-faceted thought, and adding a complete bibliography of his writings (compiled by C. H. Hamburg and W. M. Solmitz; pp. 883-910) and a complete index. The result is a scholarly, if massive, production, in which repetitions are inevitable; but it must be judged successful, and will be invaluable, indeed indispensable, for those who wish to study the thought of this truly remarkable and exemplary scholar.

Cassirer's interests extended beyond the exact sciences to the cultural or moral sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), to history, mythology, religion, language and art. His knowledge was truly encyclopedic, and this wide range of culture is reflected in the variety of subjects treated of in this volume. Many of the essays deal with his contributions to those sciences, and, in a more general way, with his humanism (J. Gutmann, pp. 443-464) his philosophical anthropology (D. Bidney, pp. 465-544) and his philosophy of culture. (H. Kuhn, 545-574) Readers of *The Thomist* will be most interested in Cassirer's properly philosophical thought, which is adequately and extensively treated, particularly in the first nine essays.

Two very able historical studies at the end of the volume serve to determine the immediate background to Cassirer's thought. Fritz Kaufmann writes on "Cassirer, Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology," (pp. 799-854) tracing the points of contact, as of opposition, between the Marburg school and that of Husserl, to which he belongs. In stating his criticisms of the Marburg school he has much of interest to say, both on the neo-Kantians and on phenomenology; and he traces in Cassirer a development from his earlier logical idealism to a more objective form of idealism. One of the best summary presentations of the ideals and teaching of the Marburg school that we have met with is contained in W. H. Werkmeister's "Cassirer's advance beyond Neo-Kantianism." (pp. 757-798) Cassirer is shown to be essentially faithful to the Marburg ideals; but whereas Natorp based his philosophy on Newtonian physics, Cassirer turns to the more recent scientific theories, in which he finds confirmation of the neo-kantian epistemology. His main contribution to the school was that he generalized the neo-kantian position in order to provide a consistent epistemological basis for the cultural sciences, and he thus broadened and humanized a system hitherto based exclusively on the exact sciences. The essentially neo-Kantian character of Cassirer's philosophy is likewise stressed by I. K. Stephens in his essay "Cassirer's doctrine of the *A Priori*." (pp. 149-181) He sees Cassirer developing from an earlier view, essentially that of Kant, to a broader view that takes into account the cultural sciences, so that the Critique of Reason becomes the Critique of Culture. Yet he considers this attempt, magnificent though it be, to have failed to establish truly a priori elements, mainly due to Cassirer's more absorbing interest in logic and mathematics than in life. Though remaining within the bounds of the Marburg mentality, Cassirer offers us a new development and an extension of the doctrine of Cohen and Natorp in his own distinctive philosophy, that of Symbolic Forms, which makes him worthy to rank with the founders as the most eminent representatives of that school. This distinctive philosophy is touched on in the three essays just quoted, and in Carl Hamburg's "Cassirer's conception of philosophy"; (pp. 73-119) it is treated specifically by R. S. Hartmann (pp. 289-333) who presents it objectively, and by F. Leander (pp. 337-357) who is critical from the point of view of one who affirms the primacy of self-knowledge over mathematical science, and sees, rightly we think, in Cassirer's predominantly mathematical mentality the reason for his neglect of philosophy and its inner history as distinct from science, as well as his aversion to metaphysics.

For Cassirer, reality is not that which is given, but that which can be thought; philosophy must be essentially a critique of knowledge, and is concerned with the structure of knowing objectively rather than with objectivity itself. In this he is faithful to Natorp, who makes thought to

be the object of philosophy, and seeks "the immanent laws according to which thought does not accept its object as simply given, but constructs it in conformity with thought's own way of looking at things." (quoted, p. 818) Phenomena, or sensuous impressions, which may still be called the raw material of thought, have no existence apart from a thought-context which sustains, relates and interprets them. The fundamental reality is a unified thought-process, which is a creative force, welding phenomena into structural totality, a subconscious dynamism which, by virtue of certain innate or *a priori* functions, succeeds in ordering and governing the welter of sensations. Within this creative process consciousness emerges in progressive stages, according as certain universal and typical principles, or invariant forms, appear, by which thought gradually moulds its raw materials and thus constitutes its objects by a process of integration within the totality of systemic thought. The different forms by which the mind accomplishes its "objectivation of experience" are called symbolic forms, symbolic in so far as they represent a union of thought and sense. These forms are recognisable as variations of Kant's categories, extended and deepened to include the realms of the cultural sciences; no empirical reality can be meaningfully referred to except under the implicit presupposition of these forms, which furnish the context within which reality can be met.

Thought thus supposes "an ultimate constant standard of measurement," which must be a set of "supreme principles of experience in general," or a set of "fundamental relations, upon which the content of all experience rests." These are the "universally valid formal functions of rational and empirical knowledge," and are genuine *a priori* elements of knowledge, "the ultimate logical invariants which lie at the foundation of every determination of a connection in general according to natural law." (Cassirer, quoted p. 157) Knowledge is thus reduced to objectivation; "we do not know 'objects' as if they were already independently determined and given *as objects*,—but we know *objectively*, by producing certain limitations and by fixating certain permanent elements and connections within the uniform flow of experience," says Cassirer (quoted, p. 159); and, as Stephens adds, "the superiority of the mathematical concept over the ordinary generic concept, its 'greater value for knowledge,' its 'superior objective meaning and validity,' seems to be due to its closer logical affinity for this set of 'supreme principles.'" The basic forms of consciousness are revealed, for Cassirer, as space, time, cause, number, etc.; whereas the main regions in which such forms are operative in the creative thought-process are myth, language, art, religion and science. The process within each region passes through the successive stages of expression, presentation and meaning, according as the referent of the senses is the affective-emotive system of man, his volitional-teleological system, or a system of theoretical order-signs, so that the object is the term of a process

of condensation or integration into the fully interrelated totality of constructive thought.

Cassirer's philosophy is thus not an attempt to lay hold on reality, but to mediate the reality-accounts offered by the various cultural disciplines; it has been well described by Theodor Litt as a synthesis of Kant and Herder. He sees the concept as the key to all thought-formation, and tries to reduce all the main modes of knowing to one fundamental function, to discover the basic mental function underlying the intellectual symbols by which the sciences describe reality. This function is the symbol-concept; "the concept contains nothing but the principle of the forms it represents, the constitutive law of their structure, the genetic essence of their formation." (Hartmann, p. 308) The symbol-concept is meant to include all phenomena which exhibit "sense in the senses," that is, in which something sensuous is represented as a particular embodiment of a sense, or meaning; for all knowledge implies the given-ness of perceptual signs and something signified, and its formal element is the representative relation holding between the senses and the sense. The term "symbolic form" in Cassirer may refer either to that symbol-concept, or to the variety of cultural forms wherein it is applied (myth, art, etc.,) or to the symbol-relations (such as space, cause, etc.) which constitute the domains of objectivity denoted by the cultural forms. For the Thomist, the main interest in this teaching would probably centre on the symbol-concept under its logical aspect, in relation particularly to the scholastic doctrine on signs. That section of our logic could certainly benefit by comparison with much modern work done by mathematicians and idealistic philosophers such as Cassirer, as also, to mention one of a different school of thought, of C. S. Peirce. The Thomist who would undertake such a confrontation between modern authors and, say, John of St. Thomas, on the theory of signs would render a signal service to Thomism, and discover many points of contact with the moderns, whose exhaustive researches on the subject cannot afford to be neglected.

In general, Cassirer replaces the concept of substance by that of a pure functional unity. He tirelessly inveighs against the notion of substance, and this must be a major bone of contention between him and the Thomist in ontology, as is his idealism in critics. He interprets the history of science and philosophy on the basis of function as opposed to that of substance, and his philosophy is essentially a critical idealistic dynamism, dominated by the logical functions so clearly evident in mathematical science, but striving to take account of the mental functions in other spheres. It is a valiant attempt to transform the narrow scientism of Cohen and Natorp into a broad humanism, while remaining faithful to their general inspiration; but it leaves unsolved all the objections that may be urged against such an idealism. Some of these objections are forcibly put by W. C. Swabey, in his essay "Cassirer's doctrine of the *A Priori*,"

(pp. 121-181) in the name of a realistic and dualistic metaphysics. Subjectivistic systems such as Cassirer's inevitably are to a great extent arbitrary, and present a deformed and one-sided view of thing. The principle of immanence, in itself a groundless assumption and denied by our most primal evidences, is taken for granted; and once the link with objective reality is thus severed, one can only seek within thought itself for a starting-point. The choice of such a privileged function, as of the elements conceived to be invariant and *a priori*., is determined largely by the philosopher's temperament and training. Cohen and Natorp looked to mathematics to provide this, and Cassirer does but extent their position to cover wider realms of thought. If philosophy means rigorous and controlled knowledge of reality, it cannot, without error and mutilation, be whittled down to a mere critical analysis of thought in its dynamic functions, however exact, no more than the philosopher himself can be reduced, as a reality, to his thought-process, or reality to an abstract functional unity. The endeavour to supplant substance by function can only lead in the end, to a substantification of function and the mistaking of symbol for reality. There is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt or symbolized in philosophy, and there is more in life than in logic or in science.

The most interesting, and perhaps the most fruitful researches of the Marburg school concern the philosophy of the sciences, and Cassirer has brought this into line with the most recent scientific theories, with which he is fully conversant. His work in this important field is considered in four essays by Felix Kaufmann, D. Gawronsky, H. R. Smart and K. Lewin, who treat of Cassirer's theory of scientific knowledge, his contribution to the epistemology of physics, his theory of mathematical concepts, and his philosophy of science and the social sciences. Here Cassirer speaks with greater authority, though his views are determined by his idealistic standpoint which, historically, owes so much to the mathematical tendency evident in so many modern philosophers from Descartes onwards.

Cassirer was indeed a man of many parts, sensitive to the appeal of many sciences and different branches of culture, and deeply versed in the history of those disciplines; in such scholarship and exemplary devotion to his calling he may be taken as a model by philosophers, few of whom will be able to equal his erudition. This volume does him full justice, and does honor to its editor and his well-chosen contributors, and deserves a place in the library of every philosopher interested in the thought of the modern world.

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Theology and Evolution. (A Sequel to *Evolution and Theology*). By Various Writers. Edited by E. C. MESSENGER, Ph. D. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1952. Pp. 337 with index. \$4.50.

In 1931 Father Messenger wrote a book entitled *Evolution and Theology*. This work attracted widespread attention and was the occasion of much controversy; some interesting and, for the most part, critical reviews and articles appeared on the subject in English and continental Catholic periodicals. The present work is a collection of some of the more important reviews or articles on the problem then presented together with some original articles and replies to some of his critics. In the concluding chapters of the present work he summarizes the position of his *Evolution and Theology* and restates it in the light of this criticism and in accordance with later developments.

In the Introduction to this volume Father Messenger gives the reason for the present work. *Evolution and Theology* had "a fairly wide distribution throughout the world, but the remaining stocks of copies perished during the air raids on England and in the second world war." Although the copies perished the work made theological history. Prior to its publication "Catholic writers, especially theologians and philosophers had regarded the subject as a very dangerous one." To the author's mind some one would have to risk burning his fingers in probing the subject and he decided to run this risk himself.

The work naturally attracted widespread attention. Some reviewers obviously adopted an attitude of "wait and see." But the author notes, "there was never even the slightest suggestion of any censure on the work by ecclesiastical authority and accordingly, the theologians, or at least some of them, drew the appropriate conclusions."

Now that the original work may be reissued, "I have thought it desirable to accompany it with this other volume, which, though complete in itself, may be looked upon as a sequel to *Evolution and Theology*. Because the work was already in the hands of the printers when the new Papal Encyclical, *Humani Generis*, which deals *inter alia* with the question of evolution, was published, I have added a special section to Chapter XV of Part One." In this section he quotes the words of the Encyclical and discusses their significance, and "willingly disclaims anything I may have written which in any way is not in accordance with it, either in the present or any former work. But a hasty revision has not revealed any need for serious changes or modifications in the present work."

The present work is divided into two parts. The first part, comprising 216 pages, is concerned with *Evolution and Theology* and embraces already published reviews and articles and some new replies. The second part entitled "The Soul of the Unborn Babe" comprises 116 pages and

is a study of animation theories. This section is by Fr. E. C. Messenger, Ph. D., and the late Canon Henry Dorlodot, D. D., D. Sc., together with an article by the Most Reverend Michael Browne, Bishop of Galway.

The relations between evolutionary theory and Catholic theology constitute one of the most delicate of all questions—for the evolutionary theory deals with the origin and development of all things, a subject treated both in Sacred Scripture and in Catholic Tradition, and a question on which modern science claims to have thrown some new light.

Dr. Messenger has studied this problem at great length both in his previous work and in the present volume. Both should be read together. In his previous work he sets forth and explains some general principles. He insists on the authority of the Teaching Church, sets down the sources of revelation and outlines the purpose of the account of creation in Genesis. There follows three sections on the origin of living beings, of the first man and the first woman. In the present volume he treats these same subjects but more in answer to the criticism directed at his conclusions.

In the case of the origin of living beings, the author reviews the Biblical texts, the exegetical and theological tradition and concludes that evolution, as an hypothesis applied to the origin of plants and animals, has won a rightful place in Catholic theology and that a Catholic is free to accept it. In chapters 14 and 15 of the present work the author notes a changed and more favorable attitude towards his evolutionary thesis in the works of some modern theologians. On page 171 after an analysis and comparison of the four editions of the treatise *De Deo Creante* by Père Boyer, S. J., the author concludes that the learned Jesuit has realized "the necessity of modifying long established theses, in view of the progress of modern science, and has not hesitated to adopt a much more tolerant and indeed benevolent attitude towards evolution in general, and a moderate form of the evolution of man. This fact is all the more significant when we bear in mind that the dogmatic theses taught in an institution such as the Gregorian University in Rome must first be approved by the proper ecclesiastical authority. Such approval is doubtless negative in character, but the fact that such change should have been given is an indication of the changed attitude in ecclesiastical circles." Of course, Dr. Messenger also notes that there are some theologians who are resolutely opposed to the idea of the evolution of man in any form and they have made their attitude more and more plain in some recently published works, as P. Daffara, O. P., in his *Cursus manualis Theologiae Dogmaticae ad usum Seminariorum*. Père Boyer, however, in the treatise *De Deo Creante* notes that in the last twenty years certain Catholic writers appear more tolerant of certain forms of evolutionary theories and names the Abbés Bouyssonie, Père Teilhard de Chaudin, the Abbé Breuil, Père Sertillanges, O. P., Père Pinard de la Boullaye, S. J., etc. There is at present a more tolerant

approach to evolutionary theories in the works of certain Catholic apologists, philosophers and theologians. Perhaps this changed attitude has been due to the works of Canon Dorlodot and Dr. Messenger. In this connection, on page 171, Dr. Messenger recalls the significant statement made by the Reverend Dr. Rhodes in his review of the work *Evolution and Theology* in the *Clergy Review* for February 1932: "If the author's thesis is at all widely accepted, and if it receives at least the tacit approbation of ecclesiastical authority, it will be scarcely possible to maintain in future that there is much foundation for attaching any note of theological censure to theories of 'moderate transformism' of plants and the lower animals or to a certain modified transformist theory of the evolution of the human body."

The theory of evolution would not have been so disturbing to people's minds if it had not been applied to man himself, with the more or less avowed purpose of proving that man is only a perfected animal. Here there is a new problem or factor in the question, namely the dignity of man.

But does Catholic doctrine prevent us from extending the theory of evolution to the human body? Is there an essential difference between man and animal, a difference which would prevent the application of Transformism to man in the same way as it is applied to an animal? The Church, in agreement with sound philosophy, affirms that there is such a difference because the human soul is immaterial and spiritual, whereas the animal soul is material. A Catholic, then, cannot accept a theory of evolution which suppresses or denies the creative action of God at the origin of the spiritual principle, the human soul, in man.

The question of the soul of the first man being determined, there remains that of his body. Dr. Messenger, of course, adheres to the conclusions of the critics. He pronounces in favor of evolution—not that he considers this proved, but rather he regards it as a possible hypothesis which has never been condemned by the *magisterium* of the Church. Moreover, he maintains that it can be reconciled without difficulty with the teaching of Sacred Scripture and Tradition.

A Catholic might be drawn to maintain the theory of mitigated evolution for three reasons. The first set of reasons are the scientific reasons. The second are in the psychological order, a desire for a comprehensive formula to explain nature, and the third are apologetic in character, designed to meet the scientist on some common ground. These last two, of course, follow from the first. The scientific case for evolution rests on a cumulative argument, no single element of which is absolutely cogent, as is admitted on page 196. Unbiased critics will agree with this statement of Yves Delage: "I am absolutely convinced that one is or is not an evolutionist, not for reasons drawn from Natural History but by reason of one's philosophical opinions. Were there any scientific hypothesis other

than descent capable of explaining the origin of species, many transformists would abandon their position as insufficiently proved." We may leave the scientists to the care of the philosophers, noting however, that in this connection Père Sertillanges, O. P., in his *St. Thomas d'Aquin*, has stated that Thomism is quite ready for Transformism, when this becomes, scientifically, something more than an hypothesis.

Dr. Messenger is not directly concerned with the arguments for the evolutionary hypothesis that he holds. This was not his purpose in writing these books. Of course, he summarizes the arguments but his aim is rather to clear the ground by showing that neither Sacred Scripture nor Tradition are against the theory of evolution. And Dr. Messenger has neglected none of the factors which might throw light on the question. He examines all the data, the texts of Sacred Scripture, the doctrine of the Fathers, all the decisions of the teaching authority of the Church bearing on the question: the replies of the Biblical Commission the decisions of the Holy Office, and some famous cases, the cases of Mivart, Leroy, Zahn, etc. From this point of view his work will have to be consulted henceforth by any one who wishes to make a study of the relation between evolution and Catholic doctrine.

With regard to Sacred Scripture and the evolution of man he maintains that Sacred Scripture neither teaches nor denies the doctrine. The interpretation of the Scriptural and Patristic texts shows clearly that there is no doctrine properly so-called on the manner of the creation of living beings or of Adam's body. God formed or fashioned man from the slime of the earth and the body of the first woman was formed from the first man. The difficulty is whether the formation of the first woman from the first man can be reconciled with a reasonable theory of evolution. Dr. Messenger thinks that it can be so reconciled, but the explanation does not seem any too satisfactory. Moreover Père Lagrange, on pages 150-152 of this present work, poses a number of questions relative to the formation of the body of Adam and Eve based on the narrative of Genesis and which do not seem capable of being satisfactorily resolved in the evolutionary hypothesis as formulated and explained by Dr. Messenger. To these questions Dr. Messenger makes this reply on page 153: "Père Lagrange would seem to imply that, unless we can answer all the questions which arise if we accept the extension of the evolution theory to the formation of the first human body, it is scarcely worthwhile departing from the literal sense of the narrative in Genesis. That attitude may perhaps be theological, but it is scarcely scientific." Such a rejoinder is scarcely theological or scientific.

There are a number of questions that the work of Dr. Messenger does not, and perhaps cannot, answer. This is but natural; it is not always easy to reconcile intelligent criticism with dogma, nor does this detract from the value of the work. Moreover, Dr. Messenger refers the reader on

the question of the formation of Eve to his reconsideration of the problem in the final chapter of the present work.

The final chapter of the present question, that is, Chapter XV of the first part, is concerned with evolution and theology today, or a re-examination of the problem. The first part of this section is historical. In the past many hard things have been said about this doctrine of mitigated evolution of the human body. Theologians maintained that even the mildest form of it raises grave difficulties both for faith and reason. This ultra-conservative view is still maintained or defended by some theologians, but at the present time there are some theologians and philosophers, as well as exegetes who more or less favor, or at least tolerate some form of evolution as applied to the origin of the first human body.

The second section is exegetical; it involves the whole concept of the nature and consequences of Inspiration and the interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis bearing on this question cannot be determined apart from Catholic doctrine. It is for the Church, the guardian and infallible interpreter of Revelation, to determine the authentic sense of Sacred Scripture. This infallible teaching of the Church is exercised by her *magisterium*, either solemn or ordinary. There is also the non-infallible teaching of the Church. Dr. Messenger discusses this doctrine from the point of view of the *magisterium* of the Church as put forth in the following documents: *Providentissimus Deus*, *Spiritus Paraclitus*, certain decisions of the Biblical Commission, *Divino Aflante Spiritu* and the important letter issued in the name of the Biblical Commission and published in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* for 1948. Such are the official directives issued by the Holy See in recent times and these Dr. Messenger does not depart from in his discussion of the meaning of Genesis in his evolutionary hypothesis.

The third section of this chapter is a recapitulation or re-examination of the conclusion formulated in *Evolution and Theology*. The arguments are the same but formulated in such a way as to answer, at least partially, the objections of the conservative theologians. The impression here at times seems vague; perhaps there are too many needless concessions to science and a theological speculation which is not always entirely satisfactory. The author himself (page 210) suggests "that it is in the highest degree important that theologians should adopt a wise and prudent attitude on all these questions. It is, of course the Church's business to teach the Catholic faith, and as such she is not concerned with natural science. . . . But we must always remember the existence of what St. Albert the Great has so truly called the other Divine Revelation of God in Nature, as studied in the Sciences. The work of adjustment of one and the other is a delicate and difficult task. But it is one which must always be undertaken."

Dr. Messenger concludes this section with a note on that part of the

Papal Encyclical *Humani Generis* which deals with the problems arising out of the theory of Evolution, and the relations between certain ideas and the teaching of the faith. The Pope distinguishes carefully between really established facts of science and hypotheses which have only some scientific foundation. Such hypotheses might be opposed to Divine Revelation directly or indirectly and if so cannot be accepted. Some conjectural opinions, as for instance certain forms of "polygenism," are opposed to Divine Revelation. There are other hypotheses which are not so opposed and they may be examined in the light of the present state of human knowledge and of sacred theology, "provided that the arguments are weighed and judged with due seriousness . . . and provided all are prepared to submit to the judgment of the Church. . . ." But the Pope adds a rebuke: "Some, however, boldly overstep the bounds of this liberty . . . and behave as if the origin of the human body were already certain and demonstrated . . . and as if nothing were contained in the sources of Divine Revelation. . . ." Thus for the first time in history the Holy See has expressed its mind on the question of the evolutionary origin of the human body and has declared that the question is one which is open to research and discussion, subject, however, to certain conditions. There is no reference in *Humani Generis* to the question of the origin of Eve, or rather, as to the manner of her origin from Adam, but Dr. Messenger suggests that perhaps this problem is included in the Holy Father's *Sermo ad Academicos* (page 188), among the questions upon which we must wait for further light.

The second part of this book is a study of Animation Theories. In the Introduction to this part Dr. Messenger notes that the late Canon de Dorlodot in his *Darwinism and Catholic Thought* referred briefly to the two rival theories of the animation of the human embryo, "*the Mediate Animation theory* and the *Immediate Animation theory*." Dr. Messenger had long planned a work in which "*the Mediate Animation theory* should be set forth in its proper light, and not only defended, as a possible view, but vindicated as indeed the only theory consistent both with the facts of modern science and with the established principles of the perennial philosophy." The result is the present study.

To vindicate this thesis Dr. Messenger begins with an outline of Embryology in the light of modern science, a history of Embryology, then passes on to the Embryology of St. Thomas and a history of the *Mediate Animation theory* and the *Immediate Animation theory*. Finally, he outlines briefly the philosophical and theological problems and arguments involved.

According to Dr. Messenger the experimental and observational foundation for the *Immediate Animation theory* was demolished by the discovery that the Graafian follicle (page 242) was not itself the ovum. But even

after this mortal blow to the *Immediate Animation theory* many Catholic philosophers and theologians adhered to it, mainly for theological reasons or difficulties.

The theological difficulties are four. The first difficulty arises from the dogma of the *Incarnation*. According to the defined Catholic Faith, at the moment of the *Incarnation*, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity took to Himself instantaneously, in the womb of Mary, a true and perfect human nature, of a true human body and a true human soul. Thus Faith compels us to accept the *Immediate Animation theory* in the case of the Sacred Humanity of Christ.

The second difficulty arises from the doctrine of the *Immaculate Conception*. This feast is celebrated on the 8th of December and *The Nativity of the Blessed Virgin* on the 8th of September. Because of this and the doctrinal definition of Pius IX the defenders of the *Immediate Animation theory* conclude that it must be accepted, at least in the case of Our Lady.

The third difficulty arises from canonical legislation. The Church in canon 747 ordains that an aborted foetus, of whatever age, is to be baptised.

The fourth difficulty arises from the Church's condemnation of direct abortion on the ground of murder and the use of contraceptive devices on the ground of child-murder, which implies that the human soul is present from the first moment of conception.

These difficulties are considered in various chapters of the present work. These and other difficulties are also considered in a formal answer to objections against the *Mediate Animation theory* in chapter 8 by the late Canon de Dorlodot.

Dr. Messenger in his summation pleads "for a reconsideration of the matter, and for a frank and impartial consideration of the grounds upon which so many modern Catholic philosophers and theologians now prefer the old *Mediate Animation theory* to the comparatively new *Immediate one*." His conclusion is less restricted than his thesis for he concludes that the question is still quite open. It may be theoretically but not practically, it would seem, in view of canon 747. Perhaps canon 747 is not a doctrinal decision, but when it comes to the matter of administering the sacrament of Baptism the Church insists that we act on the theory that the soul is infused at the moment of conception.

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The Existentialists: A Critical Study. By James Collins. Chicago: Regnery, 1952. Pp. 268 with index. \$4.50.

The Existentialist Revolt. By Kurt F. Reinhardt. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952. Pp. 254 with index. \$3.50.

Catholic scholars have long held the very front ranks in the task of interpreting and assessing the existentialists. Dialectical materialism has had several champions in Europe and one in this country to come to grips with one or other of the recent existentialists, and idealism has had a few stalwarts like de Ruggiero and Kraenzlin to oppose the new generation of Kierkegaardians; from the viewpoint of the contemporary logicians, Carnap and Ayer have taken issue with Heidegger in rather minor skirmishes, while the typical American naturalist has generally ignored even the incisive criticism of Jaspers despite the clues of Marjorie Grene in *Dreadful Freedom* that there is a rapprochement between certain phases of existentialism and of pragmatism. Catholics, on the other hand, can stake a claim to an effective literature on the subject of the existentialists, in nearly all languages.

Dr. Collins and Dr. Reinhardt have now supplied the English-speaking world with worthy successors to the books of European Catholics like Haecker, Moeller, Lotz, De Waele, de Tonquedec, and Jolivet. Both Collins and Reinhardt have brought to their work the tools of long study and reflection on existentialism. Writing in numerous American reviews, Collins has been helpful for more than a decade in interpreting existentialists for Catholics in this country; besides his recent studies of existentialism from afar, Reinhardt is a former student of Husserl, Heidegger, and Jaspers. Both authors have studied the existentialists with understanding and sympathy and the ambition to find positive achievements. Comparing existentialists and philosophers like Augustine and Aquinas, Collins says in his preface: "All these men are occupied with the same generic sort of problems, the problems of existing men, despite the enormous differences in historical situation and technique." Reinhardt's preface says, "It has long been the author's conviction (which he shares with many contemporary Thomists) that in their emphasis (and often over-emphasis) on the concrete 'historicity' of human existence and in their revolt against an abstract 'essentialism' (or idealism), the modern 'existentialists' may aid in the rediscovery of long-forgotten or neglected philosophic truths."

Both of these useful volumes cover roughly the same terrain: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, and Heidegger. The first three form the introductory chapter in Collins' work but appear in the main body of Reinhardt's. Collins treats Heidegger last on the grounds that the greatest potentiality for positive progress in existentialism lies here; Reinhardt follows the more usual order in books of this sort by culminating his historical treatment with Marcel. The similarity of these two books is further emphasized by the concluding chapters in each, "The

Thematic Structure of Existentialism" (Reinhardt) and "Five Existential Themes." (Collins) Each volume contains a bibliography; in the case of the Collins book, there are helpful subdivisions in terms of the sources, translations, and studies appropriate to the philosophers treated. Unfortunately, Collins' publisher has chosen to consign the illuminating footnotes to the rear of the book to make the scholarly reading of a work of this sort more difficult than it would normally be. Each of the two books has a combined index of topics and names.

But despite their mechanical similarities, these two welcome volumes do more than overlap; they supplement each other in presentation, in emphasis, and in critical comment. Collins, for instance, shows throughout a philosophical mood that will recommend his book to those already familiar with existentialism; Reinhardt's work shows greater, though not over-burdening, attention to historical and biographical factors and will be of use to the uninitiated as well as to the scholar. Collins takes frequent occasion to point up problems that existentialism cannot answer or that the Thomist can answer better; Reinhardt's evaluations are broader and more general. Both authors seem agreed that the chief contribution of existentialism so far has been to recall philosophy to the concrete; they seem hopeful that there may be a common ground between this central inspiration of modern existentialism and the Thomistic existentialism emphasized by Phelan, Maritain, and Gilson.

In both volumes, Sartre's philosophy is called "a postulatory atheism." Collins argues that Sartre has made a double option: one for Nietzsche's atheism and one for Husserl's autonomous phenomenology. This comparison, though not so pointedly, appears also in Reinhardt. Both books are concerned to honor the differences between Sartre and Heidegger and to show that the god denied by existentialism is the god of Hegel or Leibniz but not the God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In his critical remarks on Sartre, Collins argues: "He consistently merges the view that our knowledge of a contingent existence cannot be derived from knowledge of a prior principle with the quite different contention that the existence of the primal modes of being require no cause." (pp. 62-63) Reinhardt's criticism lists the "postulatory and unproven" premises of Sartre's thought.

In dealing with Jaspers, Collins finds traces of Descartes but not of Husserl and links Jaspers with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche through the doctrine of transcendence roughly common to all three. Jaspers' existentialism is further portrayed as "an attempt to chart the course of Kantian reason in the encircling sea of Kierkegaardian existence." (p. 92) Reinhardt groups Jaspers with Marcel and Kierkegaard in a common doctrine that allows man to appear as "*capax Dei*." "Much of what Jaspers says concerning God, transcendence, and reality," according to Reinhardt (p. 191), "follows at least in part the traditional doctrines of Christian philosophy and theology." Collins would seem to concur, at least partially, in this appraisal. (p. 104)

In dealing with Marcel, Reinhardt writes, "Philosophy is for Marcel a phenomenological analysis with an ontological goal." (p. 206) Collins uses as one of his devices to present Marcel the Bergsonian distinction between *la pensée pensée* and *la pensée pensante*. (p. 122) Both authors are in accord that of all the existentialists Marcel has the greatest respect for sensation and the reality of the human body. Collins makes the explicit conclusion that there seems to be no room in Kierkegaard for any kind of philosophy of nature, and no doubt the same verdict could be passed against the other existentialists as well. Yet Marcel does come the closest of all to the traditional views of matter and form.

The somewhat mysterious and rather elusive doctrines on God to be found in the recent Heidegger are dealt with in both books. In Reinhardt's judgment, "There is no doubt that Heidegger has a high esteem for Christian theology, although he insists that it refrain from engaging in purely philosophical and metaphysical argumentation." (p. 154) In Collins' words, Heidegger "is not ruling out God from his philosophy but is literally rendered speechless before the task of treating of Him in a way consistent with his criticism of Scholastic ontology." (p. 160)

By their titles alone, the concluding chapters of these volumes will invite the most interest from a Thomist glancing at the tables of contents. Their structures are prompted by the prudent desire of both authors to make no over-hasty definition of existentialism but rather to allow such a summary to grow as an inductive conclusion from their previous chapters. For Reinhardt, the common ground of all the existentialists is a general nine-fold doctrine of subjective truth; estrangement; existential anguish and nothingness; existence and nothingness; existence and "the others"; situation and "limit situation"; temporality and historicity; existence and death; existence and God. Five themes which Collins discerns deal with the venture of philosophizing; descriptive metaphysics; man in the world; man and fellow man; man and God. It is at the beginning of his last chapter that Reinhardt makes his strongest comparison of the existentialists and Thomists by citing *De Ente et Essentia* and Maritain's *Existence and the Existent*.

The recent silence of the existentialists, except for Jaspers' logic and Marcel's Gifford Lectures, would seem to indicate something of a crisis in existentialism itself. Heidegger has produced only minor essays since *Sein und Zeit*, and Sartre's recent public activity has been confined to the theatre. There may be a hint here that existentialism has gone as far as its potential could take it and that new and different directions may be expected. The Collins and the Reinhardt books, by the fairness of their expositions and the soundness of their counter-proposals, will be useful guides to all who hope that the existentialist excesses will not reach American shores.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Satan. Edited by Père BRUNO DE JESUS-MARIE, O. C. D. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952. Pp. 531. \$5.50.

This volume is a collection of essays on Satan, and is a translation of a volume of the same title appearing in the series "Etudes Carmelitaines" (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1948) to which several other articles have been added. As it is impossible to give an account of each article, we shall discuss only those which seem to require special mention. The volume is divided into four parts: the first deals with Satan himself and his operations, the second with pagan notions on the devil, the third with possession, the "psychological devil," and the fourth with the devil in art and literature.

The first article is a fine presentation of the Thomistic doctrine on Satan, ably written by the late Fr. Walter Farrell, O.P., and deals with the nature of Satan himself, explaining what is meant by his being a fallen angel, and discussing his powers as a spiritual being, the highest of the creatures. There is also a clear exposition of St. Thomas' teaching on the nature of the sin of Satan. This is certainly one of the most valuable articles in the entire volume.

When the impossibility of sins of carnal lust in the angels is mentioned as a part of the Thomistic teaching (pp. 12-13), it would have been interesting to have found an explanation of several puzzling passages of St. Thomas. Difficulties in this regard arose from the interpretation of Genesis 6:2 as referring to the angels (also, among some Fathers, Jude 6-7 were so interpreted) having sexual relations with women. At one point St. Thomas seems to admit this interpretation (*II Sent.* d. 8, q. 4, qcla. 1, a. 2, and sol. 2, ed. Mandonnet, II, pp. 212-213), though he later appears to reject it (*Summa Theol.* I, q. 51, a. 3, ad 6). Yet, in both texts, the Angelic Doctor speaks of the angels taking on 'assumed bodies'—and this presents difficulties as to the nature of the bodies assumed and as to the mode of assumption. The explanation of the possibility of the devil's sexual relations is a rather puzzling one.

Furthermore, it might have been well in this section of the book to have made some mention of the history of the doctrine of the absolute spirituality of the angels, especially in view of the sharp criticism of St. Thomas offered by P. de Lubac (*Surnaturel*, Paris: Aubier, 1946, pp. 214-219 especially). It would seem that a great many Fathers held only a relative spirituality (or relative corporeity) in regard to the angels. That this may have been the opinion (personal or private, not official) of the

majority of the Fathers at the Second Council of Nicea (787) may be evidenced by the letter of John of Thessalonica, advocating the liceity of paintings of the Angels (Mansi, t. XIII, 166). In any case, this matter is not discussed in this volume.

The next article by Fr. Bernard Leeming, S. J., is well-done and informative, in a discussion of the role of Satan, the adversary of God and man, the tempter to sin. The most detailed study of Satan's power, however, is to be found in the next contribution, by P. J. de Tonquédec, S. J. On page 43 (and note 3) the author seems a bit strong on the extent of the devil's activity, but restricts himself on the following page to the conclusion of St. Thomas. Satan's role in influencing collective decisions is mentioned, but unfortunately not determined more exactly than to point out general principles. The author believes that no one, without exceptional privilege, escapes the temptations of the devil himself (p. 48), but he gives no definite theological substantiation for this statement, which must then be taken as a personal opinion. On the whole, he maintains a well-balanced position between the extremes of seeing Satan himself everywhere and of scepticism as to his activity.

Part III is devoted to the question of possession and exorcism. By far the finest article in this section is that of F. X. Maquart on the signs of possession and the use of the rite of exorcism. Adhering closely to the *Roman Ritual*, the author carefully explains the natural, preternatural and supernatural, and the basis of their distinction; he rightly deplores the "naïve credulity" of the "ecclesiastical world" in attributing to direct diabolical influence especially psychic manifestations which are rather to be explained by the science of psychiatry. The question to be asked, he states, is "normal or abnormal?" not "virtuous or vicious?" The article repays a careful and thoughtful study.

The author of the following article, Jean Vichon, seems not to have read Maquart's article, or else to be in complete disaccord with it. He proposes as signs of possession a number of symptoms which he could easily have observed in psychopathologically disturbed persons. The one characteristic found in possessed persons is "aggressive impulsiveness" (p. 206), and the "two fundamental obsessions of the possessed" are those of "moral solitude" and "guilt." (p. 208) The author just mentions the psychic origin of the guilt-obsession (p. 208), but then considers it a sign of possession (pp. 210-211). The author would have done well to have consulted an expert in the field of psychiatry on the symptoms of hysteria and of the obsessive-compulsive neuroses. It seems to be certainly unscientific, not to say dangerous and misleading, to give such pathological symptoms as signs of possession. No mention is made of the solid and theologically sound criteria explained by Maquart.

The following article deals with diabolic influence in mission lands. As

the author, Dom Kilger, O.S.B., is a member of a missionary Congregation, one looks for evidence of diabolic activity which can be scientifically established. He asserts that the devil's influence in mission lands is great. If this is so, we could expect, instead of a detailed description of the rather fantastic experiences of three Capuchin missionaries in the 16th century court of Queen Nzinga in Japan, an account of diabolic activity in more recent times, and thus more easily subject to scientific historical examination. The author's assertion of diabolic influence in mission territories is not substantiated by his article—"quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur."

The next article, on the case of Jeanne Fery, also describes an occurrence in the sixteenth century. The author, Pierre Debongnie, C. SS. R., makes some attempts to establish the historicity of his narrative, but after forty somewhat tedious pages of detailed description and dialogue, we are left with the question: was all of this pathological or diabolical? The author's only answer is that it may have been both. It seems certain that some more recent, and more easily verifiable, accounts of possession would have given a more scientific character to this section of the book. One could also have mentioned examples of diabolic activity in the lives of some more recent saints—here, at least, we could be sure that no serious pathological states were present.

The article of the distinguished French physician, Jean Lhermitte, is carefully done, and attempts some psychiatric conclusions, a summary of which is to be found on page 299. It may be remarked here that what seems to be needed is a truly scientific and detailed study of psychoneurotic and psychotic states in which are found many symptoms often naively attributed to Satan. The lack of such a study, to parallel Maquart's fine theological article, is a true lacuna, and decreases the value of the volume.

While the volume is to be praised and recommended for some fine articles, it is unfortunate that others have been included which can only serve to confuse the very important subjects which are discussed.

Le Sacrifice du Corps Mystique. By Chanoine EUGENE MASURE. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950. Pp. 206. 65 fr. B.

Calvary and Community. By M. HARRINGTON. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951. Pp. 329. \$4.00.

Although these two works are dissimilar in form and content, not to mention language, they have an important common denominator which justifies their being reviewed together. The first, a further elaboration of Canon Masure's well-known "sacramental" theory to explain the essence of the Sacrifice of the Mass (*Le Sacrifice du Chef*, translated into

English by Dom Iltyd Threthowan as *The Christian Sacrifice*, and expounded in popular style by the latter in *Christ and The Liturgy*, Sheed & Ward, 1951), is straight theology, while the second is best described as devotional commentary upon theology; yet both are preoccupied with the tremendous depth of meaning and spiritual utility inherent in this aspect of the Mass. Indeed, the good Canon is himself moved to remark, in the final sentence of his exhaustive and painstaking analysis, that "the faithful have a right to know the riches of their Missal: what an immense task to accomplish!" Fortunately, the latter's own theological zeal and acumen, together with the efforts of others of his school, are inspiring devotional treatises like Miss Harrington's in increasing number and variety, which aim to clarify and apply, for the average Catholic, the profounder and more speculative aspects of this Euchology.

In its turn, the latter may be summed up under the heading of that newer and fresh approach to the understanding of the Mystery of Faith which has been greatly stimulated by the monumental work of Père de la Taille, together with the researches of Dom Odo Casel and the expositions of Abbot Vonier as well as the present author's. "Newer" that is, in comparison with the conventional interpretations fathered by Lessius and De Lugo, that have held sway since the late nineteenth century; but in reality, of far more venerable origin, as ancient indeed (if the author is correct) as the Missal itself, in particular its *Secret* and *Postcommunion* prayers which so often seem to be based upon it.

As an appropriate starting-point for his study, Canon Masure draws attention to the complete silence of *Mediator Dei* in reference to the so-called "destructionist" theory as upheld by the opposing school, and to its definitely discernible if cautious leaning in the direction of this more ancient interpretation. Then he proceeds to a re-examination of the latter as formulated by himself in previous statements, but now in the light of the Encyclical's implications and affirmations; and adduces further evidence for his conclusions from other reputable sources ancient and modern. In his view, the crux of the problem lies in explaining exactly what it is that a "sacramental sign" is capable of producing, effecting *ex opere operato*. In the case of the Eucharist, this is simply, Christ's Sacrifice; but with all its vast implications, its totality as *Opus Redemptionis*. Thus the Mass can legitimately be called the "sacrament" of Christ's Sacrifice: it not only makes Him really present in our midst, or more accurately makes us present with Him, but does this in relation to Him *as sacrificing and sacrificed*. Calvary is "made present" again through the Sign of the Eucharist, minus indeed its historic "bloody" details, but yet in its true identity, its actual reality, "*in mysterio*."

The engaging possibilities of this interpretation, especially for purposes of practical piety are, of course, obvious, as already stated; and indeed, are clearly indicated in *Mediator Dei* itself.

Pending an English translation of this stimulating treatise by Canon Masure, which we devoutly hope will not be long in appearing, we shall have to be satisfied with the more popular orientations deriving from his theory (and the similar expressions of it given by Billot, Casel, Vonier et al.) such as the second volume under review. It covers about the same territory, theologically speaking, as that of *Le Sacrifice du Chef*, having as its focal point of interest the Sacrifice of Calvary, made present on our altars by means of the sacramental sign that is the Eucharistic rite; but written to edify rather than instruct, to enthuse rather than to inform. In a series of meditative reflections upon the totality of Eucharistic doctrine, from its ancient Hebrew types down to the historic setting and then the mystical re-enactment, the author brings to bear a wealth of imagery and moral (especially social) application upon the central Mystery, viz. that "sacrificial sacrament, or rather sacrifice in a sacrament . . . (which contains) the sacrifice of Calvary." (p. 223) At times the commentary tends to become overly sentimental, too prolix in the use of analogy; and at times there appears to be some mixing of the two meanings of "sacrament" in reference to the Eucharist: the stricter one connoting the Real Presence, and the broader one connoting the Real and sacrificial Presence.

Beyond this minor criticism however, and after voicing regret that Miss Harrington did not grasp with both hands the golden opportunity presented by her material for advocating the cause of active popular participation (in the sense envisioned by *Mediator Dei*) in holy Mass, we welcome this inspirational and not uninstructional aid to Eucharistic piety from the pen of another Englishwoman who writes with insight and distinction.

Aristotle's De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by KENELM FOSTER, O.P., and SILVESTER HUMPHRIES, O.P., with an Introduction by Ivo THOMAS, O.P. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. Pp. 504. \$6.50.

We again have the opportunity, in the pages of *THE THOMIST* to welcome another translation of one of St. Thomas' Commentaries on Aristotle—this time, that on the "De Anima," which is of such importance not only to psychology but also to epistemology.

The translation itself is based on the Pirotta (Marietti) Latin edition. The translators have sought to make the text congenial to the modern reader by dint of much "excision and compression" (pp. 5-6) without sacrificing anything which would prevent a true comprehension of this

work. The reader who follows the Latin text along with this translation, must take this intention of the translators into account. This procedure, while having its disadvantages, has the benefit of presenting the analytical text of St. Thomas in a form more easily comprehended by the modern reader. In spite of minor difficulties in some passages, the rendering is faithful, and may be safely used by the student. The translators did not aim at the establishment of a definitive critical text, but rather at making available in good, readable English this important work.

The translation is preceded by an Introduction by Fr. Ivo Thomas, O. P., and discusses the nature of a Thomistic commentary, the date of this one, gives a brief summary of the Averroist problem (of the "intellectus agens separatus,") and of the Aristotelian method of definition, and treats of several particularly difficult passages in some detail.

In the first section, in discussing the nature of St. Thomas' method of commenting on Aristotle, Fr. Thomas rightly notes that the aim was not a merely historical or philological exposition, but the "exposition of an inquiry composed within a living tradition still vitally active in speculation." (p. 15) He states that it is the text itself which is explained and points out that the Aristotelian notion of science provides the basis for the method adopted. Perhaps the writer did not have available Chenu's excellent *Introduction à L'Etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montréal, and Paris, 1950), but for the reader desirous of gaining a fuller and perhaps clearer notion of St. Thomas' Commentaries the remarks of P. Chenu should be of great help (vid. especially pp. 173-183).

In dealing with the date of this Commentary, the position of Marcel de Corte is rejected, and Fr. Thomas relies on the studies of Pelster and A. Mansion for his conclusion that the proper date should be about 1271. Thus, the latest and most valuable studies are employed. Chenu, it seems, would hold the opinion of de Corte. (p. 186 and n. 2)

In the section on the Averroist issue it is strange to find no reference to the excellent study of F. Nuyens (*L' Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote*, Louvain, 1948), which, in the opinion of this reviewer, supersedes that of de Corte, on whom Fr. Thomas greatly relies. Nuyens could also have been mentioned in the section on difficult passages, especially with regard to the sixth one (pp. 34 ff.), on which the Louvain scholar has a useful commentary (pp. 296-308). There is no reference either to the differences of opinion on Aristotle's "De Anima," between de Corte and Jaeger.

The brief section on the Aristotelian method of definition should certainly have contained a reference to the solid and excellent studies of P. M.-R. Roland-Gosselin, O. P. ("Les méthodes de la définition d'après Aristote," in *Rev. Sc. Phil. et Théol.*, VI, 1912, pp. 236-252, and 661-675).

In general the Introduction is a bit over-technical, especially if the volume is intended for a public of non-scholastics. The reader may be

referred again to Chenu's work written in a more readable form and offering a more complete and valuable introduction (especially Chaps. V and VI).

We are, however, most grateful to Fr. Thomas and to the translators, as well as to the Yale University Press, for making available such a fine work, which should find its place among the "tools" not only of Thomists but of all who are seriously interested in the philosophical problems of psychology.

Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior. The Hixon Symposium. Edited by LLOYD A. JEFFRES. New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1951. Pp. 325 with index. \$6.50.

The Hixon Fund, granted to the California Institute of Technology, serves to support scientific endeavor offering promise of an increased understanding of human behavior. It sponsored the symposium of which this volume is the detailed report. Papers were read by J. von Neumann on "The general theory of automata," by W. S. McCulloch, "Why the mind is in the head," by K. S. Lashley, "The problem of serial order in behavior," by H. Klüver, "Functional differences between the occipital and temporal lobes with special reference to the interrelations of behavior and extracerebral mechanisms," by W. Köhler, "Relational determination in perception," by W. C. Halstead, "Brain and Intelligence," and by H. W. Brosin, "The symposium from the viewpoint of a clinician." Each paper is followed by a lengthy discussion which adds many further facts and ideas. Indexes of names and of subjects are appended.

The highly technical nature of the problems and their presentation forbid an extensive report on the contents of this volume. The brevity of the review, however, must not be interpreted as indicative of a lack of significance also for the non-specialist, least of all for the philosopher. The latter ought particularly take cognizance of the recent advances in factual studies and the development in the field of theory. This is necessary both because it is the task of philosophy to integrate within its framework all knowledge available and because the exposition and justification of any "philosophy of the mind" cannot be effective unless it take account of the actual state of knowledge. A fruitful discussion of the various aspects of the mind-body problem is impossible if one part fails to consider known facts and current ideas or bases his argument on views which have become obsolete.

Apart from the special problems discussed in this symposium, there is a general one which deserves attention. It is formulated and discussed in a masterly manner by Dr. v. Neumann. One may state it as that of the relations obtaining between purely logical and mathematical speculation on

one hand and the construction and interpretation of computers, automata, and also the organism on the other. It is of great interest to realize how, by means of collaboration and "team-work" such theoretical speculations prove to be eminently practical.

The participants of the symposium are outstanding men, doing research work in several fields. They are not philosophers and they do not wander off into the realm of philosophical speculation. The evaluation of their findings and ideas will be up to the philosopher. He will discover much that will force him to reconsider some of his ideas or, at least, how to reformulate them. He may also find, here and there, a corroboration of his own conceptions. One example may be given. In the discussion on Dr. McCulloch's paper mention is made of the fact that the continuous alpha-waves, in the electroencephalographic tracing, disappear when a stimulus reaches the eye. However, as Dr. Gerard pointed out, the situation is more complicated. Even a strong and patterned stimulus leaves the alpha waves unchanged if the subject deliberately pays no attention to it. "Then, with no change except what I can describe in no other way than as directing my attention to the light," the waves can be made to disappear. (p. 94.) Another rather significant remark was made, in the same discussion, by Dr. Brosin: "we have wandered, he said, . . . over a number of hierarchies—the molecular, the neuronal, the cerebral—and the question has arisen whether we need something beyond—the man or the observer."

It deserves to be pointed out that the eminent scholars, when discussing their problems, give evidence of a notable modesty. They are no longer sure, as their predecessors were not so long ago, that they will have in their hands the answer to all questions, to-morrow or next year. They wisely refrain from passing over into the field of philosophy; but one gets the impression that, at least, some are quite aware of questions which transcend their own field.

The study of the book is earnestly recommended to everyone desirous of forming and defending an opinion on the pertinent problems.

Thomistic Philosophy. By HENRI GRENIER, Ph. D., S. T. D., J. C. D. Translated by Rev. J. P. O'HANLEY, Ph. D. Charlottetown: St. Dunstan's University, 1950. Vol. I, *Logic*, pp. 263; Vol. II, *Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 320; Vol. III, *Metaphysics*, pp. 388; Vol. IV, *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 498.

The superb merits of the latin version of this manual were presented in *The Thomist* (vol. IX, 1946, p. 465) by Dr. Ignatius McGuinness, O. P. In that review the hope was voiced that the proposed English translation would do justice to the original work. Dr. O'Hanley, the translator, has

realized this hope and has given to the collegiate world a very desirable textbook in Thomistic Philosophy.

It was the college student that the translator had in mind in undertaking his work. He should be consoled by the fact that a dozen or more colleges in the United States have already adopted the translation as their official text.

The advantages of this work as a collegiate text in Philosophy are manifold. It is solid in its Thomism and has the additional merit of deemphasizing subtle and confusing disputations on problems that often are inconsequential. It is succinct in presentation and leaves plenty of room for the elaboration of expositions by the teacher. It is genuinely scholastic in its devotion to definition and division in every area of philosophy, a fact that experience shows is deeply appreciated by the average college student of philosophy. It will help to eliminate a common result of some contemporary teaching of philosophy, a wide and superficial reading of philosophical literature without steady concentration on and organized mastery of basic philosophical truth.

The formal method prevailing in this text demands a rigid mental discipline that may cause some to recoil from it. Also the limited examples presented in illustration of basic truths may lead others to conclude that the text is dry. Others may be disappointed that the text does not follow the usual pattern of appending to each chapter a list of suggested reading linking Thomistic doctrine with contemporary thought and doctrine.

The text is substantial and one can be assured that in colleges where it is adopted and used intelligently the students of philosophy will have a solid knowledge of the field.

The March Toward Matter, Descensus Averno. By JOHN MACPARTLAND.
New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 80. \$2.75.

The author of this essay has made a fully sincere attempt to deal with a real problem, that of a rapprochement to be effected between the Thomistic criteriology and the theories of knowledge prevalent among modern Idealists and Instrumentalists. He seeks to show the Thomistic doctrine of knowledge as an immanent act to be a solution for the materialization (the production of otherness, by synthesis, addition or by division) of the mind, toward which many modern theories lead. (Chap. I).

This theme is developed by treating of the 'intellectus' and 'ratio' in Chap. II—this distinction, and the emphasis on 'intellectus' would provide a check to modern over-emphasis on 'ratio,' which is an evidence of the march toward matter, and division. Chapter III discusses the intentional union of subject and object in knowledge as a remedy for the

"speculator" or "copy" theories of knowledge. The value and need of metaphysics forms part of Chapter IV, and is based on the doctrine of abstraction ('Formalis' and 'totalis') as the epistemological basis for the queen of the sciences. Chapter V. among other questions considers Kant as an exponent of the materialization of the mind by the synthetic, additive operation of the categories, and Descartes is seen as exemplifying the divisive type of materialization (cf. above, on Chap. I). The next chapter points out that a rapprochement can be made between Thomism and those who, affected by Kantianism or Cartesianism, still grope for a proper outlook. Thomism is seen to be of special value in dealing with the questions of the "speculator" view of knowledge, the passivity of the intellect, and the divorce of knowledge from action. (p. 76)

Unfortunately, the author's treatment of these interesting and important questions seems quite confused. There appears to be some confusion between the immaterial and the intentional (*esse immateriale* and *esse intentionale*). The author seems to oversimplify the problem of the intellect's grasp on being (this, in part at least, because he feels Kant presents only a false problem), and to minimize the necessary 'materialization' and 'rationalization' of the human mind. He misunderstands the true Thomistic notion of abstraction and its role (due, perhaps, to too much reliance on Maritain), and thus does not see the importance of "separatio" for metaphysics (vid. Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après S. Thomas," in *Rev. Sc. Phil. et Théol.* XXXI, 1947, pp. 3-40).

The general criticism, however, is that the author has attempted to deal with such intricate matters not only in so short a space, but without the real scientific background that is called for. To the non-scholastic the understanding of the author's thesis would be very difficult, and the scholastic reader, while recognizing the importance of the subject and the general scheme of the author, would be impressed by the somewhat confused presentation.

The system of foot-note references is very poor in many cases, with no indication of full title, date and place of publication, etc. Many technical terms are introduced without explanation. Some passages are examples of how one is not to translate technical Latin phrases: "The *reason to be* of metaphysics is that it treats being under an aspect which the other sciences do not consider. That aspect is being qua being, or being in virtue of *its first to be* . . ." (p. 54—Italics mine). On p. 23, mention is made of Descartes' "universalis mathematicis" which, if in the dative case, should read "universalibus"—at least, the present form is not Latin.

It is unfortunate that such problems should have received this treatment, and we may hope that the author will continue his studies and, at some time in the future, produce a more useful work.

Actas del Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía. Edited by LUIS JUAN GUERRERO. Mendoza, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1950. Three Volumes, pp. 2197.

These volumes record the proceedings of the first of the philosophical congresses to be held quadrennially in Argentina under the joint auspices of the government and the national universities. Perhaps, the present congress would have been more fittingly described as "international" rather than "national," because in the perusal of the list of participants one discovers philosophers from twenty countries representing seventy-three universities and institutes.

The scope of this congress was as wide as philosophy itself. This extensiveness precluded an opportunity for all the philosophers invited to utilize their talents in the intensive research, thought and discussion of one major philosophical problem. An attempt at community of effort, however, was made in the five Plenary Sessions which, in turn, were devoted to: The Philosophy of the Life of the Spirit, The Human Person, Existentialism, Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophy and the City of Man. In the closing session the entire Congress adopted resolutions recommending a wider exchange of philosophical ideas, especially by American philosophers who should take upon themselves the leadership of this undertaking. The Congress affirmed that "in the search of an integral interpretation of the human being, besides the corporeal which explains its radical relation with the world, the spiritual explanation is no less necessary to account for man's transcendental destiny, namely the Supreme Being to Whom the human being ought to tend by its free activity."

At thirteen specialized group meetings 184 papers were read and discussed. Of these, a large number dealt with the Existentialist movement. Perhaps, a dozen papers could be classified as Thomistic in orientation and doctrine. Among the recognized Thomists present or participating by means of papers submitted were: Father R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., Charles de Koninck, Father J. Todolí, O. P., O. N. Derisi, D. Labrousse.

Of special interest is the work of Argentina's philosophers, who read over one hundred papers and communications. One cannot but conclude in light of their works that the philosophical disciplines in the Argentine universities have made great progress in the past several decades, and they have produced thinkers worthy of the name. One gets the impression that there is an underlying effort aimed at producing an Argentine national philosophy, a counterpart, or reflection of that country's endeavors in the political sphere.

Mention must be made of the North American contribution to the congress. Seven representatives presented twelve papers: half of these were historical in content, two on phases of Existentialism, the others on

Aristotelianism, anthropology, axiology and theology. Noteworthy is the inexplicable omission of representatives from Catholic Universities in the United States. It is to be hoped that this oversight will be corrected by the organizing committee of the Second Argentine Philosophical Congress in 1953.

Kinships. By A. G. SERTILLANGES, O.P. Translated by the Dominican Nuns of Menlo Park, New York: McMullen, 1952. Pp. 239. \$2.95.

The late Père Sertillanges was certainly one of the most, if not the most fluent modern exponents of Thomism, as well as being one of the foremost of Catholic apologists. Unfortunately he is not too well known in this country, even, strange as it may seem, among graduates in philosophy from Catholic universities. It is a pleasure, therefore, to be able to welcome a translation of another of his spiritual books, written as a part of his apologetical work. So often spiritual books have either a good style of presentation with little solid doctrine, or else present substantial doctrine in unpalatable form. Into neither of these categories could one place the spiritual writings of Père Sertillanges whose almost lyric style is a delight to all who are acquainted with his works, even in philosophy, and whose doctrine is that of one thoroughly imbued with Scripture and St. Thomas. This happy combination of style and doctrine results in a truly worthwhile spiritual book.

Kinships deals with charity, and with man's relations to God, to self and to others. The Thomistic reader will recognize on every page the thought of the "Doctor Communis" expressed in terms both attractive and accurate. The theme of the book is the central Thomistic moral doctrine on the primacy of charity and love, and the author's practical suggestions for daily application flow from solid doctrine and indicate a course of life directed and inspired by the noblest of the virtues in man's relations to God, society and to self. Of special value are the reflections (pp. 127-156) on self-love and its relation to the all-embracing love for God.

While wishing to express our gratitude to the translators and the publisher for making available this work of Sertillanges, we may take the opportunity of voicing the hope that, in the near future, some more of this author's serious philosophical works will also be published in English. *Kinships* may be recommended to all who, in the quantity of modern spiritual literature, are seeking something of more solid worth.

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